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Abstract 
Today elections and referendums are contested across multiple media 
platforms working in tandem, including traditional media, particularly 
television, and digital outlets including social media. While in the past citizens 
had limited opportunities to engage directly with political campaigns, today 
these new channels offer a wide variety of ways to interact with the public, 
media and politicians. Televised debates in particular are accompanied by vast 
amounts of online content, much of it conducted through the use of second 
screens—personal devices, such as smartphones, tablets, and laptops used 
alongside television broadcasts.  
This research has been motivated by the belief that second screens present an 
invaluable opportunity to engage the public in political discourse. They can 
give debate viewers a platform to engage with each other, find factual 
campaign information and facilitate social movements. However, recent 
research has been critical of the way social media in particular supports 
political discourse. So-called “fake news” hinders our ability to find factual 
information, filter bubbles limit the scope of opinions we are exposed to, while 
fear of trolling creates a barrier to online participation. In order to understand 
the issues and opportunities for second screens, we need to investigate how 
and why the public uses them, and where they fit into this wider media 
landscape. 
In this thesis I aim to investigate current second screen practices, and to find 
design opportunities for tools that support viewers in their engagement with 
debates and with each other. I utilise a varied methodological approach in 
order to gather insights from a variety of different stakeholders and from the 
real-life situational context of debate viewing. I investigate current second 
screen practices through at-home observations and an analysis of tweets 
generated live during a debate, which contribute insights into how and why 
debate viewers use their personal devices. I further explored the role of new 
technologies in fostering social experiences for debate viewers. Through an in-
the-wild deployment of a series of internet-connected research products I 
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contribute considerations for future solutions and challenge the dominance of 
traditional screen-based interactions. Through speculative designs, 
workshops, and interviews, I contribute design directions for future second 
screen tools. I achieve this by investigating viewer and expert perspectives on 
the larger issues with political discourse online and how they can be addressed 
through second screens. The findings from these studies aim to generate 
considerations for existing social media platforms, politicians, and 
broadcasters, and inform the development and design of new second screens, 
which cater to the needs of the debate audience.   
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1. Introduction
Since the airing of the first ever TV election debate during the 1960 US 
presidential election, between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, 
technology has come to dominate the way politicians engage with the public. 
Social media in particular plays an increasingly significant role: it is used by 
politicians as a platform to campaign, inform, and directly engage with the 
electorate. Televised debates are watched by millions of viewers who are often 
encouraged to join in on the debate discussions online through the use of a 
hashtag. As a result, debates are accompanied by vast amounts of online 
activity on social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter (Al-Deen 
and Hendricks, 2012, Bruns and Burgess, 2011). This audience generated 
activity is enabled through the use of personal devices, or second screens, such as 
smartphones, tablets and laptops (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015).  
Technology has much to contribute to the political sphere, with many 
governments now embracing digital technologies or even redesigning the 
legislative process with the aid of crowdsourcing and online deliberation tools 
(Mancini, 2015). In the UK, a 2015 report has committed to use technology 
to make government “more transparent, inclusive, and better able to engage the public 
with democracy” ( Speaker’s Commission on Digital Democracy, 2015). There 
are high hopes for the way technology could impact our political future 
because it has given the public the ability to discuss, connect, investigate and 
be informed, but numerous issues are becoming evident with our current use 
of digital tools. Fake news is exacerbating misinformation globally (Fourney et 
al., 2017, Guess et al., 2018), filter-bubbles may be further limiting the public’s 
exposure to diverse information (Semaan et al., 2015b), and “troll” or “bot” 
accounts attempt to influence elections internationally (BBC News, 2017b). 
These issues undermine the value of technology as a tool for political 
engagement and raise concerns about the way second screens affect debate 
viewers.  
In less politically charged TV viewing contexts, second screens are also 
commonplace. In 2012 86% of Americans aged 16 to 64 use a mobile device 
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while watching TV (Proulx and Shepatin, 2012). Viewers use second screens 
for a variety of related and unrelated activity, such as checking emails, tweeting 
about the broadcast, or searching for information (Courtois and D'heer, 2012). 
Viewers who use social media while watching television report a series of 
benefits, including making them feel part of a community and affirming their 
opinions (Schirra et al., 2014). However, there are unique effects relating to 
politically charged content, which indicate that the second screen experiences 
of viewers watching debates would be different from those watching other 
types of programmes. Viewers are seen to post different types of commentary 
on Twitter alongside political debates than while watching reality TV 
(Doughty et al., 2011, Wohn and Na, 2011). Using Twitter while watching 
politically charged content may also have different effects on the opinion 
formation of viewers (Cameron and Geidner, 2014). This indicates a need for 
debate specific second screen research around political programming.  
Much of the existing research into the use of second screens around political 
debates has focused on Twitter, which has live event appeal due to its short, 
timely, and tagged content. The existing research includes an analysis of how 
it used by politicians (Kreiss, 2014, Larsson and Moe, 2011), its deliberation 
quality (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011), its sentiment (Wang et al., 2012, 
Wang et al., 2011), its networks of users (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, 
Bruns and Burgess, 2011, Larsson and Moe, 2011, Shamma et al., 2009, 
Trilling, 2014), and the hindrances of using it for political deliberation (Bakker, 
2013, Semaan et al., 2015b). Despite the extensive research into the use of 
Twitter, the platform only accounts for a fraction of the overall activity online. 
Facebook is used by a larger share of the population (Thompson and 
Vogelstein, 2018), but its data privacy and until recently lack of use of hashtags 
has contributed to the small amount of published research into the way it is 
used alongside debates. Despite this Facebook has been found to enable 
everyday politics among its users (Crivellaro et al., 2014) and is widely used by 
politicians as a means to campaign and self-promote (Al-Deen and Hendricks, 
2012). Furthermore, social media still remains a sub-set of the second screen 
activity in this context where viewers may choose to research information 
through search engines, access news websites with live commentary, or use 
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tools such as email for activity unrelated to the broadcast. Previous research 
lacks a holistic approach to understanding the different activities, actors and 
technologies at play.  
In this thesis I aim to understand current second screen practices around 
political debates and to investigate design opportunities for tools that would 
foster engagement and cater to the needs of the audience. I explore the 
relationship between debate viewers and their personal devices, investigating 
how current tools support debate viewers and how they do not. I also present 
research around future directions for second screen tools through two studies. 
The first investigates the possibilities for connected products as tools for 
political talk alongside debates, while the second explores viewer and expert 
perspectives on the issues with political discourse online and how second 
screens can address them. Through this research I contribute an 
understanding of current second screen practices, design directions for future 
tools, and considerations for social media platforms, politicians, and 
broadcasters. 
1.1. Research Questions 
This research thesis addresses the following question relating to current second 
screen practices around political debates: 
1. How and why are second screens used currently by the public during 
political debates? 
HCI research must ground the development of tools in the understanding of 
the practices of the people it designs for. The growing body of research on 
second screening around political debates often focuses on aspects of the 
viewer’s behaviour that can be observed remotely, for example through the 
collection of Tweets (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Bruns and Burgess, 
2011, Larsson and Moe, 2011, Shamma et al., 2009, Trilling, 2014). Although 
this research has helped develop our understanding of the experiences that 
viewers have online, it has not given us sufficient insight into the experiences 
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viewers have in their homes: what motivates people to pick up their device, 
what do they do with their second screens, how do they feel about interacting 
with others online, how do they behave in this online environment? Insights 
into the debate viewer’s motivations and practices for second screens use 
during political debates can inform the development of tools that meet the 
viewer’s requirements and identify needs that are not currently being met by 
existing tools.  
2. Can emerging technologies offer new opportunities for engagement 
in political discourse around televised debates? 
As the home environment becomes more populated by connected products, 
the pre-existing dominance of traditional screen-based experiences may shift 
in favour of other modes of interaction, such as IoT. By incorporating 
connected devices into our living environment, we can create new ways of 
engagement with the outside world. This led me to extend the search for 
political engagement tools beyond individual personal devices and towards the 
next major technology developments. Connected products may offer a more 
immersive and engaging way to interact with others during political debates. 
By exploring how connected products influence the experience of watching a 
debate, we can gain an understanding of how to appropriately design for them 
in the future. Furthermore, displacing the interaction from conventional social 
media and second screens can challenge the dominance of traditional screen-
based interactions. This has the potential to alleviate some of the issues that 
we observe with current second screen tools, such as managing the visual 
attention of viewers. 
3. What opportunities for second screens to address issues with 
political discourse can be identified through design-led research 
combining viewer and expert perspectives?  
Previous research has largely examined the visible online behaviours 
surrounding political debates. While it has effectively mapped out how viewers 
who actively engage online post content, it doesn’t provide all of the 
information needed to identify design directions for future second screen tools. 
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The body of research fails to account for second screen users who do not post 
content and the complicated network of stakeholders that are involved with 
political debates. Television producers, debate viewers, politicians, social 
media platforms, journalists and political researchers are all involved in the 
orchestration and experience of watching a political debate. They are all 
influenced and interested in the activity surrounding these events but may 
have different perspectives about the predominant issues and opportunities for 
online engagement. This creates a strong demand for an inquiry-driven 
exploration of the opportunities and challenges for future second screens. By 
involving debate audiences and experts involved with political debates in a 
research process, this research aims to explore new directions for second 
screen tools around political debates. 
1.2. Research Approach 
Second screens are used by viewers with varying levels of political engagement 
who may be motivated to use their personal devices for different reasons and 
in different ways. Where past studies typically present an analysis of the 
content posted on Twitter, which does not investigate the broader practices, 
attitudes and context of debate viewers, this research aims to contribute a 
more nuanced understanding of the audience and its use of technology. 
Furthermore, a multitude of stakeholders are interested in this activity, 
including broadcasters, politicians, academics, social media platforms, 
journalists, and the public. The future of second screen tools for political 
discourse will likely be shaped by these groups, who may have conflicting 
needs and desires. In order to investigate current second screen practices and 
directions for future tools, this research needs to adopt a holistic approach 
towards understanding the context of debate viewing and those involved and 
interested in second screening practices. It utilises a design-led research 
approach with an array of qualitative research methods, including in-situ 
observations, interviews, research products, workshops and speculative design.  
Two studies were used to research current second screen practices. The first 
study used thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) in order to analyse 
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tweets generated during a debate. Where past research has analysed the 
discussion topics of Twitter posts (Pedersen et al., 2015, Trilling, 2014), their 
sentiment (Wang et al., 2011), and volume (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011), 
this thematic analysis of tweets focused on the behavioural themes exhibited 
within the tweets. This approach allowed me to investigate what types of self-
expression are currently supported by Twitter.  
The second study investigates how and why viewers use second screens during 
debates through at-home observations, which were recorded with small 
wearable cameras. The study was able to capture the second screen activity 
that emerged within the real-life context of debate watching from the 
perspective of the viewer. This method allowed the participants to be in the 
comfort of their own homes, interacting with friends and family. I adopted this 
in-situ research method because it is difficult to capture the intricacies of the 
relationships between people and technology outside their real-life context of 
use (Crabtree et al., 2013). I aimed to capture in-situ second screen activity, 
which resulted in response to the debate and others in the living room. 
Together these research studies contribute a more nuanced understanding of 
the motivations behind this practice.  They identify how current social tools 
support viewers and how they do not.  
In addition to studying current practices, I further explored the role of new 
technologies in creating new second screen experiences alongside political 
debates. An in-the wild deployment of a series of IoT products in two month-
long studies, investigates the possibilities for connected products to be used as 
active political engagement tools. The project adopted a design-led approach, 
where research products (Odom et al., 2016)—inquiry-driven, finished and 
independent research artefacts situated in the wild—are used to stimulate 
reflection, and speculation in participants (Gaver et al., 2006, Helmes et al., 
2011). The research products were not designed to address the needs of debate 
viewers, but instead they pose a new set of questions around the role of physical 
devices in the home as tools for social communication. The situated nature of 
the objects reflected the real-life context of watching television, while the long 
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duration of the study allowed for participants to grow accustomed to the 
objects and form relationships with the other households.  
In order to further explore design directions for tools that support debate 
viewers, I investigated the perspectives of multiple stakeholders who are 
interested in this activity. I utilised speculative design to understand the issues 
with political discourse online and the opportunities for second screens to 
address them. A series of workshops with debate viewers conducted alongside 
a televised debate unravelled the most important issues that they see with 
political discourse online. By framing the workshop activity with the use of a 
televised debate and questions about the design of second screen tools, the 
participants were able to identify design opportunities for second screens 
alongside debates. The ideas generated throughout the workshops were then 
used to create four speculative designs, where imagined design concepts are 
used as a tool to enable the formation and analysis of unrealised design ideas 
(DiSalvo et al., 2016, Dunne and Raby, 2013). They helped visualise future 
opportunities for second screens and allow the experts to reflect on their 
implications. By using speculative designs as a means to mediate the issues and 
opportunities identified by the debate viewers to the experts, I was able to 
research ideas and futures that I could not build. This multi-layered research 
project was able to unravel some of the complexities of designing for contexts 
involving multiple stakeholders, needs, issues, motivations and intentions. 
Using varied methodologies has aided the validity of the work and the 
unravelling of the intricacies of human behaviour within political discourse. A 
triangulation of methods has been instrumental in revealing insights into both 
existing practices and speculative futures. The use of design led research 
methods allowed me to investigate the real-life context of debate viewing, to 
gather different stakeholder perspectives, and to explore how new technologies 
would impact the viewing experience. Through a user-centred, design-led 
research approach this project has been able to map out current audience 
behaviours, possibilities for connected products, and multiple perspectives on 
the future of second screen tools for political debates. 
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1.3. Contributions 
This PhD thesis makes two major contributions to the study of second screen 
use alongside political debates. The first is a look into the current motivations 
and practices within second screens use around political debates. The second 
is an exploration of the future possibilities for second screens alongside political 
debates. More specifically the thesis contributes: 
1. A minor contribution towards an understanding of the visible online 
behaviours within Twitter content generated during a 2015 UK General 
Election debate, which illustrates how current tools support self-expression 
and social interaction around debates. 
2. An understanding of how and why debate viewers utilise second 
screens during a debate. This provides insights into the range of activity that 
takes place in the home and the needs that motivate it. 
3. Insights into how second screens currently support and hinder 
engagement with political debates, which provides and understanding of the 
needs that are being supported by current tools and those that are not.  
4. An exploration of how connected products might contribute to the 
experience of watching and engaging with televised debates. This highlighted 
considerations for future design solutions, existing social media platforms, and 
challenged the dominance of screen-based interactions. 
5. A minor contribution is made through an audience perspective on the 
issues with political engagement online and the opportunities for second 
screens to address them. In addition to confirming some of the pre-existing 
issues identified by HCI research, the audience identified a few new issues and 
mapped out some of the opportunities they saw for technology in this context.  
6. Four speculative design concepts for second screen tools, used to 
capture possible solutions and prompt discussion. They were instrumental in 
visualising the audience perspective on the opportunities for second screens 
and enabled reflection on the part of the media and politics experts. 
7. An expert opinion on the implications of addressing the issues and 
opportunities for second screens identified by the audience and the speculative 
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designs presented to them, which point to a disparity between viewer’s 
expectations and complexities of addressing them. 
1.4. Thesis Overview 
This PhD thesis contains four studies conducted between 2014 and 2018, 
which were framed by the major political elections and referendums that took 
place in Scotland and the United Kingdom. These political events aired 
televised debates, which were accompanied by large quantities of social media 
content generated live by the viewers, journalists, and politicians. Each of these 
political events has been discussed at the start of the research chapters in order 
to contextualise and ground the work.   
In Chapter 2 I present the context of political television. I also explore what is 
meant by political engagement in this thesis, and what role technology plays 
in enabling it. The chapter further discusses research into the tools used for 
political engagement by both the public and politicians. The background 
section also illustrates some of the more notable issues with political discourse 
online.  
Chapter 3 focuses on second screens. It discusses the different contexts of use, 
their benefits, and how the public utilise pre-existing social media platforms. 
The related work chapter also looks at second screen use during political 
debates, including what tools are used, how they are used and the issues with 
the practice. The section identifies the limitations in the scope of approaches 
adopted by previous research.  
Chapter 4 presents research into the current second screen practices of debate 
viewers. The chapter consists of two studies conducted during televised 
debates aired throughout the 2015 UK General Election. Within the first 
study I collected and analysed tweets generated live during a debate. The 
second, used at home observations of 18 participants in order to explore the 
behaviours and motivations that frame second screen use in the home.  
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Chapter 5 presents research into how new technologies, such as connected 
products and the Internet of Things, may shape the future of second screens 
during political debates. The Social Printers study was conducted during the 
Scottish Parliamentary Election and EU Referendum of 2016. The study 
explores how physical devices could be used to engage viewers with televised 
political debates by deploying five internet-connected printers into nine 
Scottish households. The work indicated that technology has much to offer by 
enabling new ways of social interaction around debates that foster a strong 
sense of community, conversation and challenge the dominance of 
conventional screen-based interactions.  
In Chapter 6, I discuss research into the issues with political discourse online 
and the opportunities that debate viewers see for second screens to address 
them. Four two-hour design workshops highlighted six key issues, including a 
lack of fact-based content, tensions between anonymity and identity, and 
uncivil behaviour. Four speculative design concepts encapsulating possible 
solutions to these issues were used to prompt further discussion with political 
and media experts, who were able to identify the implications and challenges 
of addressing them.  
Chapter 7 presents a discussion of my research findings. It begins by discussing 
current behaviours and practices. Then following the overall narrative on my 
PhD, it discusses how and why I challenged the notion of the second screen. I 
then discuss the design directions for second screens that have been identified 
within my research and discuss their potential implications for political 
discourse. To conclude my discussion, I present the implications of my 
research for social media, technology and politics. In Chapter 8 I conclude the 
thesis by summarising my findings and discuss potential directions for future 
work.  
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2. Background 
Technology has reshaped the way citizens engage with politics. Television has 
made elections more accessible to the public by delivering political messages 
straight to people’s homes. Online platforms have also made it easier to take 
part in campaigns, raise funds, deliberate, discuss, and find information. While 
technology has made great contributions to political engagement, there are 
also worrying trends, which may have a negative impact on the electorate. 
This chapter outlines how political engagement has evolved alongside 
technology. It accounts some of the most notable historical moments within 
political television, discusses how digital social tools support political 
engagement, and what issues arise from its use.  
2.1. Political Engagement  
Today campaigns are contested across multiple media platforms, including 
print media, television, and digital platforms, such as social media, news 
websites and political websites. They are used in order to reach a wide 
audience and encourage engagement. This drive towards making politics 
accessible to the public is raising questions about the way we define political 
engagement and participation. 
Where political participation is seen as behaviour linked to measurable 
political activity, such as voting, attending rallies, and being a party member, 
political engagement can encompass more subtle behaviours and even 
attitudes (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013). Research into engagement has aimed 
to investigate the relationship between various factors and their effect on these 
participation indicators (Funk, 2010, Yamamoto and Nah, 2018). For 
example, a willingness to search for information has been linked to higher 
political engagement (Yamamoto and Nah, 2018), while social incentives, like 
being seen as an active community member, can contribute to higher voter 
turnouts (Funk, 2010). 
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Research usually utilises self-reported survey results to assess engagement 
(McKinney and Warner, 2013, Shah et al., 2005). Social and political sciences 
tend to seek out measurable behaviours to indicate political engagement, 
which can blur the lines between engagement and participation. Increased 
engagement is positively associated with voting, attending clubs, volunteering, 
talking to family about politics, campaigning, and taking part in political and 
social movements (Funk, 2010, Hargittai and Shaw, 2013). Within social 
media, Rainie et al. (2012) define political engagement in terms of actions that 
leave a trace on the network, such as clicking “like” on political material, 
posting thoughts on issues, and reposting political content, while Verba et al. 
(1997) define political engagement in two ways, which do not produce such a 
visible trace. The first is through measuring political knowledge, such as a 
person knowing who their government representative is. The second is a 
subjective self-assigned measure of engagement, that often may include a 
personal account of political interest, taking part in political discussions, and 
exposure to the media.  
Within this thesis I have adopted definition of political engagement described 
by  Verba et al. (1997).  Here political engagement is a self-assigned and 
personal label, a willingness to be actively informed or participate in civil 
society. It could be something as small as researching information, or as 
engaged as being a party member.  
2.2. History of Television and Politics 
One way that politicians attempt to stimulate political engagement during 
campaigns is through political debates. The first TV election debate in history 
took place in the US in 1960 between Kennedy and Nixon (Botelho, 2016). 
There was a stark difference in the perceived debate winner for those that 
watched it on screen versus those that listened to it on radio, and it is argued 
that the TV debate swung the race in favour of Kennedy who looked healthy, 
young and articulate on screen (Botelho, 2016). At the time some experts 
thought that the move towards televised debates could help bring about an 
‘informed democracy’ (Gardam et al., 2011), while others were concerned that 
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debates could corrupt the judgement of viewers in favour of looks rather than 
politics (Botelho, 2016).  
Televised debates took longer to be adopted in the United Kingdom. 
Proposals for televised political debates were repeatedly initiated by the BBC 
starting from 1960, but Gardam et al. (2011) speculate that the government 
was reluctant to  incorporate them into the election process earlier because the 
United Kingdom, being a parliamentary democracy, may find it difficult to 
include smaller parties without overplaying or underplaying their importance 
and role. Furthermore, political debates may also over-emphasize the role of 
the party leader (Walker, 2015).  The first ever UK election debates were 
finally aired in in the 2010 General Election and were much anticipated and 
appreciated by the public (Gardam et al., 2011).  
Outwith election debates, various forms of political broadcasts have been aired 
in the UK, such as Party-Political Broadcasts, Prime Minister’s Questions, and 
BBC’s Question Time. Party-Political Broadcasts, broadcast material created by 
a single political party, began being aired around election times in 1951 
(Webb, n.d.). Meanwhile, Question Time, a debate panel show, provided a 
televised debating platform for politicians in 1979 (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 
2011). Although Prime Minister’s Questions had existed since the 1880s, they 
started to be aired live on BBC Two in 1990 (White, 2011).  
Such televised debates play a vital role in the public’s perceptions and 
understanding of current issues. In a study spanning a decade, McKinney and 
Warner (2013) discovered that televised debates inform the public’s 
understanding of key issues, opinions about the candidates, their voting 
choices and their political engagement.   
2.3. Political Engagement Through Technology 
Citizen’s active political engagement is integral to Habermas’ notion of the 
public sphere, a space that facilitates critical debate within society and holds the 
state accountable (Habermas, 1991). Research identifies social networks, such 
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as Facebook and Twitter, as having the potential to support the formation of 
a public sphere. Conversely there are vast inequalities between those that 
participate online (Hindman, 2009), which creates tension with traditional 
notions of a public sphere grounded in Marx’s political theories of equality 
between citizens (Habermas, 1991). Continued debate into the implications of 
using online platforms for political discourse indicate that they foreground 
everyday socio-political talk as a means to encourage a talking electorate (Brooker et 
al., 2015, Halpern and Gibbs, 2013). They argue that this engagement plays 
a key role connecting citizens to democratic processes, making them aware of 
a variety of issues and opinions (Brooker et al., 2015, Halpern and Gibbs, 
2013). Digital technology plays an intricate role within political engagement, 
with a majority of people in the USA recognising that they have used it for 
political purposes at least once (Rainie et al., 2012).  
The use of social media has been credited with the formation of political 
movements and activism across the globe, from the election of Barak Obama 
in 2012 (Kreiss, 2014) to the momentum and spread generated around the 
Arab Spring (Lotan et al., 2011) and the umbrella movement in Hong Kong 
(Parker, 2014). However, in his book The Myth of the Digital Democracy Hindman 
(2009) argues that while it is easy to post political opinions online it is difficult 
to be heard. Furthermore, in a large scale survey into online political 
engagement with 2,081 Dutch participants, Bakker (2013) found that internet 
access does not necessarily translate to participation. The majority of the 
public do not use participatory media, media where the public plays an active role 
in creating and disseminating content (e.g. Twitter, political blogs), and those 
that do are already highly interested in politics, such as journalists and 
politicians. Instead they found a connection between personality traits and 
political participation, where extroversion and online political contributions 
are correlated. These findings echo research done by David Clarence 
McClelland, a Harvard psychologist who developed a theory commonly 
referred to as the Achievement Motivation Theory discussed in his book The achieving 
society (McClelland, 1961), which links motivation to the need for achievement, 
the need for affiliation, and the need for power. In a similar way to Bakker’s 
(2013)  research connecting personality traits and engagement, McClelland’s 
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(1961) findings that the need for achievement and power are often observed 
within individuals in leadership positions, may also be influencing the 
emergence of inequalities within online political engagement. Due to this 
tension between consumption of political content and willingness to actively 
interact or contribute Ward et al. (2003) argue that the internet will make only 
a “modest positive contribution to participation  and  mobilisation”. 
Other research teams draw a stronger link between use of technology and 
political participation. Through telephone interviews with 2,254 adults, Smith 
(2009) found that during the US 2008 Presidential Election, 78% of Americans 
who use the internet reported searching for political information and news 
online. 58% of those that used online tools for political purposes report sending 
or receiving campaign information and one in five internet users in the US  
reported participating in politics online through social media (Smith, 2009). 
Statistics indicate  that those numbers are growing each year as technology 
becomes more accessible but that television remains the dominant source of 
political news (Smith, 2009). Hargittai and Shaw (2013) suggest that although 
using digital tools does not correlate to higher levels of voting, it is connected 
to other forms of political engagement and social capital, such as volunteering, 
contacting political officials, and signing petitions.  
Political engagement is especially important around elections, when citizens 
are expected to make informed voting decisions. Current events indicate a shift 
away from conventional politics. The election of controversial figures into 
power, such as Donald Trump in the US and Rodrigo Duterte in the 
Philippines, and the vote of the United Kingdom to leave the European 
Union, all highlight a perceivable change in public opinion across the globe 
away from liberal-democratic norms (Foa and Mounk, 2017).  
Although we can’t draw a connection between the use of technology and these 
political trends, it is important to note that this shift of public voting choices is 
happening at a time when people are more connected and informed than ever 
through the Internet. Despite hopes that technology would enable a more 
democratic and just social and political environment, there are worrying 
trends which overwhelm the public’s ability to find trustworthy information 
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and be surrounded by diverse opinion. Technology seen the rise of 
problematic trends like filter bubbles, where people are exposed to opinions 
that complement their own, and fake news, where news articles containing 
false information are distributed as true (Fourney et al., 2017, Guess et al., 
2018). 
Conversely technology has also brought to light empowering information to 
the public’s attention such as the Panama Papers leak, which revealed the 
names of prominent figures and politicians who have avoided paying tax 
through offshore entities. The data leak had a significant impact on the 
public’s perceptions of the politicians and celebrities involved and led to the 
stepping down of the Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð 
Gunnlaugsson (Henley, 2016). Although it is difficult to gauge the ways that 
technology impacts public opinion and engagement it is becoming a vital part 
of the political campaign toolkit. 
2.4. Politics and Social Media During Elections 
The United States were some of the first adopters of technology within an 
election campaign with the use of candidate websites in 1992 and email in the 
1996 presidential campaigns (Gueorguieva, 2008).  By the year 2000, US 
election campaigns adopted online fund-raising, and by 2006 they began using 
social media platforms and video services, such as MySpace and YouTube 
(Gueorguieva, 2008). In later years Facebook and Twitter also became 
adopted in elections across many Western countries for a variety of purposes, 
the most important of which are to campaign, self-promote and spread 
information (Al-Deen and Hendricks, 2012, Bruns and Burgess, 2011, 
Pedersen et al., 2015). This is particularly important since Twitter is widely 
utilised by journalists from traditional media (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 
2012). 
Furthermore, the use of social media by politicians increases the public’s 
perceptions of authenticity and trust (Enli and Rosenberg, 2018). The use of 
social media by the Democratic Party during both of Obama’s presidential 
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campaigns in 2008 and 2012 have been accredited with his success (Kreiss, 
2014). In the 2008 election research identified the emergence of “citizen-
initiated” campaigning, in which campaign tasks, such as fundraising, are 
outsourced to ordinary supporters (Gibson, 2013). While the freedom and 
flexibility afforded to Obama’s campaign staff in the 2012 election led them to 
have ‘performative power’ and allowed them to be more responsive to real time 
political events, which aided his second presidential win (Kreiss, 2014). In the 
UK political campaigns are recognising and embracing the power of 
technology to inform and influence the electorate. Gibson (2013) argues that 
citizen-initiated campaigning, like the one observed in the US, is migrating 
into the UK. In the 2010 Election the use of social media may have 
contributed to the popularity of the Liberal Democrat party (Gibson, 2013). 
As a results of the growing recognition of the value of online campaigning 
strategies the Conservatives spent ten times more money on digital 
advertisements than Labour in the 2015 UK General Election (Wong, 2018).  
Pre-existing social media platforms host the majority of political discourse 
around election periods in many western countries, such as the USA, 
Australia, the UK, Austria, and Germany (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, 
Bruns and Burgess, 2011, Kreiss, 2014, Pedersen et al., 2015, Trilling, 2014). 
The expression of political views on social media platforms, like Facebook and 
Twitter provide social reinforcement, through the networks that form and the 
likes and retweets users receive on posts, which facilitates further participation 
(Mutz, 2013).  
Much of the research into the use of social media around elections has focused 
on Twitter, in part due to its openly available, relevant and tagged content. 
Politicians use it as a platform to campaign and a way to influence public and 
journalistic perceptions, while the public use Twitter to post and read political 
commentary (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Kreiss, 2014, Larsson and 
Moe, 2011). Research has looked at Twitter’s deliberation quality (Anstead 
and O’Loughlin, 2011), its networks of users (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, 
Bruns and Burgess, 2011, Larsson and Moe, 2011, Shamma et al., 2009, 
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Trilling, 2014), and the hindrances of using it for political deliberation (Bakker, 
2013, Semaan et al., 2015b). 
Twitter is dominated by a small group of very active users. Studies from both 
Australia and Sweden have identified the majority of election content was 
generated by a small group of active twitter users, including journalists, 
politicians, experts, and citizens (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Larsson 
and Moe, 2011). Ausserhoffer and Maireder (2012) analysed the network of 
users by manually identifying 374 individual accounts of politically active 
users, they discovered that the political discourse was dominated by an elite of 
political professionals, but that is was also open to outside participation as 
indicated by the mentions between different groups (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Twitter user groups mentioning themselves and others as a percentage of the 
overall group mentions in the Austrian Twitter-sphere (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012). 
Due to this complicated activity by a variety of different groups including the 
general public, news media often attempt to evaluate public opinion and the 
success of party candidates based on Twitter content (Anstead and 
O'Loughlin, 2014, Patterson, 2016). Despite this sentiment analysis does not 
seem to indicate election success, as was in the case of Hilary Clinton versus 
Donald Trump in the US presidential campaign of 2016 (Patterson, 2016). 
Clinton received 46% positive twitter sentiments in comparison to the winner 
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of the election who received 44% (Patterson, 2016). Despite this lack of 
correlation between sentiment on Twitter and voting patterns there is a push 
to create real-time Twitter sentiment analysis tools. These tools have low 
accuracy rates, due to the demographic unrepresentativeness of those who use 
Twitter,  but are convenient due to the vast quantity and speed of the 
generated content (Anstead and O'Loughlin, 2014, Wang et al., 2012, Wang 
et al., 2011).  
Meanwhile, Facebook also holds a great political significance because it is used 
by politicians to self-promote and campaign (Al-Deen and Hendricks, 2012). 
It has been instrumental in the organisation of protests and revolutions (Lotan 
et al., 2011). The majority of the research into the use of Facebook for political 
engagement have adopted a survey or interview approach (Nils, 2012, Wang 
and Mark, 2017). Unlike Twitter the platform has a different set of privacy 
settings and until recently a very limited use of hashtags, which made the 
collection of data difficult. Despite this its use for political purposes is widely 
researched. 
Facebook is a valuable tool for political discourse and is used for both issue 
specific and everyday politics (Crivellaro et al., 2014, Vraga et al., 2015). 
Although Facebook can lower the threshold for political participation, it does 
not increase the likelihood that politically interested users would use it to 
actively participate. Factors such as not wanting to make your political views 
known to friends and family and insecurity concerning credibility discouraged 
participation (Nils, 2012). Instead of a platform for active political 
participation, Facebook is commonly used as a source of political news. A 
study with 50 US university students who use Facebook on a regular basis 
showed that the majority of them used the platform as a primary news source 
due to its convenience (Wang and Mark, 2017).  
In addition to these social media platforms, research suggests that the 
electorate utilises other social tools, like the image sharing platform Instagram, 
for political purposes as well. A study conducted by Mahoney et al. (2016) 
indicates that citizens are adopting Instagram, an image-sharing social 
network, for political self-expression and every-day political talk. They 
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collected Instagram posts from the Scottish Independence referendum in 2014 
and the UK General Election in 2015, which were tagged with the official 
campaign hashtags and discovered that the public uses imagery for political 
self-expression, symbolism, egocentrism, and to document the campaign.  
2.5. Issues with Political Engagement Online 
Filter bubbles, echo chambers, fake news, trolling, and targeted 
advertisements are among some of the recently identified issues with the use 
of online tools for political deliberation and discourse in addition to numerous 
barriers to participation. 
2.5.1. Barriers to Participation 
Despite the expectation that social media will foster political engagement, 
users experience numerous concerns when it comes to contributing online. 
These include privacy worries, that self-expression is difficult, it costs time and 
energy, it can be uncivil (Bakker, 2013), that they may receive a negative 
reaction, that it doesn’t suit their online identity, or they fear sounding 
ignorant (Semaan et al., 2015b). A study by Semaan et al. (2015b) illustrated 
the challenges that US citizens faced when seeking and posting political 
information online, such as an inability to find diverse information, negative 
interactions when they shared information and issues managing their 
audience. The most difficult aspect of managing online audiences is the 
unwanted attention of friends, family and co-workers, who may have 
conflicting political views from the person who posts (Marwick and boyd, 
2010, Taber and Whittaker, 2018). On Twitter users tweeted content that they 
thought would interest a perceived audience (Marwick and boyd, 2010). 
Whereas on Facebook users avoid sharing opinions on controversial topics 
altogether because they perceive their friends as judgemental (Taber and 
Whittaker, 2018). In contrast social media platforms that offer more 
ephemeral forms of self-expression, like Snapchat, can have a lower perceived 
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risk of social evaluation, which can encourage more extroverted behaviour 
and the sharing of content (Taber and Whittaker, 2018). 
These perceptions of a judgemental audience and fear of engaging with 
controversial topics are further reinforced by the existence of racism online. A 
study looking at the public’s reaction to the photo of Alan Kurdi, a young 
Syrian boy who was photographed dead on a beach after attempting to reach 
Europe through the Mediterranean found that humour “cloaks” racism online 
(Topinka, 2018). Topinka (2018) reveals how online platforms are used to 
perpetuate and spread racist and nationalistic views on a subreddit with 
considerable outreach as indicated by its 516,036 subscribers.  
These perceptions around online audiences and the existence of racism and 
derogatory behaviour on social media may be creating a barrier to 
participation for the wider public. Instead online political discourse is 
primarily conducted by journalists, politicians, and experts (Ausserhofer and 
Maireder, 2012). This makes online political discourse inaccessible and 
unalluring to citizens. 
2.5.2. Fake News  
Fake news is news content that is factually incorrect and published for purposes 
other than satire (Fourney et al., 2017). Controversy around the validity of 
popular news stories has erupted across the globe in relation to elections and 
referendums. There exist a range of motivations, such as simply making a 
revenue or more worryingly to distribute propaganda (Bean, 2017). The 
potential to monetise on page visits and the low entry barrier for media content 
into social media platforms have spurred the emergence of fake news (Spohr, 
2017). Around elections troll and bot accounts purposefully aim to disseminate 
untruths and divisive information in order to affect election results 
internationally (BBC News, 2017b). 
Fake news stories increase polarisation on political topics (Spohr, 2017). 
Polarisation is seen as the difference in ideological self-placement between non-
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activist Labour and Conservative supporters (Spohr, 2017). Having great 
political polarisation within society is detrimental to democracy because it 
leads to greater alienation between social groups and extremism (Oosterwaal 
and Torenvlied, 2010). Fake news often contains news stories that are very 
politically divisive (Flintham et al., 2018) but it can be difficult for individuals 
to recognise if the information it presents is factually incorrect because it 
appeals to their conformation bias (Spohr, 2017). Confirmation bias is a 
psychological phenomenon where people have a predisposition to interpret 
information in a way which aligns it with their pre-existing beliefs (Spohr, 
2017). This makes fake news challenging to discredit in the eyes of readers 
whose political beliefs align with those present in the article.  
When analysing traffic to fake news websites during the US presidential 
election of 2016, Fourney et al. (2017) discovered that Facebook was the 
primary traffic source of 68% of fake news page visits. Furthermore, the 
majority of fake news pages had a distinctly pro-Trump bias (Fourney et al., 
2017, Guess et al., 2018). Some of the top fake news stories during the election 
included that Hilary Clinton was wearing an earpiece, that she was selling 
weapons to ISIS, and that Obama banned the pledge of allegiance to the 
United States (Fourney et al., 2017). A study by Guess, Nyhan and Reifler 
(2018) discovered that conservative voters were more likely to access fake news 
articles, and that subsequent fact checks rarely reached those affected. They 
conclude that it is unlikely that fake news had an effect on the outcome of the 
vote, but that it deteriorates the quality of public debate.  
In Britain a very potent example of fake news was when a troll or bot account 
used a photograph from the aftermath of a terrorist attack that took place on 
Westminster Bridge (Figure 2) in March of 2017 and captioned it: "Muslim 
woman pays no mind to the terror attack, casually walks by a dying man while checking 
phone #PrayForLondon #Westminster #BanIslam". Although it is clear that the 
woman in the photograph is distressed, by taking the photo out of context and 
attaching it to a controversial statement the tweet was widely shared and it 
received numerous provocative comments (BBC News, 2017b).  
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Figure 2 An image used by a Russian bot account on Twitter used to spread misinformation 
and provoke a negative reaction.  
2.5.3. Filter Bubbles 
The tendency of people to be exposed to and interact with content that 
complements their pre-existing beliefs has been described by research using 
many different terms including filter bubbles, echo chambers, homophily, and selective 
exposure. Each term is used within a slightly different context and originates 
from either social science, psychology, or human computer interaction. The 
phrases filter bubbles and echo chambers both refer to online environments where 
the public are exposed to and interact to a limited scope of opinion and bias 
that aligns with their own views (Grevet et al., 2014). This tendency for people 
to group together based on similarities is called homophily (Grevet et al., 2014), 
while selective exposure, refers to how the public tends to consume media and 
sources through selectively choosing content they agree with (Barnidge et al., 
2017). The formation of ideological pockets on social media platforms are 
influenced by people’s tendency to seek out and engage with content that 
reaffirms their pre-existing beliefs (Slater, 2007). This tendency is commonly 
known as conformation bias (Slater, 2007). 
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Both allowing for the formation of filter bubbles and breaking people away 
from them can have negative effects. Filter bubbles limit the public’s ability to 
be well informed. Furthermore, those that selectively consume media are also 
more likely to feel that mass media is biased (Barnidge et al., 2017). 
Meanwhile, the exposure to diverse political opinions can help engage society 
in healthy political deliberation (Kriplean et al., 2012a). Although research 
recognises how filter bubbles and homophily can be detrimental to 
democracy, breaking away from them may also have negative effects for the 
public. Mutz (2013) indicates that people are hard-coded to seek out those who 
are similar to them. Her research showed that cross-cutting exposure to 
diverse political ideologies may even limit the public’s ability to deliberate and 
participate.  
There are signs that the public also recognises the importance of being 
exposed to diverse political content. Kelly (2009) discovered that when users 
are presented with news articles they are only slightly less likely to read articles 
that express a political bias opposing their own. The participants were willing 
to engage with, but not necessarily be persuaded by, articles that opposed their 
pre-conceived beliefs, and on average spent more time reading articles that 
opposed their views (Kelly, 2009), while Kou and Nardi (2018) discovered that 
people can actively seek out information from beyond their existing filter 
bubble. In a study that looks at the process mainland Chinese citizens use to 
seek out information in order to form political opinions, Kou and Nardi (2018) 
discovered an array of complicated strategies involving the aid of technology 
and other people, where these citizens were able to retrieve and reflect on news 
from beyond the Chinese digital firewall.   
2.5.4. Trolling 
Trolling is aggressive behaviour, whereby an individual or group are attacked 
online (Cheng et al., 2017). The term is beginning to be associated with an 
intention to provoke and sway public opinion by external influencers (BBC 
News, 2017b). But until recently trolling was seen as anti-social behaviour 
exhibited by a small fraction of users (Cheng et al., 2017). There is a growing 
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concern that online trolling may lead to emotional distress or harassment and 
bullying offline. Online politically-charged discussion groups of like-minded 
individuals, such as feminist forums, are especially susceptible to bullying and 
abuse (Herring et al., 2002). Within cases where trolling seems to have sexist, 
heterosexist and racist motivations, anonymity as seen as relieving social 
inhibitions and fuelling both trolling behaviour and hasty responses by those 
that are being trolled (Herring et al., 2002).  
Work into abusive and anti-social behaviour online has been split in its 
understanding of how and why individuals choose to exhibit trolling behaviour 
online. A large scale study into the connection of personality traits and trolling 
found that individuals with sadist personality traits were positively correlated 
with trolling (Buckels et al., 2014), while, Cheng et al. (2017) who looked at 
news comment sections on the CNN website, found that rather than 
personality traits, trolling can be predicted by discussion context and mood. 
Research suggests that the level of uncivil behaviour online may be perceived 
rather than real (Shephard, 2014). When analysing the tweets generated 
during the release of the White papers for the Scottish Independence 
Referendum of 2014, Shephard (2014) discovered very low levels of profanity 
and high levels of re-tweeting, which indicates favourable climate for 
deliberation. In contrast the work of Topinka (2018) concludes that social 
platforms are used in the dissemination of racist views. 
2.5.5. Political Advertisements 
Google and Facebook have reported the use of their platforms for targeted 
political advertisements (Wong, 2018). Political campaigns and fake accounts 
commission these advertisements in order to push a political agenda 
(Lapowsky, 2018, Wong, 2018). An investigation into the ties between 
Facebook and political election meddling revealed that in the 2016 US 
presidential election a group of fake accounts with foreign ties, bought around 
3,000 advertisements for about $100,000, which were shared 350 million 
times and shown to US Facebook users (Thompson and Vogelstein, 2018).  
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Legitimate political campaigns also use social media advertisements in 
worrying ways. Brad Pascale, who led Trump’s digital advertisement 
campaign, claims he ran between 50,000 and 60,000 variations of Facebook 
advertisements per day, targeting different segments of the population (Wong, 
2018). This micro-targeting is deeply problematic because there is no one 
place where all these variations of advertisements can be found. This raises 
concerns about the ways in which the political message changes from person 
to person, leaving room for the campaign to make different promises based on 
the identity of the user (Wong, 2018). These so called “dark advertisements” 
can undermine democracy because they impede the public from having a full 
understanding of the political message of a campaign (Wong, 2018). Finally, 
questions are being raised about how the data needed in order to tailor 
advertisements is obtained. The  2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal revealed 
that the data of millions of users was captured through a personality quiz and 
used as a campaign tool by the Trump administration and the UK Brexit 
campaign (Halpern, 2018). The data for 87 million Facebook users was 
obtained through a personality quiz. It collected data for both the users that 
did the quiz and all of their friends (Halpern, 2018). 
2.6. Platforms for Political Engagement 
Despite the issues we are currently experiencing with online political discourse, 
governments and researchers alike are working towards the development of 
tools that would support deliberation and discussion (Iandoli et al., 2018, 
Mancini, 2015). In the United Kingdom the Digital Democracy Report 
(Speaker’s Commission on Digital Democracy, 2015) outlined a government 
initiative to use technology to improve parliamentary democracy and break 
down barriers to public participation. In Argentina an ambitious project called 
DemocracyOS (democracyos.org) aims to redesign political deliberation by 
enabling people to discuss and vote on upcoming legislation through the online 
platform. Mancini (2015) who is a political scientist and activist developed 
DemocracyOS as a way to address the disparity between the workings of our 
political systems and the times that we live in.   
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Research into the development of political discourse and deliberation tools, 
often adopts a strategy whereby they encourage users to be exposed to the 
opinions of others in supportive environments (Doris-Down et al., 2013, 
Kriplean et al., 2012a, Kriplean et al., 2011, Kriplean et al., 2012b). This can 
be achieved though listening interfaces where users are prompted to respond 
to each other by interpreting and summarising each other’s points. These 
interpretations are a sign of listening, which improves communication 
satisfaction (Kriplean et al., 2012b). Two examples of online political 
deliberation tools that support discourse are ConsiderIt (Kriplean et al., 
2012a) and Political Blend (Doris-Down et al., 2013). Political Blend (Doris-
Down et al., 2013) was developed to break people from their existing echo-
chambers by introducing them to people with different political views. The 
app supports people to meet face-to-face and discuss politics, thus encouraging 
a more personal and sincere interaction. It was discovered that the Political 
Blend application was successful at encouraging people to discuss politics with 
those who have different political ideology than them, thus breaking their 
social interaction from their pre-existing echo-chambers (Doris-Down et al., 
2013). While ConsiderIt, encouraged political deliberation through a pro/con 
format, where users submitted their opinions on election ballot measures. The 
tool was tested during a US state election. It encouraged users to consider the 
points of others. Nearly half of those who used the system contributed both a 
pro and a con indicating desirable deliberation behaviours. It was discovered 
that the stronger the stance of a user the less likely they were to include points 
opposing their own. One of the issues with the system was the user’s inability 
to assess the trustfulness of the points raised by the other participants, the 
authors speculate that including sources and user identity would increase trust 
in tool and opinions (Kriplean et al., 2012a, Kriplean et al., 2011). These 
deliberation platforms indicate that there is an opportunity to address existing 
issues with political discourse online by creating new tools to support 
engagement. 
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2.7. Summary 
Online political discourse is a vital part of modern-day democracy. It gives 
citizens access to information, a platform for self-expression, and can be 
instrumental in sustaining and encouraging political engagement. Although 
we have not yet found solutions to the issues that frame online interactions and 
influence the electorate, citizens already use digital tools, such as Google, 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram for political purposes. In order to make 
digital tools that address current issues and empower the public, we need to 
gain a deeper understanding of the contexts and triggers that frame online 
political engagement.  
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3. Related Work 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, technology plays an increasingly 
important role during political elections but it subject to an array of issues that 
undermine its value as an engagement tool. A key moment for political 
engagement is during televised debates. They are accompanied by high 
quantities of online activity, which is generated through second screens 
alongside the broadcast (Anstead and O'Loughlin, 2014, Anstead and 
O’Loughlin, 2011, Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Brooker et al., 2015). 
These debates play an important role in people’s understanding of key issues 
(McKinney and Warner, 2013), which is why it is vital to examine the effects 
of second screens on viewers. While literature on the subject of online political 
engagement frames the narrative of this research, research into second screens 
delves into the context of watching television. Although the social media 
platforms viewers use and the issues they encounter may be similar to those of 
online political discourse at large, reading and posting alongside a debate 
would pose its own set of challenges, such as greater time-constraints and less 
visual attention. Within this section I introduce relevant work around second 
screens. It includes second screens from a wider interaction context, how the 
public adopts pre-existing social media, how second screens are used during 
political debates, and how new developments in technology may be used in 
this context.  
3.1. Second Screens  
Second screens are personal devices, such as smartphones, tablets and laptops, 
used to accompany a television broadcast (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015). In this 
context, the ‘first’ screen is the television, which delivers the main content and 
drives the contextual use of the device (Doughty et al., 2012). In a survey with 
98 participants Nandakumar and Murray (2014) found that 84% of 
respondents report using their second screen devices while watching television. 
Viewers use their personal devices for a variety of purposes, such as for social 
interaction, to complete personal tasks, such as checking emails, and search 
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for information relating to the program they are watching (Courtois and 
D'heer, 2012, Nandakumar and Murray, 2014). Wilson (2016) discovered that 
certain genres of television can be enhanced by second screens, such as reality 
TV, game and talent shows. These genres can be enhanced because second 
screen applications are “facilitating a deeper engagement with the program’s 
subject material as well as playfulness” (Wilson, 2016). Second Screens can 
benefit viewers in a variety of different ways including letting them socialise, 
immerse them in a storyline, give them additional information, and let them 
take part in activity relating to the program or event (Nandakumar and 
Murray, 2014, Schirra et al., 2014). 
Where new technologies like video streaming have previously encouraged 
asynchronous media consumption, where viewers watch programs in their 
own time after it has been broadcast on TV, second screens encourage live 
viewing by providing timely content and a social experience (Proulx and 
Shepatin, 2012). This trend has been of interest to content producers and 
advertisers who see its potential to increase revenues and engage the public 
further. In order to foster second screen activity we are now frequently 
encouraged to contribute to online discussion on Twitter through the use of a 
hashtag (Proulx and Shepatin, 2012). Another way the TV industry tries to 
encourage live viewing is by creating an array of additional content usually in 
the form of downloadable applications for smart touchscreen devices. They 
are designed to add social, informational and advertisement value to the TV 
experience, while promoting live viewing (Proulx and Shepatin, 2012). 
However, the majority of second screen activity gravitates towards pre-existing 
social media platforms, in part due to their ability to foster a community and 
to affirm viewer’s opinions (Maruyama et al., 2017, Schirra et al., 2014). 
Below, I will highlight several categories of second screens: pre-existing tools, 
series specific applications, event specific applications, and applications for 
politically charged content.  
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3.1.1. Second Screen Use with Pre-Existing Tools 
Viewers often utilise their pre-existing social media accounts while watching 
television. Through a survey exploring viewing habits Courtois and D’heer 
(2012) found that a portion of the respondents used Facebook and Twitter in 
order to post opinions relating to the TV content they are seeing. This active 
social behaviour is especially prominent during the airing of series like Downton 
Abbey and Glee, where a large and vocal fanbase of viewers take to Twitter to 
share their opinions, because it fosters the feeling of a shared community 
experience (McPherson et al., 2012, Schirra et al., 2014). Plot-twists, sadness, 
humour and character development moments trigger live tweeting (Schirra et 
al., 2014). Benefits that viewers experience when using social media to 
accompany a live broadcast, include helping people not feel alone, being part 
of a community and affirming their opinions (Schirra et al., 2014). While, the 
broadcasting of one’s thoughts may help viewers feel as part of a community, 
McPherson et al. (2012) discovered that very few people actually seek out the 
commentary of others. This indicates that posting opinions does not equate 
being read by others.  
Second screening also takes place in households where not everyone in the 
living room is interested in the TV content. Through a 14-day field study in 
seven homes, Holz et al. (2015) observed that participants often watched TV 
content they were not interested in because they wanted to spend time with 
their family. In those cases, second screens were used as a primary screen for 
content unrelated to the programs and to complete chores online, such as 
banking. When participants were more interested in the content they were 
watching they used their second screens to search for information relating to 
the TV content (Holz et al., 2015).  
3.1.2. Series Specific Applications 
For broadcasters and television producers these social second screen 
behaviours are beneficial because they have the potential to encourage live 
viewing thus increasing advertisement revenue (Proulx and Shepatin, 2012). 
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They foster this activity by creating series specific applications also known as 
companion applications, designed to accompany and enrich the TV viewing 
experience of fans (Proulx and Shepatin, 2012). For example the TV series The 
Walking Dead provided viewers with a second screen application that gave them 
additional information about on-screen characters and weapons, and social 
features, like taking part in live polls (Bishop, 2014). While the company Miso 
created a second screen application for Game of Thrones, which allowed the 
show’s fans to create their own complementary content containing trivia, links, 
and polls for each episode of the first season (Warren, 2012). An issue with this 
model of series specific applications, which is identified by broadcasters, is that 
viewers are unlikely to download many applications (Bulkley, 2013). Instead 
broadcasters are exploring ways to provide viewers with companion content 
for all of the programs they air in one aggregated application (Bulkley, 2013).  
Series specific companion applications can improve viewer’s memory of 
complicated story lines and engage them with additional show content but 
require a balance between engagement and distraction (Geerts et al., 2014, 
Nandakumar and Murray, 2014, Neate et al., 2015). Viewers report that 
second screens can be distracting during their favourite programs (Neate et al., 
2015). Neate et al. (2015) reduced the need for visual attention through 
auditory stimuli, which can alert the viewer to changes in the companion 
content without distracting them. In another exploration of delivering 
companion content in an appropriate way, Nandakuymar and Murray (2014) 
created a second screen application for the TV drama Justified. It was created 
to support viewers in remembering long arc plots and many characters. 
Through the testing of their application they found that viewers want to 
minimise and have control over disruptions during shared TV experiences, 
they want the app to be synchronised with the present context, to emphasise 
the characters and their relationships with one-another, to provide concise 
descriptions of events, and to be sensitive to social contexts. Meanwhile, Geerts 
et al. (2014) combined at home observations, interviews with producers and 
series viewers, and Google Analytics data of the use of a companion 
application for De Ridder, a Belgian crime drama, in order to examine both 
viewer and producer perspectives on the second screen application. They 
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found that participants and producers value usability, well timed content, 
social interaction, limited attention demand, and additional content. A 
common theme across these research projects is that companion content 
should be well-timed and not distracting. 
3.1.3. Event Specific Applications 
In addition to TV series, live events, such as sports and political debates, also 
see the emergence of companion content. Event specific applications are created 
for a single televised event, such as the Olympics or football championships. 
These applications are usually designed to provide viewers with additional 
camera streams, provide a platform for social interaction, and give viewers the 
event schedule (Ansaldo, 2016, Ansaldo, 2017, Anstead et al., 2014). Creating 
applications for live events is subject to similar issues to those for TV series. 
Research has emphasised the challenges of creating companion content for 
fast-paced events, such as limiting visual attention, synchronising content, and 
supporting multiple viewers (Anstead et al., 2014, Centieiro et al., 2014, 
Geerts et al., 2014, Proulx and Shepatin, 2012).  
Anstead et al. (2014) tested a second screen application for the 2012 Olympics, 
where the BBC showed up to 26 parallel feeds at the same time. They 
discovered that within this context supporting parallel viewing, and scheduling 
and queueing of content were desirable. In order to limit visual attention 
Centieiro et al. (2014) designed a feature on an application to place bets about 
potential goals using eyes free interaction. The development of event specific 
applications that cater to the needs of viewers and provide timely companion 
content is now a staple of live sport television. 
The 2016 Olympics featured several companion applications, provided by TV 
broadcasters and national sports agencies, including NBS Sports, Rio 2016 
Social Hub, Rio 2016, Team USA, and USA Basketball (Ansaldo, 2016). 
They provided different content, such as the social media feeds of Olympians, 
the journey of the Olympic torch, and TV and live streaming schedules 
(Ansaldo, 2016). NFL football is also accompanied by numerous applications, 
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provided by sports television companies, such as NFL mobile, ESPN fantasy 
Sports and Fancred (Ansaldo, 2017). These applications allow football viewers 
to play fantasy football games with each other, give fans a platform for self-
expression, and receive updated scores (Ansaldo, 2017). This array of 
companion applications indicate that live-sporting events can be enhanced 
through dedicated applications that either provide sport-related information, 
or help fans express-themselves and socialise. In a similar way, televised 
political debates can be enhanced by allowing viewers to communicate with 
each other or find factual information relating to the content that is being 
discussed. 
3.1.4. Politically Charged Content 
Although we expect to see similarities between the motivations and behaviours 
in second screen use during non-political and political programs, previous 
research indicates unique effects relating to politically charged content. Wohn 
and Na (2011) compared the live-twitter activity surrounding Obama’s 
acceptance speech of the Nobel Peace Prize and the activity surrounding So 
You Think You Can Dance, an American dance competition. They categorised 
the content from both programs into attention seeking, emotional, 
informative, and opinions. They discovered that the majority of the content 
during both broadcasts was emotional, reactionary and subjective, but that the 
tweets posted during Obama’s speech contained more links to external 
information, re-tweets, and personal opinions than those for So You Think You 
Can Dance (Wohn and Na, 2011). Doughty et al. (2011) on the other hand, 
found that tweets alongside Question Time were longer, than those posted 
alongside the reality program The X Factor. This indicates that second screen 
use alongside political programming aims to contribute to the overall political 
discussion. When comparing the networks that form on Twitter during 
political broadcasts (Question Time) versus a reality TV show (Strictly Come 
Dancing), Doughty et al. (2012) found that the audience of the reality program 
tend to connect with the celebrities that take part, whereas the Question Time 
audience tends to communicate within smaller networks of friends. These 
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differences between political and non-political second screen activity indicate 
a need to better understand the motivations and behaviours of debate viewers. 
Furthermore, there are differences in the effects live-tweeting has on second 
screen users while watching politically charged content. The practice of 
monitoring the social media activity surrounding a program is called social 
watching (Maruyama et al., 2017). In a study exploring the effect of combining 
political television with Twitter content, it was discovered that viewers have 
the tendency to conform to the opinions they see online, but that this effect 
was less pronounced when the footage was about polarising political issues like 
gun regulation (Cameron and Geidner, 2014). This effect, whereby people 
tend to change their actions and behaviours in order to align with a perceived 
majority social group, is called normative conformity. While increasing political 
polarity may diminish this normative conformity, other factors like receiving 
positive feedback on posted comments can amplify it (Maruyama et al., 2017).  
In a study looking at second screen use alongside the watching of news Gil de 
Zúñiga et al. (2015) discovered that second screening is linked to greater 
political participation. Other politically charged content, like reality TV 
focusing on the United Kingdom’s welfare system, are also accompanied by 
second screen activity. These programs portray people in a negative light 
resulting in vast amounts of negative live-commentary on Twitter (Brooker et 
al., 2015, van der Bom et al., 2018). Benefit Street, which looks into the lives of 
British benefits recipients, described as “poverty porn” by critics (van der Bom 
et al., 2018), has seen the rise of counter-discourse activist campaigns online 
(Feltwell et al., 2017a). Feltwell et al. (2017b) argue that there is a need to 
enable critical live viewing of such politically charged programs because 
poverty porn can marginalise welfare recipients and can reinforce an austerity 
agenda. In response Feltwell et al. (2017b) designed Spotting Guide and Moral 
Compass, which use social tagging, a process of attaching tags to content live 
alongside the program. They discovered that the tagging process enables the 
critical viewing of reality television. In addition to enabling criticality through 
social tagging, viewers are naturally more critical in the hours after the 
program has aired. A study into the use of Twitter around Benefits Street, 
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discovered that during air time the content generated on Twitter tended to be 
abusive and judgemental, whereas between the programs viewers of the 
program posted much more appreciating, defending and contesting content 
(Brooker et al., 2015). 
3.2. Televised Debates and Second Screen Activity 
Social media is now a fixture in politics, including during televised debates. 
Twitter in particular has been thoroughly studied within second screen 
research. A study into the Australian federal election of 2007 discovered that 
the days of televised political events mark a significant increase in election 
tweets (Bruns and Burgess, 2011). The Twitter activity on the days of the 
broadcasts was seen to be strongly skewed towards the evening hours, when 
they were aired. Furthermore, those days saw a dramatic decrease in the use 
of URLs within the twitter content, from an average of 33%, down to 8% and 
12% on the days of the debates. Although research has not reached a 
consensus about the relationship between the debate and the online activity 
that accompanies it, the Twitter discourse has been found to give insights into 
the viewers’ evaluations of the topics and participants of the debate (Pedersen 
et al., 2015, Shamma et al., 2009, Trilling, 2014).  
A study by Shah et al. (2015), which looked at the Obama and Romney debate 
of 2008, linked content analysis of the debate with sentiment analysis of tweets, 
where they found that the candidates physical gestures and facial expressions 
were better predictors of the volume and valence of Tweets than their 
arguments. Shamma et al. (2009) who also studied this debate, observed that 
the tweets generated during the presidential debates were correlated to the 
topics of discussion and served as a predictor of changes of topics (Shamma et 
al., 2009). Meanwhile, a study conducted during the Scottish Independence 
Referendum debates of 2014, Pedersen et al. (2015) also saw that the tweets 
generated by the Scottish public followed the debate topics of discussion 
(Figure 3). Whether the tweets are generated in response to the debate topics, 
or the gestures and expressions of politicians, the tweets indicate an emotional 
response to what happens on screen (Trilling, 2014, Wohn and Na, 2011). 
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This emotional commentary lacks conversation and discourse, even when 
syntactical elements like the @ sign are used, they do not indicate conversation 
(Mascaro and Goggins, 2015). Instead most people online act as observers 
learning how others feel about the event they are all witnessing together 
(Schirra et al., 2014). This creates the feeling of a shared experience.  
 
Figure 3 Peaks and Troughs in Twitter Discussion, during a Scottish referendum Debate on 
the 5th of August 2014 (Pedersen et al., 2015) 
In the UK, Question Time, a long-running, weekly debate programme, began 
broadcasting in 1979 on the BBC. Since its beginning it has been a highly 
participatory program, which invites questions from its live audience. Even 
before the advent of social media, viewers could send messages via SMS, some 
of which were shown on the BBC’s teletext service. It started promoting the 
use of a hashtag to its viewers in 2009, and it is now accompanied by a high 
volume of tweets every time it airs. Within the first month of the hashtag being 
launched, a particularly controversial edition featuring a far right party leader 
saw the hashtag used at a rate of 800 tweets per minute (Anstead and 
O’Loughlin, 2011). To illustrate the shift in the role of the audience away from 
passive consumers Anstead and O’Loughlin (2011) coined the term 
“viewertariat”, referring to those who use social tools to interpret, comment 
and debate a political television broadcast. It has been shown that a large 
proportion of Question Time tweets contain actionable language that indicates 
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not just how they feel about socio-political issues but also how they would like 
them to be addressed by society and government (Ferrario et al., 2012).  
Although the use of second screens during debates increases engagement, this 
political communication may be subject to the issues discussed in section 2.5, 
such as barriers to participation, fake news, filter bubbles, and trolling. 
Furthermore, for the average citizen, broadcasting their personal views online 
can be futile due to their limited outreach and influence (Hindman, 2009). In 
The Myth of the Digital Democracy, Hindman (2009) concludes: “If we consider 
the ability of ordinary citizens to write things that other people will see, the 
Internet has fallen far short of the claims that continue to be made about it. It 
may be easy to speak in cyberspace, but it remains difficult to be heard”. 
Instead, influence rests primarily with politicians, journalists and a small group 
of anonymous users (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Hindman, 2009, 
Kreiss, 2014).  
Previous research into political second screen use has been able to explore the 
way Twitter is being used (Anstead and O'Loughlin, 2014, Anstead and 
O’Loughlin, 2011, Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Brooker et al., 2015), and 
the effect of social media on opinion formation during debates (Maruyama et 
al., 2017, Maruyama et al., 2014). Through an analysis of tweets generated 
during the 2013 German election debates, Trilling (2014) found that, while 
there is a relationship between the topic of the debate and Twitter, the 
majority of tweets were sarcastic or humorous. They often drew the attention 
of the reader away from the debate topic, for example a large quantity of 
tweets concerned a necklace worn by one of the candidates. The work of Davis 
et al. (2018) suggests that humour is used by viewers in order to “express 
opposition, establish political subjectivity, and engage in direct and symbolic 
civic support”. Anstead and O’Loughlin (2011) discovered that although 
viewers used Twitter to engage further with debates, they were less likely to 
engage in one-on-one communication during the broadcast, indicating that 
there was little active debate between viewers during the broadcast.  
Although second screen activity can be seen as a form of political engagement 
around debates, there are worrying trends which hinder the public’s ability to 
52 
 
 
deliberate. In the most extreme examples the content that viewers are exposed 
to both online and on screen can influence their perceptions of the debate and 
their vote decision (Doughty et al., 2011, Maruyama et al., 2017, Maruyama 
et al., 2014). In two separate lab studies exploring the effects of actively 
tweeting during a political debate on the opinions of viewers, Maruyama et al. 
(2014, 2017) discovered that those that posted were more likely to conform to 
the popular opinions expressed by others. This effect became even more 
prominent when participants received positive feedback on their posts 
(Maruyama et al., 2017). This effect is not limited to second screens: live on-
screen graphics of viewer sentiment informally known as “the worm chart”, have 
also had a strong influence on viewer perceptions. The worm chart is a real-
time visual feedback overlaid on a debate, which is generated by a sample of 
twenty to thirty undecided voters who watch the debate in a controlled setting. 
They are all given individual dials, which they turn throughout the debate to 
indicate the extent to which they approve of what is being said on screen (Davis 
et al., 2011). Worm charts have been used in both US and UK election debates 
in an effort to give viewers real-time feedback and add drama and interest to 
the broadcast (Davis et al., 2011). Despite efforts to make the data presented 
to viewers objective and unbiased, Davis et al. (2011) found that the worm 
influences viewers even if they had a clear preference towards one of the 
politicians before the start of the debate. Their work suggests that rather than 
empowering viewers by providing them with information about the opinions 
of others, the worm actually makes forming personal opinions more difficult 
(Davis et al., 2011). This research into conformation effects around the worm 
and social media use raise serious concerns about the ethics and future of 
second screen use around debates.  
Despite the concerns raised by research, the use of social media during debates 
brings about benefits to the viewers. Jennings et al. (2017) discovered that 
tweeting while watching a debate increases learning and the recollection of 
information from the debate (Jennings et al., 2017). Using second screens can 
also increase incidental learning, where technology can be used to find new 
information and become more engaged with the televised content (Nee and 
Dozier, 2017). Furthermore, watching debates with others either in the same 
53 
 
 
location or others online is more enjoyable and may lead to a greater incentive 
to watch more political debates (Thorson et al., 2015). Giving viewers a 
focused activity during a political debate has the tendency to reduce political 
cynicism, which is the tendency of citizens to see politicians as corrupt or self-
serving (Jomini Stroud et al., 2011).  
In second screen for political discourse research, there is a push towards 
creating new tools that support debate viewers’ engagement. Liddo et al. 
(2017) used a series of physical flash-cards with nuanced responses, which were 
used by participants to measure real-time audience engagement and feedback. 
The study illustrated a novel and nuanced method that could be used to gather 
debate viewer responses. Pluss and Liddo (2015) tackle the issues of trust and 
public engagement by creating a tool for political debates called Democratic 
Replay, which supports fact-checking and argument visualisation. Through a 
review of relevant literature, they identified four requirements for their system: 
it must be non-intrusive and accessible, increase political engagement, enable 
participation, and provide complementary information (Pluss and Liddo, 
2015).  
3.3. Emerging Technology and TV Viewing 
This research takes place alongside the developments and commercialisation 
of a range of internet connected products, otherwise called Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices. In the home they include a range of home assistants and internet 
connected household devices. However, although connected products in the 
home are a relatively recent development, there is already precedent for the 
use of physical objects alongside TV content. For example, the 1987 TV series 
Captain Power and the Soldiers of the Future used a light gun toy that allowed viewers 
to shoot at the screen during battle scenes to gain points (Toal, 2012). More 
recently, the Universal Control Dalek was a prototype toy created by the BBC 
that would react to episodes of Doctor Who, exploring how emerging 
technologies could be used to offer new viewing experiences in the home 
(Woolard, 2011). While these examples relate purely to entertainment, the 
degree to which second screens and social media have become central to 
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political programming leads us to ask whether such connected products might 
bring value to political programs as well. 
Technology in the home is quickly evolving and branching into a variety of 
smart products. The phrase Social TV refers to the convergence of social 
media and television (Proulx and Shepatin, 2012). Until recently it was hoped 
that Smart TVs would enable this social aspect of watching television without 
the need for a second screen (Mantzari et al., 2008, Proulx and Shepatin, 
2012). Although, Smart TVs did not develop social media platforms of their 
own, they are becoming ever more responsive and multifunctional. 
Furthermore, personal assistants like Alexa, Siri, and Google are now 
transforming the way we interact with our home through the use of home-
assistants like the Amazon Echo. These home assistants are currently used for 
a variety of simple purposes, such as making purchases, playing music and 
setting timers. As more of the technology we use at home becomes internet 
connected IoT devices may be adapted for a variety of uses including to 
support TV viewing. 
While IoT and smart devices have potential to be used within a political TV 
viewing context issues, such as susceptibility to hacking, will have to be 
acknowledged and addressed. Home assistants like Alexa make it easy for 
people to place purchase orders on goods through simple voice commands. 
While they make shopping convenient they also leave room for mistakes: when 
a Texas news channel reported on the story of a six-year old girl ordering a 
doll-house accidentally, the reporter said ‘Alexa ordered me a dollhouse’, 
triggering the home assistants of viewers to also place orders for doll-houses 
(Liptak, 2017). Others like Burger King and South Park have intentionally 
exploited the ability to trigger home assistants (Stolworthy, 2017, Titcomb, 
2017). Burger King asked viewer’s Google Home assistants to list the 
ingredients in their burger (Titcomb, 2017), while South Park intentionally 
triggered viewers’ Amazon or Google home assistants repeatedly throughout 
one of their programs (Stolworthy, 2017). The current susceptibility of IoT 
devices to hacking and manipulation illustrate some of the issues that may 
occur if they are adopted in other more politically charged contexts. Despite 
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these issues, IoT technology may be able to make second screen experiences 
more convenient, fast-paced, or immersive.  
3.4. Summary 
Second screens are commonly used by television viewers and broadcasters, 
and television producers cater to this activity by producing series specific and 
event specific applications that bring companion content to their viewers. 
Despite this, viewers often utilise pre-existing social tools, such as Facebook 
and Twitter in order to commentate and feel part of a community.  
The second screen activity around televised debates are of particular interest 
to researchers due to their potential to engage the electorate and give insights 
into viewer’s perceptions of the debate topics and politicians. Current research 
has largely focused on Twitter due to its live-event appeal and openly available 
content. It has utilised an array of computation analysis methods, such as 
sentiment analysis (Shah et al., 2015, Wang et al., 2012, Wang et al., 2011) 
word frequency counts and analysis of the networks of people (Shamma et al., 
2009, Trilling, 2014). Where research into second screens more generally has 
adopted a design-led research approach that gives us insights into the issues 
viewers experience, the research surrounding political debates is limited to 
insights into the online activity of a small portion of active users who are willing 
to post on Twitter. In order to investigate ways to engage debate viewers 
through second screens, research needs explore the behaviours and 
motivations of debate viewers through a user-centred lens. 
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4. Current Second Screen Practices 
4.1. Introduction 
Understanding how and why debate audiences make use of their personal 
devices, can help us identify both their fulfilled and their unfulfilled second 
screen needs. These can help us design tools that would support increased 
political engagement and higher quality public discourse around televised 
debates. I have addressed this through two studies, which ran in parallel, 
during the 2015 UK General Election. The first is an analysis of the visible 
content generated on Twitter during a political debate. It gives an overview of 
how politically active debate viewers utilise social media. The second study 
uses at home observations and post-interviews to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the range of second screen activity which takes place in the 
home during a debate. This study demonstrates that second screens are used 
in a variety of ways that do not always lead to visible social media outputs. 
Instead, the study identifies what motivates debate viewers to use their second 
screens and in what ways current tools do not support their needs. Together 
these studies helped identify potential future design directions for second 
screens in order to better support public engagement around political debates. 
The two studies presented within this chapter are designed to address the 
following question: 
How and why are second screens used currently by the public during 
political debates? 
4.2. Context  
The time period covered by this PhD thesis is scattered with various UK 
political events, they include two major referendums, two General Elections 
and a Scottish Election. Although I do not present research into the Scottish 
Referendum of 2014, it revealed how similar political events can increase 
political engagement and increase voter turnouts. With 84.6% turnout, the 
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referendum had a significantly higher turnout than previous elections, for 
example the Holyrood elections of 2011 had 65.1% turnout and the European 
elections of 2014 had only 35.6% (Research, 2014). The Referendum was 
accompanied by three heated televised debates, which were accompanied by 
large quantities of online activity (Pedersen et al., 2015). Despite polls 
indicating a last-minute shift of opinion in favour of Independence the 
campaign resulted in a vote to remain in the United Kingdom (BBC News, 
2015c). While the referendum resulted in one of the highest voter turnouts in 
Scottish history and large amounts of online engagement, it also resulted in 
the widely publicised abuse of both prominent celebrities and citizens in favour 
of Remaining in the United Kingdom (Whitaker, 2017). The online abuse of 
author JK Rowling and Sir Chris Hoy for their pro-Union political views was 
widely publicised (BBC News, 2015c). Furthermore, pro-independence 
cybernats were seen to target individuals who expressed pro-Unionist views 
online, by personally attacking them using abusive and threatening language 
(Whitaker, 2017). As a result, the Scottish Referendum made visible some of 
the negative effects associated with online political talk, which further 
unravelled throughout the political events that followed.  
A year later the UK had a General Election in May 2015. The election had a 
strong focus on immigration. It was fuelled by the European refugee crisis, 
which saw an influx of over a million asylum seekers and immigrants from the 
Middle East and Africa (Lindsay, 2015). The refugee crisis stimulated the 
increased popularity of far-right parties across the whole of the EU (Lindsay, 
2015). For the United Kingdom the crisis highlighted concerns over the 
meaning of staying in the Single Market, which allows open borders between 
countries, at a time of uncontrolled immigration from elsewhere (Lindsay, 
2015). The recently passed Scottish Independence Referendum and the 
increased importance of the issue of immigration, resulted in UKIP and the 
SNP holding an unusually prominent position within the election.  
Although televised debates have been a staple of major elections in other 
countries, this was only the second time they had been used in a UK General 
Election. The debates themselves had been a source of much controversy after 
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lengthy negotiations between government and the media over the format of 
the events, leading to a high degree of public interest and frequent speculation 
that they would not take place at all (Walker, 2015). The increased 
prominence of several smaller parties— particularly the SNP (Scottish 
nationalists) and UKIP (advocating leaving the European Union)—led to 
further discussion about who should be allowed to participate. Eventually, and 
at short notice, four separate televised events were agreed upon: two with a 
typical debate format (one featuring seven major parties and one featuring 
only smaller parties) and two following a less adversarial Q&A format with 
individual party leaders (Walker, 2015).  
As might be expected, these debates were major social media events (Walker, 
2015). Some memorable highlights include Ed Miliband stumbling through 
his declaration of toughness during his debate with Jeremy Paxman, and Nigel 
Farage condemning foreign HIV patients in the UK, which resulted in the 
highest tweeted about moments from the Leaders Debate on April 2nd 
(@JoannaG, 2015). The Leaders Debate in particular, which featured the 
Conservative party, Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP, UKIP, Greens, and 
Plaid Cymru, was watched by 7.7 million people, some of whom generated 
more than 1.5 million tweets during the debate (BBC News, 2015b). The 
entire election period saw vast amounts of online content, with 78 million 
Facebook interactions across the campaign (Crossley, 2015) and 3.8 million 
tweets using #GE2015 on election day (Walker, 2015). The election saw high 
turnouts of 66.1%, with an even higher turnout for Scotland with 71.1% 
(Knapton, 2015). It has been speculated that this higher Scottish turnout was 
due to increased political engagement following the Scottish Independence 
Referendum (Knapton, 2015). The election resulted in a win for the 
Conservative party who as part of their manifesto promised a referendum on 
the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Union (BBC News, 
2015a).  
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4.3. Visible Behaviours on Twitter 
4.3.1. Introduction and Background  
It is now common for debate broadcasters to promote the use of a hashtag 
alongside a debate (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011). For journalists and 
researchers the increase in publicly available viewer generated data is an 
opportunity to access and evaluate the opinions of the public (Ausserhofer and 
Maireder, 2012). This is often done though an array of computation analysis 
methods, such as sentiment analysis (Shah et al., 2015, Wang et al., 2012, 
Wang et al., 2011) word frequency counts and analysis of the networks of 
people (Shamma et al., 2009, Trilling, 2014). Sentiment analysis in particular 
often appears in the media as a predictor of popularity of the political 
candidates (Patterson, 2016). Although computer assisted analysis methods are 
convenient due to the vast quantity and speed of the generated content, the 
currently utilised political sentiment analysis tools have low accuracy rates, 
and only explore the broad positive or negative polarity of the text (Wang et 
al., 2012, Wang et al., 2011). As a result sentiment analysis tells us little about 
the underlying behaviours within the user-generated content (Wang et al., 
2012, Wang et al., 2011).  
Another method used for the analysis of Twitter activity was developed by 
Brooker et al. (2018), where the Twitter timelines of users are analysed, rather 
than the associated program hashtag. This method of analysis draws on digital 
ethnography, rather than event-based analysis of content. The benefits of this 
method are that the analysis of the timeline of users who engage with politically 
charged content reveals how socio-political issues fit within their every-day 
lives (Brooker et al., 2018). The study presented below aims to capture some 
of these rich qualitative insights, while keeping the focus on the duration of the 
political debate.  
This research is motivated by the belief that by exploring what types of tweets 
emerge regardless of their political affiliation, we will gain a deeper 
understanding of citizen’s behaviours online during live debates. This in turn 
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can help us find ways to cater and enable citizens engage further with politics 
in order to empower people to take an active role in political deliberation. The 
existing research into the use of Twitter in this context, includes analysis of 
who takes part in this discussion (Shamma et al., 2009, Trilling, 2014), how it 
is used by politicians (Kreiss, 2014) and what sentiment characterises the 
Tweets (Patterson, 2016). What is not well defined and understood is the array 
of behaviours and motivations visible in the tweets. 
4.3.2. Study Design 
To understand why Twitter is used during televised political debates, I 
collected and analysed tweets generated during the 2015 UK General 
Election. The analysis of Twitter use focuses on a single two-hour debate, held 
on April 2nd 2015 on ITV. This was the only debate that featured all major 
parties and had a typical debate format in which all the leaders are on stage at 
the same time. In addition to the three main parties, it also included four of 
the UK’s smaller political parties. I have focused on Twitter due to its live 
event appeal and the ability to easily acquire tweets through a Twitter search 
API. Although it is far from being the only social media outlet utilised during 
televised debates, content is openly visible and broadcasters actively promote 
its use. 
The use of social media as a resource for research data is still an emerging area 
of exploration. There is no consensus on the ethical considerations that should 
be addressed especially when the data is considered openly available 
(Townsend and Wallace, 2015). An approach adopted by academics in the 
United Kingdom and Australia is to consider social media posts as public if 
the social media users expect their data to be public (Townsend and Wallace, 
2015, Wolfinger, 2016). If the data is viewed as public it can then be 
understood that the user consented to the data they publish to be used by 
others (Townsend and Wallace, 2015, Wolfinger, 2016). Twitter is a 
predominantly public platform, which uses hashtags to concentrate posts 
based on topics. Furthermore, the public generated content on the platform is 
now often used in news and media coverage (BBC News, 2015b, Patterson, 
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2016). Based on these considerations I have used the openly available public 
tweets generated during the debate containing the official debate hashtag. 
Although, the data I have used is publicly available on a data repository 
(Taylor and Gorkovenko, 2015) and on Twitter itself, I have deleted 
usernames and links that lead to Twitter accounts from the provided examples 
of Tweets in the result section.  
During the debate, a PHP script was used to access the Twitter search API 
every 30 seconds to request the 100 most recent tweets using #leadersdebate, 
beginning at the start of the debate and continuing for approximately 90 
minutes afterwards. This was the official hashtag for the debate and was 
actively promoted throughout the event. Retweets were excluded from the 
search in order to focus on original authored content. 38,569 tweets were 
gathered and 2% of these tweets (every 50th tweet captured see Appendix A.1) 
were used for an inductive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Thematic analysis was used throughout my research because it is suitable for 
the analysis of a range of different types of qualitative data, including images 
and video. Other analysis methods, such as grounded theory, discourse 
analysis, and sentiment analysis result in the development of findings that are 
not in line with the goals of this research, which is to generate a comprehensive 
understanding of the thematic variety and content within the data. 
Throughout my research I have adopted a more explorative approach that 
has not required the development of a philosophical position before 
conducting the research as is required by grounded theory (Birks and Mills, 
2011). Sentiment analysis has already been used for the analysis of tweets 
generated during televised debates, and results in the development of an 
understanding of the positive and negative sentiment of posts, rather than the 
underlying behaviours that they represent (Wang et al., 2012, Wang et al., 
2011).  Finally, since understanding the linguistic properties of the content was 
not a primary goal of the research I did not use discourse analysis (Drud, 2010). 
The tweets were aggregated in an Excel sheet, which is available on an open 
data repository (Taylor and Gorkovenko, 2015). I manually coded each tweet 
in an additional column that I added to the dataset. Each full tweet was 
62 
 
 
assigned one or more codes. The analysis included all text and images within 
the tweets and considered the content of web-pages attached. I searched for 
the individual tweets on Twitter if they contained and image or a link in order 
to gain a full understanding of the content. Once I coded through the full 
dataset myself and another researcher agreed upon a set of codes to use 
throughout the whole dataset. The tweets often contained multiple codes, 
which could not always be resolved and is further discussed in the findings and 
discussion of the study. Tweets that were representative of multiple codes 
retained all of the coded information until the themes were refined. The tweets 
were then clustered together into the final themes. 
4.3.3. Results 
The analysis resulted in three major themes and another four large sub-
themes. The theme of commentating, which included the sub-themes of 
sharing evaluations, experiences, humour and provoking; and the themes of 
interacting and informing. Described below, these themes cover a range of 
behaviours and give insight into the motivations that led the viewers to post. 
4.3.3.1. Commentating 
Commentary was the most prominent behaviour throughout the dataset. The 
majority of the content within this theme seems reactionary and emotional. 
This content uses Twitter as a platform to broadcast a response to the debate, 
its participants, and the user’s immediate surroundings. The content is diverse 
in nature, often quite humorous and juxtaposes the serious tone of the political 
debate. It is composed of four large sub themes: sharing evaluations, 
experiences, humour and provocation. Although I identified these sub-themes, 
the tweets themselves could often be interpreted as belonging to more than 
one of them, which made it difficult to assess the prominence of each distinct 
category. Instead of a rigid structure of different types of commentary that can 
be observed on Twitter alongside a political broadcast, these subthemes exist 
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within a gradient of emotional and contextual insight into the viewer’s 
reactions.  
Evaluations 
Although many tweets from the data set contained opinions, the tweets within 
Evaluations were overtly focused on a personal analysis of the debate and 
candidates. Twitter provides readers with evaluations of every aspect of the 
debate: the politicians’ performance, the poll results, the debate structure, the 
audience, even the Twitter content itself. Most tweets guide the attention of 
the reader towards the negatives and positives of the debate (“brilliant 
entertainment so far - not sure it will change any voting choice. Pleased @natalieben has held 
her own this time”; “My #leadersdebate scorecard at the three quarter mark: 1. Sturgeon 2. 
Wood 3. Clegg 4. Miliband 5. Cameron 6. Bennett 7. Farage”; “SNP impressive, UKIP 
bonkers, Conservatives don't represent us, Labour good sounbites, Liberals desperate, Greens 
progressive”).  
Many ideas presented to the Twitter observer go beyond the events of the 
debate itself and consider broader knowledge of politics and news (“Everything 
about treatment of Farage/ Bennett/ Sturgeon/ Wood would've been different if they had 
central [government] record to defend”). This evaluative process often merges with 
the endorsement and promotion of certain political leaders. Some simply show 
their support for politicians and quote statements they agree with (“The women 
won hands down”; “@NicolaSturgeon ‘there isn't anything that @Nigel_Farage won’t 
blame on immigrants’), while others give detail about their position possibly in the 
hope to persuade others to vote in a similar way (“As a dad of 1 child with liver 
disease and 1 in [hospital] after huge spinal surgery there is only 1 party I trust for NHS 
#labour”). 
Experiences 
Where Evaluations focused on a personal analysis of the debate, sharing 
experiences gives a more personal and reactionary annotation of the debate. 
Different aspects of the experience are addressed throughout the data set, 
including observations of the debate and the viewer’s surroundings, and 
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emotional reactions. Viewers illustrated both the physical context in which 
they are watching (“THIS IS HOW #leadersdebate night has gone [Figure 4]”) and 
the emotional state of themselves and others around them (“My mum got so tired 
of Nigel Farage’s bullshit, she fell asleep halfway through the debate”). This subtheme is 
also rich in personal emotional commentary, including a reaction to the 
debate (“OH FFS CLEGG, STAND FOR SOMETHING ALREADY. Always on the 
pissing fence.”) and other’s tweets (“‘Wish England could vote for @NicolaSturgeon’ 
^^^Just one of thousands I've seen tonight, wow, just wow!”). The emotional 
connotation of the content is extremely varied and included agitation, 
bewilderment, excitement, disappointment, frustration and relief.  
 
Figure 4 An image shared on Twitter by a Leader's Debate viewer depicting him and his 
family watching the debate together. 
There were also careful observations that guide the attention of the reader to 
intricate details of the content and narrative of the debate (“Ed has gone from 
‘when’ to ‘if’. Clearly he feels he had a bad one”; “Land law fans will appreciate Nick’s 
recent suggestion about renters acquiring a share of ownership in their homes.”). A portion 
of these observations highlight aspects of the character, appearance, and 
speech of the politicians (“They definatly just want to swear and go at each other’s 
throats, think Ed might crack first”; “Miliband sharp on detail. He can think on his feet. 
Cameron struggling. Oh gawd he is using his son again. He has no shame”). Others made 
observations on the Twitter activity and the audience of the debate (“Love the 
@KTHopkins debate commentary! It makes delightful evening reading.”; “Splendid tash on 
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the gent behind Rebecca Creamer”). Sharing personal experiences like the ones seen 
in this theme may help the social network mimic a physical community. 
Humour 
Humour manifests itself in a very complicated manner within the data. 
Although some of the tweets are jokes, it is difficult to separate them from other 
forms of commentary, as humour is usually combined with a political 
statement or opinion. For example, the tweet “So Conservative MPs all think 
Cameron won. Labour MPs all think Miliband won. Liberal Democrat MPs all went to 
bed early” gives an evaluation of the performance of the party leaders but 
conveys this in a humorous way. Although, many tweets are just playful (“If 
you want a fun drinking game than do a shot every time ed millaband says ‘and im sure 
people at home...’”; “Next one to say ‘long term economic solution’ gets a slap.”; “Like the 
Bank of England, the lad who asked the 1st question seemed to have 0% rate of interest once 
the bickering started”), sarcasm and satire are the predominant way that people 
express a humorous opinion (“Oh God it is immigration next. Farage is already 
salivating”). There seems to be an obvious desire to break up the seriousness of 
the debate—exemplified in the widespread use of memes (e.g. Figure 5). The 
images found throughout the data are characterised by their mocking and 
abusive nature. In addition to sharing the opinion of the author, this type of 
content had a secondary aspiration to either entertain, mock, or make 
opinions less antagonistic. This behaviour is grounded in a history of televised 
political satire, irony and parody that is broadcast on television (Young, 2014). 
 
Figure 5 A mocking meme, depicting Nigel Farage in the debate. 
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Provocation 
Provocative tweets throughout the dataset have been written with a variety of 
intentions: some target at specific people or groups in an aggressive manner 
(“WANKER #wallace #EdMiliband”; “Sorry who thinks farage won?!? Who are these 
fools?”; “You'd think if you were asking a question on national tv, Rebecca would make sure 
she had a better haircut”), while others try to provoke thoughts and reflections in 
the hopes of persuading others to vote for their choice of party (“So Cameron 
wants to take an already under performing NHS and improve it by stretching it over an extra 
2 days”; “Vote Labour and get more borrowing, higher taxes and a greater financial burden 
on future generations. #VoteConservative”).  
Most importantly, this theme shows how delicate and personal the topics in 
the debate can be. One of the most tweeted about moments from the debate 
was when a party leader with an anti-immigration stance condemned foreign 
HIV patients receiving free treatment in the UK (Dathan, 2015): this resulted 
in a large quantity of provocative commentary (“How can @Nigel_Farage 
@nigelmake such a statement about HIV very shameful”; “Shame on you #Farage - we 
should be proud we diagnose and treat 60% of non-UK nationals with HIV - not deriding 
it!”). Most tweets within this sub-theme were a strong negative reaction to the 
statement and are provocative and emotional.  
4.3.3.2. Interacting 
Direct interactions between Twitter users were prominent during and after 
the end of the debate. This happened in two ways: the first was through direct 
replies to other users (“@[username]: ‘Rent to own scheme’. Isn't that a mortgage? this 
is what my 12 year old said!”; “@[username] Couple of these lot need the half time oranges 
asap”; “@[username]: Piss off she's not even english? Talking about ‘our NHS’ please leave 
#leadersdebate…”). These tweets, although conversational, we often reactionary 
and emotional reflecting the characteristics of the commentary sub-themes. 
The second type of interactive tweets attempt to directly engage with a large 
segment of Twitter users rather than specific individuals (“Number geeks... If 
Plaid and SNP win every seat they stand in is it numerically possible for them to hold balance 
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of power?”; “If your tweeting about #leadersdebate what are you tweeting about?”). Due 
to the way the data was collected, only the individual tweets containing the 
debate hashtag were visible to the research team rather than the threads they 
formed part of. The lack of access to the conversation threads limited data 
analysis and resulted in a lack of contextual information about the dialog that 
took place. 
4.3.3.3. Informing 
Finally, users added additional layers of factual information to the broadcast 
through the use of links, images and text. During the debate this behaviour 
was characterised by its strong link to the current topic of conversation. 
However, while the content was factual, there was often a clear desire to sway 
the thinking of viewers in a particular direction (“In 2013 397,160 migrants were 
claiming benefits (5.3% of the migrant population & 7% of all benefit claimants)”; “Nicola 
Sturgeon wrong on affordable homes. They are dropping http://t.co/Efew4TBpvM”).  
 
Figure 6 An informative tweet depicting the sentiment of debate topics. 
Near and after the end of the debate the informative tweets changed their 
purpose and were used to inform of news and analysis relating to the debate 
itself (“Positive sentiment associated with Immigration and Borders with debate on policy 
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and diversity [link to image in Figure 6]”; “poll results - Guardian/ICM #leadersdebate 
poll: 25% Miliband 24% Cameron 19% Farage 17% Sturgeon 9% Clegg 3% Bennett 
2% Wood”), or as a way to promote tools (“Feel more #confused after #leadersdebate? 
Here's some plain-English info on the issues that matter: http://t.co/s3ww2rM3og”). 
Unlike the theme of commentary, the informative content was not reactionary 
and emotional, but rather deliberative and backed by visuals, facts or links. 
Within this theme we see the prominent participation of political and media 
experts and even official news pages.  
4.3.4. Discussion 
This first study contributes a view of Twitter usage through a thematic analysis 
of tweets generated during a UK General Election debate. Debate viewers 
used Twitter to commentate along by sharing their evaluations, experiences, 
post humorous and provocative tweets and interact with and inform others. 
The tweets were often rich in contextual information about the location and 
mood of the twitter user and at times provided supporting images and links. 
The tweets gave readers evaluations of and reactions to every aspect of the 
debate, such as the politician’s behaviour, speech, performance, key points, 
and appearance. This indicates that during a debate Twitter is used as a 
broadcasting tool. An array of underlying motivations is evident within the 
themes, such as wanting to share an experience, feel part of a community, 
sway other’s opinions, and engage with others. This diversity of behaviours 
indicates that debate viewers can be exposed to a wide range of political views 
online that may be absent from their other social media platforms. 
Furthermore, these views are expressed in a variety of different ways, some 
emotionally, others more informatively.  
Research shows that 40% of Twitter users do not actively share their thoughts 
on the platform (Holt, 2013), while those who do report concerns about uncivil 
reactions (Bakker, 2013) and sounding ignorant (Semaan et al., 2015a). Thus, 
the provocative tweets visible online may be deterring some users from 
contributing during debates. Since more politically engaged individuals tend 
to have a curated experience on Twitter, due to the pre-formed network of 
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users they follow (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012), the provocative behaviour 
seen in the data may be a greater concern for less politically engaged viewers. 
These users may instead be drawn to Twitter due to its abundance of 
humorous content.  
Although social media platforms provide the public with a platform to voice 
political views, the enormity and density of content online leads people to 
cluster around very popular and prominent sources of political opinion 
(Hindman, 2009). This effect can drown out content posted by users with a 
small following. This raises the question of why people choose to express their 
views through public forums where it is easy to post but difficult to be heard. 
Furthermore, it is vital to investigate what motivates the use of second screen 
devices around debates more broadly, are people interested in each other’s 
views, and do second screens enable meaningful engagement around political 
events?  
This work builds upon previous analysis of twitter content generated live 
alongside a debate, where researchers either looked at the sentiments of the 
posts (Wang et al., 2012, Wang et al., 2011), or have organised the content in 
pre-determined themes, including emotion, attention seeking, informative, 
and opinion (Wohn and Na, 2011). Although sentiment analysis of Twitter has 
been the dominant method for studying discussion around political debates, I 
believe that the categorising of content based on token words may be an 
oversimplification of the posts. As seen throughout the themes, the opinions 
and language used by the viewers is extremely subtle. Humour can often 
disguise negative attitudes, such as in the case of the tweet: “Lol Clegg talking 
about breaking promises“, which alludes to the negatively perceived political track 
record of the leader of the Liberal Democrat Party. Such a statement may 
easily be misinterpreted using sentiment analysis tools. 
Throughout the theme of commentating we saw that viewers shared not just 
their political views, but also their experiences and observations relating to the 
debate. This indicates that Twitter can be used as more than just a tool to 
evaluate the mood of the public, but also gain insights into the most 
noteworthy aspects of the debates. Furthermore, thematic analysis could be 
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used to analyse in detail the views of the public regarding a political debate 
after it is aired, including the perceptions about the audience, participants, and 
questions asked by the host. While this analysis captured the visible behaviours 
debate viewers exhibit on Twitter, it did not provide insights into the personal 
motivations and social contexts that formed this activity. 
4.4. Motivations for Second Screen Use 
As seen in the Twitter content analysis study, the debate audience used the 
platform to broadcast their reactions and thoughts on social media. The tweets 
themselves can give us an indication of a diverse set of underlying motivations 
that trigger this behaviour. While collecting content generated live can 
illustrate the posting behaviours supported by Twitter, many debate viewers 
use their personal devices for other activities and in less visible ways. 
In order to be able to address the research question in this chapter, I needed 
to be able to gain insights into the real-life context of debate viewing. An 
observational study allowed me to both observe second screen activity as it 
emerges live in the living room and communicate with the debate viewers 
about details of the experience.  
4.4.1. Background 
Research in the area has also focused on the use of Twitter during political 
debates, it includes an analysis of its main users (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 
2012), how it is used by politicians (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Kreiss, 
2014, Larsson and Moe, 2011), the language characteristics of the tweets 
(Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011, Bruns and Burgess, 2011, Trilling, 2014) and 
the hindrances of using it for political deliberation (Bakker, 2013, Hindman, 
2009, Semaan et al., 2015b). There is a large gap in our knowledge and 
understanding of second screen use beyond Twitter. This visible and openly 
available behaviour online is only a small subset of the activities that take place 
in the home. Although the analysis of Twitter content from the previous 
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section identified some insights into user motivations, past research does not 
capture the reasons for participating, or for not participating on Twitter. 
Furthermore, even less apparent is the range of behaviours and motivations 
that incentivise second screen use. It is important to capture these less visible 
experiences. By doing so, this study aims to identify new design opportunities 
for second screen applications to support political discourse and engagement 
with debates. The study presented here was designed to investigate the 
motivations and behaviours that frame second screen use in the home. 
The study was conducted around three of the four official televised debates 
aired in the month leading to the UK General Election of May 2015. Through 
at home observations and semi-structured interviews of 18 participants, I 
explore attitudes and practices around second screen use. In doing so, I was 
able to identify not just how second screens are supporting engagement with 
debates, but also how they are not. This research contributes a more nuanced 
understanding of the range of behaviours and motivations around second 
screen use. 
4.4.2. Study Design 
To capture the behaviours and motivations that shape the use of peripheral 
devices during a televised political debate I recruited 18 participants and asked 
them to record themselves, watching a debate of their choosing. By situating 
the observations in the homes of participants I aimed to capture a range of 
real-life contexts in which people watch debates. Furthermore, by having the 
participants film the experience I was able to capture the debate from their 
perspective, seeing the triggers that stimulate second screen activity, the digital 
tools they used, and the social interactions they had with others in the living 
room. The video footage was collected after the debate, it was then condensed 
into a 10-minute segment and used as a memory prompt during a semi-
structured interview. By prompting the participant with the aid of the 
recording, the participants were able to reflect on the motivations and issues 
with the use of their personal devices. 
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4.4.2.1. Recruitment 
I aimed to recruit participants with varied political interests, social media 
usage and viewing arrangements. Thirteen participants were recruited 
through advertisements placed on social media, university mailing lists, 
newsletters and posters. A website containing information about the project, a 
way to contact me, and an invitation to an induction event was circulated as 
part of the recruitment process. The material generated in order to advertise 
the event was branded as Gogglebox for Research, which aimed to help 
potential participants understand that they would be filmed at home watching 
a program before signing up, much like the popular television program 
Gogglebox on Channel 4.  
Two induction events were held, where I presented a short formal recruitment 
presentation to explain the process of the research project to the event 
attendees. Those that wished to participate were invited to sign up to a single 
debate through a sign-up sheet. Everyone who signed up was asked to fill out 
a study pre-questionnaire, which gathered demographic data and explored 
how they engage with politics and social media (see Appendix B.3).   
A further five participants were jointly recruited with another study through a 
collaboration with the University of Dundee’s Politics Department. The study, 
led by Dr Edzia Carvalho and Dr Kristi Winters, is a longitudinal qualitative 
study into how and why people vote the way they do, their perceptions of 
British party leaders, and opinions on British politics. Within their study they 
recruited participants who watched a debate in a room together and took part 
in a pre and post-debate focus group, which recorded their views of the 
performance of the politicians and the debate. The study took place in 
England, Wales and Scotland.  
I elected for a relatively small cohort of 18 to capture rich user experiences not 
possible with a large group. Eligibility was determined by the use of typical 
second screen apps (e.g. social media), ownership of a smartphone, tablet or 
laptop and the desire to watch the debates.  
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4.4.2.2. Participant Information 
Through a combination of the pre-questionnaires and interview data I 
established that all but one of the 18 participants were within the 18 to 29 age 
bracket, with eleven males and seven females. The homogenous age of the 
participants can be explained by the recruitment methods used and by the 
technological focus of the study. The participants had varying levels of political 
engagement: seven of them were very politically engaged (four of which were 
politics students), eight moderately engaged and three slightly. Participants 
were recruited in Scotland (N=15), England (N=2) and Wales (N=1). They 
had a wide range of political party preferences such as Labour (N=4), SNP 
(N=8), Green (N=3), Conservative (N=1) and undecided (N=2), which 
roughly corresponds to general trends in Scotland during that year. They 
indicated that they all used their devices to access either Facebook (N=7), 
Twitter (N=6) or both (N=5) during the debate, as well as varied other new 
sources, messenger services and websites. They mainly used their smartphones 
(N=10), but there were also tablet users (N=5) and laptop users (N=3).  
The pre-questionnaire, filled out by those who watched the debates at home 
provided further details about the participant’s political interests and social 
media use (See Table 1).  
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Table 1 Answers from the Observations Study Pre-questionnaire.  
Pre-questionnaire questions/ statements Positive responses out of 13 
Do you watch political programmes such as Question Time? 
Always - 1 Sometimes - 10 Rarely - 1 Never - 1 
Have you ever used social media during televised political debates for 
political discourse? 
Always - 1 Sometimes - 9 Rarely - 3 Never - 0 
Do you use peripheral devices such as your laptop, phone or tablet while 
watching television? 
Always - 5 Sometimes - 8 Rarely - 0 Never - 0 
Which of the following social media platforms do you use on a regular basis? 
Facebook - 13 Twitter - 6 Google+ - 2 Tumbler - 0 
LinkedIn - 0 Reddit - 1 Other – Instagram (1) 
Do you use social media on a daily basis?           13 
How do you use your device while watching television? 
To look up information related to the TV 
content. 11 
To socialise with others and discuss the TV 
content. 10 
Look at unrelated content. 10 
What would you like to gain from the debate? 
Help me decide whom to vote for. 2 
Knowledge about party policies. 10 
Knowledge about public opinion. 7 
Other – The spectacle 1 
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4.4.2.3. Watching the Debates 
Three debates were included in the study. The first was the Leader’s debate 
hosted by ITV on April 2nd 2015, which included the Conservative, Labour, 
Green, Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru, Scottish National Party and UK 
Independence Party. The second debate aired on April 16th, it was hosted by 
the BBC and included only the “challenger” parties: Labour, Green, Plaid 
Cymru, Scottish National Party and UK Independence Party. Finally, the last 
debate covered by the study was aired on April 30th as a special edition of 
Question Time and followed a Q&A format with each of the leaders of the three 
main UK parties, the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat parties.  
 
Figure 7 Left: An image captured in the home of one of the participants showing him 
watching a debate with his personal device. Right: An image from one of the focus groups. 
All of the participants recruited through this process were given a box 
containing a wearable camera (Figure 8), a clip for the camera, a charging 
cable, popcorn, a cereal bar and instructions on how to charge and operate 
the camera (see Appendix B.4). The package was designed to make the 
observation process easy and comfortable, while through the use of the 
popcorn and snack, create a sense of excitement about the experience of 
watching the debate. The 13 participants who were recruited solely by myself 
watched a debate of their choosing at home (Figure 7, left). They watched the 
debate either alone (N=2) or with a friend or family member (N=11). The 5 
participants who were jointly recruited with the university Politics Department 
used the wearable cameras to record themselves watching the televised debate 
in the same way as those who watched the debates at home, but in a group 
setting (Figure 7, right). In this case, the use of the cameras was facilitated and 
instructed by the Politics Department research team. They did not receive the 
camera and instructions box and did not fill out the pre-questionnaire because 
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I did not personally communicate with them ahead of the debate. Instead, 
they were asked demographic and political interest questions during the 
interview.  
 
Figure 8 The box containing the wearable camera and instructions given to the participants. 
Each participant was provided with a small wearable camera (a Veho MUVI 
Micro) and asked to leave the device recording while watching a debate. This 
approach was utilised in order to capture behaviour in the home where 
participants would act most naturally, without being distracted by the presence 
of a researcher. For their privacy, participants were allowed to pick the 
position of the camera but were encouraged to either attach it to their lapel (to 
capture their view of the television and personal device) or place it directly in 
front of themselves (to capture their face). Only three participants opted for 
the latter placement. All participants were instructed on how to use the camera 
ahead of the debates and expressed confidence about the recording process. 
Example footage is shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 Example footage from collected during the observational study. 
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This footage was not intended to be analysed directly, due to the difficulty of 
meaningfully capturing the nuances of people’s interaction. Instead, it was 
condensed in order to be used as a memory prompt alongside interviews. Each 
recording was reviewed and condensed by the lead researcher into a 10-
minute segment, including moments of high activity and all instances where 
participants interacted with their personal device. We also collected all tweets 
and retweets made by the participants on Twitter and asked that they take 
screenshots from their personal posts on Facebook. In total we recorded 15 
Facebook posts, 49 tweets and 48 re-tweets. 
4.4.2.4. Interviews and Analysis 
Within a week of the debate the participants took part in a semi-structured 
interview about their experience and motivations, lasting between 30 and 80 
minutes. In the first half, participants were asked why they used their 
peripheral devices, what for, what they liked and didn’t like about it, and how 
it augmented the televised event. In the second part they watched the 
condensed video and were prompted to reflect on the footage. The interviews 
were then transcribed and underwent a thematic analysis, during which two 
researchers, including myself, independently coded a set of interviews and 
agreed upon the codes used. The process was done by hand with codes written 
alongside printed copies of the interviews. Once all of the interviews were 
analysed the emerging themes were refined and agreed upon by the research 
team.  
I created a set of standard questions for everyone (Appendix B.5), but based 
on the video footage I generated additional questions that catered to each 
participant. The questions were designed to explore the range of different 
second screen activity that took place, including social media, searching for 
information, communication and unrelated activity. The questions further 
examined in depth how and why the seconds screens were used. The 
anonymised interview transcripts and the Social Printer conversations 
between the households are available on an open data repository from the 
University of Dundee (Gorkovenko and Taylor, 2016). 
78 
 
 
4.4.3. Results 
The findings exposed a number of motivations for utilising second screens 
alongside the debate, but also concerns that participants had about 
contributing content. Below, I describe the three major themes that emerged 
from the thematic analysis: gauging opinion, enriching the debate and sharing 
opinion, further broken down into a number of sub-themes. It is notable that 
the second screen activity captured by the participants almost entirely 
represents social media usage and many of the behaviours mirror those that 
have been identified from examining social media content alone. However, by 
observing and interviewing participants directly, the findings expose wide 
range motivations for utilising second screens and concerns about posting 
content online. 
4.4.3.1. Gauge Opinion 
All 18 participants in the study described the ability to gauge public opinion 
through the use of social media apps as the most valuable aspect of using a 
second screen device. As the interview responses suggest, Twitter and 
Facebook are used in a process of learning what others think, reflecting upon 
that and in most cases reaffirming their own opinion rather than changing it. 
Learn 
The participants learned what others thought about the debate via social 
media apps, although a few also accessed online broadcasters who provided a 
live stream of commentary such as the Guardian and BBC News. When 
reading information and opinions online the participants recognised variety 
and relevance as the most important aspects of online content. Social media 
content was perceived as relevant if it reflected events from the debate 
instantaneously. 
Variety of opinion was vital for the process of learning. For example, the 
participants wanted to see people with opposing views to their own (P1: “You 
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can obviously see people endorsing something that you totally don’t think, so it’s interesting to 
see that opinion”), people from different locations around the UK (P13: “It was 
quite interesting to see especially being [an SNP supporter], what people from England and 
Wales and Northern Ireland thought of them”), and their friends (P14: “It’s interesting 
to see people who are not usually interested in it and who don’t talk about it. Like people who 
I was in school with”). 
Although everyone valued variety, it is interesting to note that there was a 
difference in the sourcing of this diverse opinion between participants who 
perceived themselves as very politically engaged and those who did not. The 
four politics students expressed a preference for their personal Twitter stream 
where they follow a curated group of political commentators, journalists, 
satirical profiles and academics (P17: “I have built up the people that I follow and 
who follow me, sort of got a rapport and sort of share the same sort of attitude rather than 
views”, P4: “I usually keep to my feed because it’s always got good stuff”). The main 
reason that they identified for not being interested in the opinions of the 
general public and their friends who they could find on Facebook was that 
they questioned the quality of their views (P5: “I don’t care what any of my friends 
think really. I mean I care less about what they think than other people who are more 
interested”). In contrast the rest of the participants who perceived themselves as 
less politically involved showed more interest in what friends and family think 
about politics and identified Facebook as a primary source of such opinion 
(P15: “Facebook is more about interacting with people I know”). This behaviour can be 
attributed to the fact that the politics students had an already established 
political community commenting along the broadcast, whereas less politically 
engaged participants lacked a politically-focused network and instead turned 
to friends and family. 
The most prominent type of content that the participants were interested in 
was what others thought were the highlights of the debate, which had the effect 
of guiding their attention to aspects of the event that they might have not 
noticed (P1: “It is definitely beneficial because you get highlighted things that maybe you 
did not think of before”). Often these highlights would include humorous remarks 
about the politician’s behaviour, clothing, mannerisms and speech. The 
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participants were also interested in the tools and experiences of others on the 
internet. On one occasion two of the participants noticed that Twitter users 
were commenting about the live opinion tracker (or ‘worm’) shown alongside 
the broadcast (P6: “We switched to the worm actually because we saw tweets about it”). 
The ‘Top Tweets’ section (a slightly filtered stream of more popular Tweets) 
was a primary way to see what drew the public’s attention (P6: “I was on 
#GE2015 and #BBCdebate. I just search them occasionally and see what rises to the 
surface”). The very politically engaged participants also emphasised the value 
of evaluations of what is said and how the politicians were performing (P17: 
“In an event like that you are interested in when someone says something and someone points 
out that it is false. Correcting them and fact checking”). 
The relevance of content depended on the speed at which it was posted. 
Immediacy was the key factor that made gauging public opinion possible, with 
participants describing it as “instant feedback” (P7). Those that used both 
Facebook and Twitter regularly expressed a preference to Twitter solely for its 
instantaneity (P17: “With Twitter you have got things coming through and it’s easier to 
actually see what is happening. Whereas Facebook feels slower”). 
Reflect 
Knowing how others perceived the politicians and their arguments was then 
used to reflect upon the participant’s political position and the performance of 
the politicians. However, all of the participants felt the online content they saw 
either reaffirmed or did not change their view of the politicians (P18: “From 
reading the comments I saw that most people agreed with me”). One participant 
explained that re-tweeting served as a way of bookmarking interesting tweets 
in order to return to them at a later time (P4: “I would just retweet it so I can go 
back to it [...] so it’s like a diary almost”). Although during the programme everyone 
found that others have a similar opinion to them, in one case the person 
reconsidered their initial impressions based on online content he read in the 
days that followed (P7: “I thought [the Green Party leader] did quite well during the 
debate but then after getting people’s views after it [...] you are putting things together and 
you are like ‘Ahh!’”). It is apparent through the interviews that the participants 
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acknowledged the importance that the second screen had in the process of 
reflecting upon the debate. An understanding of the opinion of others is valued 
and viewed as vital for the understanding of the impact their vote may have 
(P8: “I would rather just feed on everyone’s opinion and get an understanding of what other 
people are thinking other than myself because I want to make the best decision”). The lack 
of structure and enormous amounts of content that they were exposed to 
online was at times detrimental to reflection. 
Reaffirm 
Despite the minor changes of view described above, none of the participants 
reported their political opinion changing dramatically based on what they saw 
online or on TV. No matter how politically engaged a participant was the 
content that they read during the debate had the effect of reaffirming their 
opinion. This was based on three major factors. First, all of the participants 
had a pre-conceived idea of whom they would like to vote for (P3: “I was not 
expecting to go into the debate and change my mind based on social media or the debate itself. 
But I think it could do for someone else”). The second reason is that many of the 
participants experienced an echo chamber effect, where they are mainly 
exposed to views similar to their own (P7: “People wall themselves into echo chambers, 
they surround themselves with the opinions that they want to see or hear”). The third 
reason is that the most participants were dismissive of opposing opinions (P4: 
“When you see something you don’t like [...] I just go ‘you are an idiot’ to myself”). 
4.4.3.2. Enrich Debate 
In the second theme, the personal devices that participants used throughout 
the debate also had the effect of enriching the experience. Many expressed a 
need for this use due to their perception of the debate as “boring” (P4) and 
“shallow” (P5), but also as a “spectacle” (P7) by those with a more positive outlook 
on the debates. The shallowness of the event meant that there was room to 
add value through the use of their devices for entertainment, empowerment 
and as a talking point with the people in their surroundings. 
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Entertainment 
Humour had a positive effect on participants who felt disengaged with the 
broadcast. The participants expressed the opinion that the juxtaposition of the 
seriousness of the political debate with humorous content made politics 
accessible for more people (P5: “Politics is quite dry and boring for most people and 
anything that lightens it up is a good thing”). Humour also served an important role 
in creating a social online atmosphere. Facebook and Twitter were identified 
as a way to feel as if you are in the company of others. This content was 
especially valued by individuals who watched the debate alone (P17: “I think a 
lot of it is just a public way of chatting at the TV screen. It makes it actually feel much more 
of a collective event”). Furthermore, some participants used their devices for 
personal communication and unrelated content in an effort to distract 
themselves from the debate (P3: “A lot of the time I am willingly getting distracted 
because I don’t want to listen to them all that much”, P4: “[Using WhatsApp] was not 
really about the debate it was just general chit chat”). It may seem counterproductive 
that one of the most valued aspects of second screens in the context of a 
political debate is distraction from the debate itself, but since many of the 
participants did not feel very politically engaged it was a way to sustain a level 
of interest in the event. 
Empowerment 
Second screens provided a valuable tool that empowered the participants, 
bridging the public with the politicians themselves. For some, it was a source 
of information about candidates with the aid of search tools like Google (P11: 
“I looked up who was the Green [Party] candidate for [my area]. Because I had not looked 
at that before”), while for others a way to gauge their opinions (P4: “There is a few 
times where I am like ‘Oh I really want to know what [a candidate has] to say’. If they are 
not in my feed immediately then I will look”). The most valuable aspect of being able 
to connect to politicians was that it gave them a sense of authenticity. It was 
not enough for political leaders to have a social media presence: they need to 
be actively engaging with the public, which gave viewers a sense of their 
personality (P17: “It is engaging with them as an individual rather than ‘thank you for 
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your comment’ you are actually engaging in conversation with people. It’s a good way for 
them to be able to show their human side”) and accountability (P6: “I feel that it is a 
platform to represent yourself and if you are not on there then there shouldn’t be a front for 
your name”). This had the effect of generating trust and reinforcing the 
participants’ desire to vote for those individuals (P7: “[The SNP leader] would talk 
to the other politicians, she would tweet journalists [...] the idea that she may tweet you back 
[...] fosters the creation of a sense of trust”). 
In this theme, we also see instances where the television screen took on a 
secondary role. Rather than dictating the online behaviour of the participants, 
it was a catalyst for political activism. For example, one participant was the 
face of a campaign meant to foster empathy towards immigrants who used the 
increased social media attention around the debate to increase the campaign’s 
exposure, much in the way advertisers might (Figure 10). A tweet posted 
through his personal device received many comments, 142 retweets and 88 
favourites (a far greater number than anyone else from the participant group). 
Other participants used less involved tools like change.org to actively engage 
with a cause (P11: “I follow quite a lot of change.org petitions [...] It has had an effect in 
the past”).  
 
Figure 10 An example of a participant using Twitter as a platform for political activism. 
84 
 
 
Use as Talking Point 
This theme was evident in all eleven individuals that watched the debates at 
home with their friends and family. When interesting pieces of information 
emerged from their second screen usage, they shared it with the people around 
them for the purpose of entertainment, education and to socialise. Google and 
Twitter were the main online tools that sparked discussion. 
In one instance, we saw online content being used as an educational talking 
point amongst a family. P4 watched the debate with her father and used 
Twitter at the same time. When she read a tweet by a celebrity regarding the 
debate she shared it and used it as the basis of a discussion about the political 
views of people that may be of interest to her father. This example was 
especially interesting as it involved someone who did not use technology being 
included in the online discourse by proxy. P4 explained that she felt that she 
acts as a bridge between the digital world and her father (P4: “Sometimes he 
would be reading about the debate in newspapers and I would say that I have read on Twitter 
about Russell Brand that he would have not had access to. I think it’s just to... to educate 
him a little bit”). 
All eleven participants who watched the debate with a friend or family 
member discussed the online content they came across with the person 
because face-to-face discourse had greater value to them (P5: “Having a 
conversation with a real person is inherently better”). The conversations that were 
created broadened the experience of the participants: some benefited from the 
contacts and work that was done by the other person (P8: “I was watching the 
debate I was feeding off of what [P7] was looking up and sort of mainly to gain information 
about the parties”), while for others it was another way to make the debate more 
entertaining (P15: “The funny [posts] are the ones you would always show each other”). 
The conversations that they had with each other reinforced learning, reflecting 
and entertainment. The fact that everyone took part in conversing about the 
online content that they found points to the great value that technology may 
have within the living room family dynamic. 
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4.4.3.3. Share Opinion 
The final theme was apparent throughout the interviews, although the ways 
participants shared their opinion varied. While seven of the 18 participants 
did not contribute content online themselves, they still felt that the action 
would be beneficial for others but expressed personal fears, a preference for 
person to person interaction or lack of motivation (P14: “I prefer reading. I talk 
about politics in person but I am too scared of people on the internet”). 
 
Figure 11 An example of a Facebook post made by P13 and comments by the participant’s 
friends underneath. 
Influencing Factors 
The decision to share or not share opinions online was influenced by a number 
of factors. These included the particular properties of the platform being used 
in terms of audience, behavioural norms and effort. Participants often had to 
decide about whom the recipient of the opinion would be (P13: “A lot of my 
friends that I have on Facebook I don’t have on Twitter [...] so it was just a case of trying to 
share my view as much as possible”) (Figure 11). Furthermore, they were aware of 
unwritten etiquette and behavioural norms on social media, especially on 
Facebook. These included frequency of posts and responses, homogeneity of 
attitudes and the probability of a reaction by an unwanted audience member. 
This led to some participants feeling reluctant to post their thoughts (P17: “I 
comment a lot more on Twitter than I do on Facebook. So it would just end up flooding my 
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Facebook timeline with silly comments”, P7: “People’s Facebook timeline they are precious 
about. If you dare talk about politics on their Facebook they are like ‘It’s not like you have a 
politics degree man!’”). 
The two social media platforms also required different amounts of effort to 
post: for example, Twitter’s 140-character limit was perceived as an obstacle 
to self-expression by a few of the participants (P3: “Sometimes when I have Tweeted 
in the past I have had to rewrite it like 4 times. It’s all abbreviated and looks a mess. It looks 
like you can’t spell”). Six of the participants felt it was best to use a platform they 
felt comfortable with in order to post (P3: “I feel I can express myself more openly 
[on Facebook]. I would only get abuse from friends and that is not a problem”), while five 
curated their online activity and used the strengths of multiple social media 
platforms to create a new type of experience (P15: “I just read what other people 
try to say on Twitter and try to gauge people’s opinion. Whereas Facebook is more about 
interacting with people I know and commenting myself”). Small interactions such as 
liking or re-tweeting, usually as an indication of agreement, caused much less 
anxiety (P1: “It’s a good opportunity to try and re-tweet something that someone has thought 
but has maybe articulated it better”). 
Although the perceived audience, effort and etiquette influenced the way the 
participants expressed themselves, the biggest factor that deterred self-
expression was the fear of provoking someone. A large proportion of the 
participants avoided making statements that could lead to disputes or hurt 
people’s feelings (P8: “I don’t even look at an argument, a discussion or a debate I am 
not one to get into it [...] because I don’t want to sound like an arsehole”, P1: “If you say 
something negative it can go badly”). Others found that debating helped them 
solidify their own arguments (P15: “It’s good to hunt out an argument sometimes 
because you learn from arguing with people”). 
Reasons for Sharing 
Only the participants with strong political engagement were able to explicitly 
articulate the value of posting content, other than as a way to react to the 
debate and interact with others. Posting thoughts about the debate had a few 
beneficial outcomes for the participants, such as providing an ego boost (P17: 
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“In a way I am a bit shameless and looking for a bit of attention. Trying to get a joke that 
people will like”), allowing them to light-heartedly commentate (P7: “My Twitter 
is effectively where I vomit up the contents of my mind”), and as an 
opportunity to help their future career (P1: “I probably started tweeting about this 
sort of thing to do it for my career or to have more of an online presence”). 
 
Figure 12 Humorous but mocking tweet from P17 
 
Figure 13 A considered political statement tweeted by P1 
These motivations were clearly reflected in the content posted by participants. 
To get the attention P17 wanted, he humorously mocked the conservative 
party leader’s way of avoiding to answer questions directly and his persistent 
use of ‘sound-bites’ (Figure 12). P1, who saw Twitter as a way to further her 
career, disputed the claims made by politicians by carefully paraphrasing the 
points she disagreed with and expressing her own opinion on them (Figure 13). 
P7, who used Twitter to unload his thoughts, tweeted his opinion on the 
clothes of the politicians, their behaviour and his own excitement about the 
debate (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14 A series of tweets generated by P7. 
Desirable Qualities 
When sharing their opinion online, participants mentioned that humour, 
immediacy and integrity are essential. One participant justified his need to 
make a tweet funny in order to not seem antagonistic, while others simply 
enjoyed being funny (P17: “I come up with humorous comments. To mock him and 
make a bit of a joke out of it. Those are the sort of things that people pick up and re-tweet 
around”). Content posted by the participants included 15 tweets and two 
Facebook posts with humorous content. The majority of those posts use 
sarcasm, satire and irony to mock aspects of the debate. For example, P13 
commented on the behaviour of the Labour leader on Facebook: 
“#leadersdebate Milliband loves talking to us people at home, that makes me trust him 
more...”.  
The instantaneous nature of the debate meant that content needed to be 
generated quickly and be posted while it was still relevant (P15: “It’s generally 
immediately afterwards because generally by the end of the debate you are angry about 
something else”). Statements needed to have sufficient backing otherwise they 
compromised the integrity of the online discussion (P6: “I would not post it if I 
don’t look it up. If I can’t be bothered looking up I will not post it”). However, while the 
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participants spoke about the importance of humour, relevance and integrity, 
the vast majority their own posts focused on aspects of the debate or the 
participants that they disliked. This resulted it overwhelmingly negative 
commentary that was sometimes conveyed humorously.  
The most dramatic difference between the use of the two platforms was that 
Twitter was used to broadcast opinion and Facebook was used for discussions. 
P7, who used Twitter to commentate also used Facebook but in a much more 
interactive way. His post read “So who do you think won?” and underneath he 
took part in a discussion with his friends. This tendency to want to discuss on 
Facebook because of the friend circle that exists there, was evident in those 
other participants that used the platform (P15: “Contribute on Facebook. Read on 
Twitter. Strangers versus friends”). 
4.4.4. Discussion 
Through this study I explored the experiences of second screen users during 
the 2015 UK General Election debates. These findings expose the value that 
viewers see in second screens, but also the concerns they have that prevent 
them from participating further, making it clear that existing desires are not 
being fully met by current second screen applications—which ultimately 
consisted almost entirely of mainstream social media applications. Here I 
discuss a number of possible ways in which online discourse might be better 
supported, largely through more scaffolded or curated experiences. 
Furthermore, I challenge current perceptions of second screens and imagine 
new possibilities for technology to make the experience more inclusive. 
4.4.4.1. Participation  
It was clear from the interviews that the mechanics of the social media 
applications being used played a large part in determining how likely 
participants were to contribute. Factors at play included the perceived 
audience, impact, effort and normative rules governing the network. These 
considerations could at times be crippling, leading participants to agonise over 
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draft messages, or more often simply withdraw from the conversation. 
However, these opinions varied dramatically: some of the participants were 
apprehensive about taking part in an online discussion, while others saw it as 
an opportunity to develop their ideas.  
As we saw in the study, participants’ Facebook accounts were connected with 
their friends and family, which had the effect of discouraging some of the 
participants from posting their opinions knowing that they may be perceived 
negatively. Twitter posed a different set of challenges, such as the perception 
that “it can go badly” (P1) if you post controversial views or get into an argument 
with strangers. As previous research has observed, there is no coherent notion 
of the audience an individual thinks they are communicating with online 
(Marwick and boyd, 2010), leading to a variety of behaviours based on the 
individual perceptions of the individual. Platforms like Facebook where the 
full network of ‘friends’ a user has can comment on their posts result in less 
open and agreeable online behaviour where users avoid controversial topics 
due to fears of being judged (Taber and Whittaker, 2018). These issues form 
part of a much greater problem concerning abusive behaviour online that 
defies any straightforward design solution, requiring further research on 
behavioural norms online.  
4.4.4.2. Conflicting and Reaffirming Opinions  
The very politically engaged participants, such as the politics students, used 
Twitter as their primary second screen application. They had different intents 
behind the use of their device, for example one participant said they used it 
like a diary to log in their thoughts and another to maintain social media 
presence to aid their future political career. Despite the varied incentives 
identified by the politically engaged participants, they were mostly interested 
in content uploaded by specific individuals whom they were following. They 
all looked at the hashtag but preferred the filtered, refined content provided 
by their personal page. In contrast, less politically engaged participants used a 
larger variety of applications, such as Facebook and Google. They favoured 
talking to others about politics in person, on through more intimate Facebook 
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groups and chats. Furthermore, when they used Twitter they were much more 
interested in the hashtag itself where they could scope the public’s opinion as 
a whole.  
There is an interesting tension between the participants’ desire to curate their 
online experience and their desire to gauge the public’s opinion. Although the 
content on social media needed to be diverse, provocative content was 
disliked. Participants with existing high levels of political engagement 
eliminated this factor by creating a highly curated online experience for 
themselves and selecting specific circles of people to interact with and learn 
from. Although this had the effect of exposing them to more informed 
commentary, it decreased access to broader public opinion. This created the 
so-called “echo chamber” effect, where people gravitate towards those with 
similar views (Doris-Down et al., 2013). As previous research suggests, this 
serves to narrow the scope of the information that can be accessed and 
reflected upon by an individual, reinforcing existing beliefs (Doris-Down et al., 
2013).  
4.4.4.3. Curating Quality Content  
Across the participant group, humour, integrity and immediacy were essential 
qualities for the content that participants wanted to read and post. Some felt 
that content given by politicians and online commentators had to be verified 
before being accepted as true or distributed further. Researching points of 
interest during the political broadcast posed difficulties due to the fast-paced 
nature of the event. The content needed to be relevant to the topics discussed 
on screen at the time, which helped create a sense of a shared experience with 
viewers across the country.  
As previous research indicates, humour is an important part of online political 
engagement around debates (Davis et al., 2018, Young, 2014). The 
participants valued humour as a way to express themselves without being 
antagonistic and as welcomed distraction online. Humour may be useful when 
designing for groups with low political engagement by adding entertainment 
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value to the debate. For example, applications that allow the easy generation 
of ‘memes’ could act as a simple way of creating discussion within the social 
group of a politically disengaged viewer. Past research has noted playful 
aspects of online political discourse (Shamma et al., 2009) but it has overlooked 
its potential to make politics feel more accessible by the wider public. 
Conversely research also indicates that political satire, parody and irony, can 
reduce argument scrutiny and counter argumentation. 
4.4.4.4. Contrasting Home Observations and Twitter Analysis 
The participants valued social media as a way to gauge public opinion. It 
provided an opportunity to learn, reflect and reaffirm their own opinions. As 
could be seen in the Twitter analysis, the platform was rich in diverse 
commentary that could give viewers insight into the reactions and evaluations 
of the public. Furthermore, the participants expressed a desire for humorous 
content as a way to lighten the mood and make the debates more entertaining 
and Twitter was rich in such humorous commentary.  
Although, through the process of thematically analysing the tweets from the 
first study and the data from the observations study the need to inform or 
educate others appeared in both sets of data what is interesting is that it 
appeared in a very different context. When this theme was found within the 
Tweets it had the role of educating the public through fact checking, giving 
addition information through links, promote online tools, fact check the 
politicians, etc. In contrast, when this same theme of informing and educating 
others was found in the observation study it was in relation to the people 
around them in the setting in which they were watching the debate. The 
participants in the observation study who watched the debate with a friend, 
partner and those in the group setting used the online content they found in 
order to start discussions. This action had the effect of creating new 
conversations around the debate and enrich it through humour, exchange of 
ideas, clarification of information, the sharing of an experience and to broaden 
the conversation. As the participants stated the “real life” conversations are 
inherently better than socialising online.  
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As seen in the observation study only 6 of the 18 participants used Twitter as 
part of their second screen activity around the debates. Those that did use 
Twitter considered themselves very politically engaged. This points to how 
important it is to consider and understand the use of second screens beyond 
Twitter, especially as a way to understand the value of social screens for less 
politically engaged viewers. Furthermore, studying the visible behaviours 
online gives little indication of other active forms of political engagement that 
can be observed in the home, such as discussions in the living room, or use of 
private political Facebook groups. 
4.4.4.5. Challenging the Notion of the Second Screen  
Although within this thesis I have adopted the term ‘second screens’, the 
theme of Share Opinion demonstrated that as online discourse increases in 
importance, the television itself becomes secondary, acting as a metronome 
that brings people together and sets the topic, but that is ultimately secondary 
to the online discussion. In the context of political debates, the viewers can 
take on a multitude of new roles with the use of their phones and tablets, such 
as fact-checkers, content contributors, activists and spectators. Furthermore, 
these online activities were able to spark discussion in the living room, which 
encourages political engagement. This indicates that “second screen” activity 
should not be restricted and framed by the hierarchy and device implied 
within the phrase.    
I see opportunities to re-think not only the terminology of what I call a second 
screen but also re-envision what form it can take and how it can be used. This 
may open up new possibilities for involving the public in a national 
conversation. Whereas most second screen applications assume a solitary user, 
the second screens within the observation study were conduits through which 
a group of collocated viewers can engage in online discourse. In particular, it 
is worth remembering that political debates are not just watched by young, 
tech-savvy people, but are potentially of interest to any citizen. This creates an 
opportunity to explore innovative connected devices for use within this 
context. Much like one participant included her father in her second screen 
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experiences by reading out Tweets for him, there seems to be an opportunity 
to use technology not just on an individual level but to encourage its use within 
a group or family dynamic. Placing a further emphasis on group discussions 
could add greater importance to both the broadcasted event and the online 
content.  
4.4.4.6. Limitations  
Nearly all the participants were young, active social media users in the UK, 
particularly Scotland. However, research has shown similar trends in political 
engagement across Western Europe and North America, e.g. in the growth of 
web-based campaigning (Gibson et al., 2003) and decline in youth 
engagement (Esser and Vreese, 2007). That is why I have reason to believe 
that the findings from the observational study may have broader applicability 
across this region, although further research would be needed to verify this.  
Although the sample size is relatively small, this was necessary to capture in-
depth experiences as opposed to more shallow observations, and this 
qualitative approach is modelled on other similar work into second screens 
(Nandakumar and Murray, 2014) and social media in political deliberation 
(Semaan et al., 2015b). I approach this work not with the intention of 
contributing a definitive picture of second screen behaviours, but rather to 
develop insights into current usage that can be used to design new applications 
and interfaces for engagement with debates.  
Finally, the use of the Veho MUVI Micro camera proved challenging within 
the home context. There are always risks when handing over control of the 
recording process to participants, but it was difficult to anticipate the extent to 
which this would affect the quality of recordings. In addition to awkward 
camera angles and compromised audio, the camera’s low resolution and 
quality in dimply lit environments meant that large portions of the footage 
were not usable for analysis purposes. As a result participants who used the 
cameras in low lighting produced video where all of the screens can be seen as 
white rectangles with no distinguishing visible content. This made analysing 
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the footage impossible despite my hopes to analyse it in addition to the 
interviews. 
4.4.5. Summary 
While the increasing role of social media allows more people than ever to share 
opinions, many challenges remain in making these opinions heard. It is 
important therefore, to understand how existing technologies can evolve to 
support improved discourse.  
The two studies presented within this chapter contribute an understanding of 
how and why debate viewers utilise second screens during a debate. They 
provide insights into the range of activity that takes place in the home and the 
needs that motivate them. The Twitter study revealed that viewers like to 
interact and inform others and commentate along by sharing their evaluations, 
experiences, humour and provocations, while the observation study revealed 
that second screens are being used for a range of activities, many of which do 
not result in any visible online activity. In particular the observation study 
gathered insights into why second screens are used alongside debates, the 
digital tools used, and the strategies for online engagement. Sharing opinions 
online was done by only half the participants, those that did not post online 
expressed worries about who might see and interact with their content and 
how that might affect them negatively. Instead second screens were a valuable 
way to gauge the opinions of others, reflect and reaffirm your own views. 
Finally, the observations study revealed that second screens can enrich the 
debate. They can empower very politically active viewers to engage with 
others or allow less engaged viewers to find a source of entertainment or 
provide a talking point within the living room. By examining motivations and 
frustrations around second screen usage during political debates, this research 
has contributed a more nuanced understanding of these behaviours than can 
be seen from examining social media content alone.  
Observations and interviews with participants revealed a wide range of 
motivations, including gauging the public’s opinion, enriching the debate and 
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sharing one’s own opinion. These in turn point to future directions for 
research, such as the potential for humour to make political discourse more 
inclusive and the need to re-evaluate the implied hierarchy between devices in 
the phrase second screens.  
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5. Connected Products as Second 
Screens 
5.1. Introduction 
My research into current second screen practices around debates revealed 
how personal devices could take on a more primary role than the televised 
debate itself. The observation study, which utilised at home observations, saw 
that for many politically engaged debate viewers the debate was at times 
predictable and using a personal device to access the news or other’s opinions 
could make the debate more entertaining and informative. The debate 
audience adopted their personal devices to gauge the public’s opinion, enrich 
the experience and to share their thoughts. Such use was primarily supported 
through social networking platforms like Twitter and Facebook. The 
broadcast acted as a metronome of discussion topics on social media, changing 
the topics and mood of content and social interactions as the debate 
progressed. Understanding that the personal device can hold a more primary 
position during televised debates led me to question the assumptions 
encapsulated by the phrase “second screens”. The phrase depicts the personal 
device as secondary to the TV. It also describes the personal device as a screen, 
which severely limits its scope and form. Defining the act of using a personal 
device alongside watching television in such narrow terms could in turn limit 
our search for engagement solutions with debates. This led me to consider how 
smart devices in the home, like IoT products and smart TVs, can facilitate 
new experiences that go beyond screen based interactions.  
Technology does not exist in isolation but is part of an evolving ecosystem. 
The television viewer’s attention is now split between traditional broadcast 
media and other devices used to access other streams of content for a variety 
of related and non-related purposes (Proulx and Shepatin, 2012). As 
technology continues to shift in the home environment, new developments in 
the coming years will likely include connected products and the Internet of 
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Things. This leads me to question: what might it mean to engage with 
television and politics in a world of connected objects? 
Connected products have the potential to shift the experience of watching 
televised debates away from conventional screen-based devices. This study 
aims to understand the possibilities of a physical device alongside political 
debates, and in the process challenge the assumed nature of the second screen. 
To explore this I developed the Social Printers: connected objects designed to 
support engagement with political television, aiming to extend the search for 
political engagement tools beyond individual personal devices and towards the 
next major technology developments. The Social Printers act as research 
products (Odom et al., 2016), designed to address the following question: 
Can emerging technologies offer new opportunities for engagement in 
political discourse around televised debates? 
Social Printers are physical devices that create a pseudonymous social network 
between households during televised political debates. The network of devices 
allows users to communicate with each other through printed messages. I 
aimed to investigate how connected products could be used to engage viewers 
with debates. By displacing the interaction from conventional social media and 
second screens I observed that the printers were successful in encouraging the 
participants to share their thoughts and create a personal social experience. I 
primarily contribute to the study of second screens for political discourse by 
exploring how connected products might contribute to the experience of 
watching and engaging with televised debates and by challenging the 
dominance of conventional screen-based interactions. Based on the results I 
discuss potential implications for conventional social media and second 
screens in the context of political television programs. 
5.2. Context 
Two major political events took place in the United Kingdom during 2016. 
The first, was the Scottish Election, which took place on the 5th of May and 
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saw the third consecutive win of the SNP party. The second, was the EU 
referendum, which took place on the 23rd of June and resulted in the United 
Kingdom voting to leave the European Union.  
The Scottish election had two debates early in the campaign, one at the end 
of March, and another, which aired on BBC Scotland on the first of May. The 
second debate focused on the possibility of a second Independence 
referendum in the event of a “substantial change in circumstances’, such as 
Scotland being taken out of the EU without the support of the public (Hastie, 
2016). The election resulted in a victory of the SNP but fell two seats short of 
winning a majority in the parliament. 
The EU referendum saw a heated campaign between the ‘Brexit’ and 
‘Remain’ sides. The campaign was closely followed by the media and involved 
eleven televised and online debates (Elgot, 2016). The debate on immigration 
played a key role throughout the campaign and was embodied in the most 
popular slogan of the campaign: “take back control” (Clarke et al., 2017, 
Rentoul and Johnston, 2016). The refugee crisis, which continued throughout 
2016 highlighted fears that if the United Kingdom remained in the single 
market it would have little choice but accept refugees like all other EU member 
states (Dearden, 2016). Furthermore, the lifting of free movement restrictions 
on new EU member states at the end of 2014, further exacerbated the public’s 
worries over the immigration issue (BBC News, 2014). The EU’s agriculture 
and fishing regulations also reinforced the Leave argument against allowing 
the EU to dictate laws that affect British businesses. These issues highlighted 
some of the ways in which the United Kingdom had handed over power and 
control to a seemingly anonymous group of unelected 'Brussels bureaucrats' 
(BBC News, 2016a). In contrast the Remain campaign lacked a coherent 
message and a positive framing of an argument for remaining in the European 
Union (Behr, 2016). Instead, the Remain campaign was often criticized for 
scaremongering rather than giving viable examples of the ways the EU 
benefits the United Kingdom (Clarke et al., 2017, Rentoul and Johnston, 
2016). The campaign resulted in a victory for the Leave campaign with a 
51.89% share of the public vote. The public voted in favour of leaving the EU 
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based on benefit-cost considerations, risk assessment and an emotional 
reaction to the EU (Clarke et al., 2017).  
5.3. Study Design 
To understand the possibilities of a physical device alongside political debates, 
I created the Social Printers: a network of physical devices that allow users to 
communicate with each other through printed messages. By displacing the 
social interaction from the screen, I could explore how alternative interfaces 
might affect social interactions around political broadcasts. Five printers were 
deployed in two month-long studies, the first during the 2016’s Scottish 
Parliamentary election, and the second during the EU Referendum. Each of 
the political campaigns were accompanied by various televised events and 
broadcasts in the month leading up to the vote, including debates, special 
Question Time episodes that focused on the campaign, and other political 
broadcasts. They were deployed into a total of nine households over the two 
studies. The small number of households allowed the participants to 
communicate within a small closed network.  
In each study, five households were asked to take a printer into their home for 
25 to 35 days. The long duration of the study was necessary in order to allow 
participants to get used to the products and form relationships with each other. 
Each study had a pre-arranged schedule of eight TV programs, which the 
participants were asked to watch with the printer. They were informed that 
they were not required to interact with the other participants if they did not 
wish to do so. I explained that they had to watch the schedule of programs I 
had provided for them and that the other households would watch them as 
well. I also explained that they could use the printers to communicate with 
each other but that they were not obliged to do so. The explanation of what 
was expected of them was purposefully ambiguous in order to see what activity 
emerged naturally. In addition to the printer, each participant was given a 
small instruction booklet, which contained information on how to connect the 
printer to their Wi-Fi network and some general information about the study 
(see Appendix C.3), and a scrapbook, in which they could collect and annotate 
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prints if they wished, which were used as prompts in interviews. For all of the 
households, except Blue who did it himself, I personally went to install the 
printer and connect it to the local Wi-Fi network.  
5.3.1. Approach 
Research into connected products from the past ten years has already 
developed a rich understanding of the relationships between people, their 
home environment and technology (Baillie and Benyon, 2008, Gaver et al., 
2016, Gaver et al., 2006, Lindley et al., 2010, Odom et al., 2016). Baillie and 
Benyon (2008) explored how technology in the home is part of contextually 
grounded activities, where its location could influence its relationship with 
different household members. Within Lindley et al.’s (2010) work we see how 
household-messaging systems placed in the homes of different families showed 
the emergence of playful behaviour, while William Gaver often explores the 
ways in which technology can stimulate ludic engagement, which is motivated 
by curiosity reflection and exploration (Gaver et al., 2016, Gaver et al., 2006, 
Gaver et al., 2015, Gaver et al., 2004). Gaver’s Interactive Tablecloth, which 
illuminated patterns on a dining room table based on the activity that has 
taken place on it, served as an object for reflection, interpretation, social 
interaction and aesthetic appreciation (Gaver et al., 2006). The Drift Table, a 
coffee table that lets people explore aerial photography of the United 
Kingdom through a weight sensitive interface, was deployed into a London 
home for a six week period of time and demonstrated how, when using 
technology without instruction, people are motivated to explore its 
functionality through their curiosity (Gaver et al., 2004). Perhaps most 
relevant to this work, physical devices, such as an automated radio called the 
Energy Babble, have the potential to construct publics around issues, by 
forming a concentrated account of current discourse around a topic (Gaver et 
al., 2015). 
My approach has been influenced by existing design-led work including 
technology probes (Hutchinson et al., 2003) and research products (Odom et al., 
2016): inquiry-driven, in-situ, finished and independent research artefacts. 
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The use of such research tools has been shown to stimulate reflection, and 
speculation in participants (Gaver et al., 2006, Helmes et al., 2011). The Social 
Printers were designed to provide a new way for viewers to engage with each 
other and the debates, while prompting reflection on the role of a physical 
device in the home. To achieve this, we adopted one of the most common 
tropes in IoT product design: The Internet-connected printer. I was inspired 
by projects like the Little Printer (Bandziulis, 2014), which delivered a 
personalised news feed and the Reflexive Printer, which stimulated 
reminiscence (Tsai et al., 2014). In taking this common IoT form, we intended 
to capture some of the enchantment of connected products without becoming 
too engrossed in specific aspects of the design. 
5.3.2. Deployment 
The first study took place in the run-up to the Scottish Parliament elections in 
May 2016. There was little expectation of a surprising result in the election, 
due to the widespread popularity of the current governing party. There was 
only a single televised debate four days before polling day. The study instead 
focused on two weekly political shows: Question Time (a debate programme) and 
Sunday Politics (a discussion programme), which the participants watched for 
four weeks (Table 2). The study ended with the Leaders’ Debate. During this 
study, a tweet from the Top Tweets feed for each programme’s Twitter 
hashtag was selected and forwarded to the printers every five minutes. To 
provide some variation, I cycled through tweets representative of an opinion, 
personal experience, humour, provocation, or a question. These categories 
were based on my findings from the first study presented in section 4.3. In 
order to select a tweet, I refreshed the top tweets feed and forwarded the first 
one that matched the theme that I wanted to send to the participants.  
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Table 2 The schedule of programs during the first study around the Scottish Parliamentary 
election of 2016. 
Date Program Households Present 
07 April 2016 Question Time 3 
10 April 2016 Sunday Politics 4 
14 April 2016 Question Time 2 
17 April 2016 Sunday Politics 2 
21 April 2016 Question Time 3 
24 April 2016 Sunday Politics 1 
28 April 2016 Question Time 3 
01 May 2016 Leader’s Debate 4 
The second study took place around the June 2016 referendum to decide 
whether the UK should remain in the European Union. This was a strongly 
contested and exceptionally close vote, with five televised debates. The 
participants watched a total of eight programs over a three-week period, which 
included the five debates, two political panel shows, and live coverage of the 
counting of the votes (Table 3). During this study, I only sent prompts to the 
printers if there was a lull in the conversation of five minutes. Instead of 
forwarded tweets, these were broad discussion topics, e.g. what do you imagine 
may happen in the case of leaving the EU? 
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Table 3 The schedule of programs during the second study around the EU referendum of 
2016. 
Date Program Households Present 
02 June 2016 Scotland 2016 Newsnight 4 
05 June 2016 Sunday Politics 2 
07 June 2016 Cameron and Farage Live: The EU Referendum 3 
09 June 2016 The ITV Referendum Debate 4 
15 June 2016 Question Time EU Referendum Special with Michael Gove 5 
21 June 2016 EU Referendum: The Great Debate at Wembley Arena 4 
22 June 2016 Europe: The Final Debate with Jeremy Paxman 4 
23 June 2016 Exit Poll Results 4 
5.3.3. Social Printers 
The Social Printers are connected devices intended to be situated alongside 
the television in the participant’s living rooms for the duration of each study. 
Each object housed a thermal printer and Electric Imp, an IoT connectivity 
platform, in a simple case made from laser-cut MDF and an acrylic top (Figure 
15).The Electric Imp controller connected the devices to the internet and 
allowed for the messages to travel between the households. The messages were 
printed on long strips of paper, using the same technology as common till 
receipts. The object was relatively small in size 120mm wide, by 120mm deep, 
by 95mm high. The printer had to be connected to an electrical socket using 
a two-meter-long charger and could not operate with a battery pack due to its 
long stay in the participants households.   
Each household had a unique URL printed on the front of the object leading 
to a simple text entry form, which they used to write their messages. Messages 
could be submitted through any device with a web browser. Messages 
submitted through the web interface were broadcast to the entire network and 
printed in every other household (Figure 16). Each household was identified 
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by a colour to make the network pseudonymous. The colour of the household 
corresponded to the colour of paper that they received with their printer. 
Coupled with the small number of participants, this meant they would be able 
to build relationships amongst themselves but did not have to worry about 
being identified.  
 
Figure 15 The Social Printer was essentially a small laser-cut box containing an Electric Imp 
and a thermal printer. 
 
Figure 16 The simple text-entry form could be accessed through any personal device and 
printer messages onto the whole network of households. 
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5.3.4. Participants 
In line with my research approach, the Social Printers were deployed with a 
relatively small cohort in order to gain in-depth insights into their individual 
experiences. There were 14 participants in total from nine different 
households, who were recruited through social media, university mailing lists 
and posters. Each household was given a £10 Amazon gift-card for their 
participation. I aimed to recruit participants with varied political interests, 
ages, and household dynamics (Table 4). Through a pre-interview we 
established that throughout both studies there were households with 
participants in their 20s (N=8), 30s (N=3), and 50s (N=3). There were 7 males 
and 7 females. They rated their political engagement level on a rating scale 
from 1 (low) to 7 (high). Although all of the participants in both studies 
expressed fairly liberal political views, their voting patterns varied across 
different political parties, including SNP, Labour, Green, and Lib Dems. 
Everyone except the Pink household were used to using second screen devices 
while watching TV. All of the participants used a smartphone to send messages 
to the printers, except Yellow who also used her laptop. The conversations 
started up to 10 minutes before the scheduled programs and ended up to 5 
minutes after it had finished.  
The participants had varying occupations. Blue is an academic and computing 
lecturer. The White household contained a political researcher for a Labour 
MP and a zoology student. The Green household contained a man who works 
in a factory constructing routers and a female who works in retail. The Pink 
household had an art teacher and a health and wellbeing consultant. Yellow 
is a Product Design student. The Violet household contained a female web 
developer and a male dentist. Red is an SNP party member. The Lime 
household contained a man who works in retail and a jewellery designer. 
Finally, the Mint household contained a PhD student in neuroscience and a 
support worker.  
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Table 4 Pre-interview data for participants in the Social Printers study - gender, age, number 
of prints and political engagement level. 
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All but one of the households from the first study volunteered to take part in 
the second study as well. In order to include more participants but still enable 
the reflections of continuing individuals I chose two households to continue. I 
chose Yellow and Pink, as Yellow was the only participant who was very much 
undecided about their future vote on the EU, and Pink, due to their limited 
social media use. Lime dropped out of the study after the first program due to 
personal circumstances and was replaced by Mint. 
5.3.5. Interviews and Analysis 
The participants were interviewed twice, once before the study and then again 
within two weeks of the end. The post-interviews explored a variety of 
questions about having the Social Printers for the duration of a month, such 
as the positives and negatives of the experience, how did all household 
members react to having the device, how it affected watching the debates, how 
it affected the participants self-expression, and in what ways it stimulated and 
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impeded discussion with the other households (See Appendix C.4). The post-
interviews were supported by the complementary prints collected by the 
participants in the scrapbooks, and the full print conversations, which I 
brought along. Most of the interviews were conducted in the living-rooms of 
the participants where the printers were situated, but a small number preferred 
to be interviewed elsewhere. All of the interviews were semi-structured. The 
pre-interviews lasted between 10 and 80 minutes and the post interviews 
between 30 and 80 minutes. The interviews, prints and scrapbooks (See 
Appendix A.2) were thematically analysed by hand (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
A section of the codes that were generated through the analysis were verified 
by a second researcher. Once all the data was analysed the emerging themes 
were refined and agreed upon by the team. 
5.4. Results 
While the households had the Social Printers, they were able to adopt them 
into their viewing of the scheduled programs. Below we outline the themes 
that emerged from the interviews and other collected data. Within we see the 
behaviours and attitudes that shaped the experience.  
5.4.1. Roles and Responsibilities  
The object naturally demanded a lot from the participants. It required them 
to multitask and concentrate, splitting their attention between the program, 
printer and the personal device where they were entering messages. They had 
to choose what they prioritised: the debate or the printer, which largely 
depended on the quality of the debate. Mint recalled that “when the debate was 
better we actually [...] messaged slightly less”. The experience was described as 
overwhelming and Pink reported feeling “quite exhausted afterwards”. Due to my 
ambiguous explanation of the printer’s purpose, participants were at times “not 
sure what [they] were supposed to be doing”. Regardless, they all established a set of 
behaviours by the end of the study. Despite the effort involved, participants 
were not put off by this:  
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Pink: “We made an effort to watch these programs and 
concentrate on them rather than just letting them go over the top of 
your head” 
Many of the participants were used to using second screens on a regular basis, 
so by the end of the study, in addition to interacting with the object, they often 
returned to their usual TV viewing habits. Yellow was texting friends, and 
Violet and Red were scrolling through Twitter.  
In five of the households, both individuals living in the home wanted to take 
part in the study. Nonetheless, there was always one participant that took a 
lead role. We call the participant that took ownership of the Social Printer 
primary and the other, who participated less in the study, secondary. In all those 
households, the secondary participant was less politically engaged than the 
primary. The primary participant in the Mint household pointed out that his 
partner “doesn’t have confidence in her political opinions even though they are valid and 
good, I think she thinks that everyone is this mad political genius”. This led him to take 
up responsibility for interacting with the printer. They watched the programs 
together and often discussed the debates. She read the prints, sometimes even 
typed out the messages he wanted to send but refrained from sending a 
message herself. Although she did not want to send messages to the others, she 
felt that “it was quite nice hearing other people’s views and not getting involved in it. I quite 
like being a spectator”.  
In the Violet household, the secondary participant helped during the debates. 
Violet recounted that her partner “would read the printer while I watched [the 
programs], he was filtering out the chatter to pick up the main points so that I could reply 
to them”. Unlike the secondary participant in the Mint household, he was not 
shy about sharing his opinions with the others in the study and even sent out 
a few prints himself, but said he preferred to focus on the debates instead. In 
the White household, the secondary participant also helped by filling the 
scrapbook.  
110 
 
 
White: “Usually I would watch [the programs] myself. [My 
partner] stuck them all down and she would read them afterwards 
and just laugh.”  
In the Pink household, the primary participant involved her partner by testing 
her messages on him and seeing his response, which was “just a way to test whether 
I was saying something really stupid”. Although her husband did not engage with 
the printer, their 12-year-old son typed in some messages for his mother. Her 
slow typing speed led her to the idea: “Because I thought if I get him to do the typing, 
I can focus on the debate and I can read what is being said.”  
In the households where not all household members were taking part, there 
was a level of suspicion and unease towards the object and the study’s 
intentions. Red’s husband “would say: ‘there is more to this’”, when questioning 
her behaviour and the activity on the Social Printers. Yellow’s flat-mate called 
it a “listening box”, alluding to potential dystopian intentions. Although Yellow’s 
flatmate had doubts about the purpose of the object, she was also “quite interested 
in reading all of the responses”.  
Lime and Red observed reluctance from their partners to get involved with 
the study. Red lives with her husband and two children, and although she 
watched some of the debates with her husband they refrained from talking 
about the debate, which they would usually do. This may be due to the 
perception that “it was a thing that I had been asked to do”, which distanced him 
from the social aspects of watching together. The children expressed more 
curiosity towards it: although Red had forbidden them to touch it, they would 
often go and sniff the object, which had a peculiar odour due to the laser-cut 
MDF.  
Red: “the wee one in particular loved the smell [...] Burnt 
macaroni cheese. And quite often ‘What are you doing?’, ‘I am 
just sniffing the printer’, ‘Right okay’.”  
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5.4.2. Physicality and Presence  
As well as anticipating the start of the political programs, Violet recalled “sitting 
and waiting for the first print to come through”. The use of the printers was tightly 
bound to the debates and “came to life” when a scheduled program started. 
There was a positive response to the Social Printer itself: Red reported she 
“quite liked having the wee thing”. For some it was “quite a natural object to have”, while 
others became accustomed to it over the duration of the study. The Mint 
household detailed their positive impressions of the smell, size and aesthetics 
of the object, which contributed to it fitting in with their home. They perceived 
using an object as the basis for a social interaction as novel and engaging.  
Mint: “I found it quite novel that you had to look to a specific 
object to see what someone else had to say [...] That it is actually 
a physical object rather than a screen.”  
Yellow: “It’s nice the way you are getting data coming out of just 
the printer. And you don’t have any sort of extraneous things 
around, you don’t have personal profiles like you do on social 
media.”  
Although the object itself was perceived positively, it was at times restricting 
having to be in a specific place at a specific time to interact with the others.  
Yellow: “It is quite awkward. Because you need to get everybody 
there and available to work, otherwise you get into a situation 
where you only have one or two people, and it just doesn’t.”  
Blue moved the printer between two rooms, dependent on where he was 
watching TV. Nevertheless, he felt the object locked him in one place. Red on 
the other hand was not as confident when it came to unplugging and moving 
the printer. In the interview she mentioned she did not want to unplug it, 
meaning she was “sitting squished over on one side of the room”. This caused some 
frustration in her household when she missed one of the debates. When she 
came home late after work she found her husband irritated by the noise and 
paper coming out of the printer: “I should have switched it off, but because there wasn’t 
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a sort of clear, sort of on/off I didn’t want to mess it up”. Although some of the other 
households were also uncertain about moving and turning off the printer, they 
were often better able to adapt it to their needs.  
Mint: “It was good that the wire was long enough so we could 
move it from where it was plugged in to closer to where we were 
sitting.” 
Violet and Red also missed some of the features of the conventional social 
media chats they were used to, such as the ability to send images and links. 
Violet had wanted to send a web link before realising the others would not be 
able to follow it. But despite the shortcomings of the Social Printers, they often 
became a conversation piece. The participants reported sharing information 
about the object with others.  
Red: “People that I got round the house: ‘This is my wee friend’, 
because it was sitting beside the wee WALL-E model ‘Yeah, this 
is WALL-E’s wee buddy’” (Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17 The Social Printer situated near a Wall-E model in the Red household. 
The physical nature of the data output as opposed to a screen became a point 
of reflection and speculation. The paper became an unchangeable artefact and 
“an actual piece of history that people can look back on” (Mint). The long, thin strips 
of paper made it difficult to read through the conversation, but also sparked 
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the participants’ curiosity and wonder every time the printer started “spewing” 
out notes. The paper served as a reminder of what had happened throughout 
the program and as a physical representation of the amount of conversation 
that took place.  
Violet: “You never thought that we were talking that much and 
then you looked at what you had been printing and it’s like ‘Oh, 
ok we did’” 
Yellow: “I wonder what this is going to be about? I wonder who 
has said it? I wonder if this is a response to something I have 
said?”  
The participants liked the sounds made by the printer because it served as a 
reminder of activity and an indication of a reply. Due to the noise Red knew 
when someone is replying (“I suppose is kind of like the Facebook app I use, it starts 
putting the dots when someone is writing”), while Yellow found that it demanded 
attention. Yellow reflected that there is a pre-existing relationship between 
people and printers that may have affected the way she responded to it.  
Yellow: “If you are in a room with a normal printer and its starts 
printing something, the response is to go and have a look.”  
In addition to the scrapbook being helpful for us as a conversation piece during 
the interviews, the five households that filed and annotated prints also found 
it beneficial as a way to reflect. Pink observed emerging themes in their 
conversations, such as “someone coming up with solid arguments on either one side or the 
other” and how they tended to bring the discussion “back to Scotland”. Yellow’s 
scrapbook was much more focused on the characteristics of the other 
participants (e.g. Figure 18).  
Yellow: “‘I’m voting [to stay] too but I have some reservations’. 
This is about the bureaucracy of the EU [...] that kind of 
reinforced my view of Mint as someone that really thought things 
through.”  
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Figure 18 Page from Yellow's scrapbook, which notes comments made by other participants 
as anti-Tory, fear, and optimistic about Brexit. 
5.4.3. Creating a Community  
The Social Printers were designed to create a tiny social network for the live 
discussion of politics. The participants naturally gravitated toward fostering a 
communal and friendly social environment. To do that, they had to build 
relationships and learn enough about each other to feel comfortable in sharing 
their experiences despite the veil of pseudonymity guaranteed by the platform.  
The pseudonymous nature of the study made it challenging to get to know the 
others. Some participants, such as Blue and White, found “it was difficult to then 
remember who [the others] were and remember and ascribe a set of opinions from previous 
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shows onto them” (White). Red perceived the naming convention like a game of 
Cluedo/Clue, and White liked imagining characters in a book. In addition, it 
encouraged a few subconscious biases, such as association with certain parties, 
or genders. Violet, for example, assumed that Mint was male based on 
subconscious colour-gender association.  
Although pseudonymity proved to be somewhat challenging, the households 
reported that they also saw it as one of the greatest benefits of the project. It 
was the most striking difference between it and conventional social media. It 
gave them freedom to share their views with complete strangers.  
Green: “There are not going to be any repercussions from this, I 
am not going to get into an argument with somebody about it. It’s 
just a debate. It’ s just a conversation.”  
But the most important positive effect it had, in light of the fractious issues that 
were discussed, was that it limited any possible pre-formed judgments about 
the other participants, such as their social background or age. Pseudonymity 
helped the participants keep an open mind about each other.  
Yellow: “Instead of having a pre-made image or model of who 
they are, the model gets built up through time, through their actual 
comments.”  
Pseudonymity on the Internet, especially in the context of political discourse, 
is often associated with abusive behaviour (Lee and Kim, 2015), but here such 
behaviour was not present. Green recalled that even when he disagreed with 
points made by the other participants, that it did not lead to rude language. 
The small size of the group and the desire to be friendly were some of the 
contributing factors to the overwhelmingly polite discourse that took place. 
They reported the desire to like the others and be liked by them, which 
increased throughout the duration of the study, as the community atmosphere 
strengthened. “You still want people to like you even though you are anonymous […] You 
thought you were spending your evening with some nice people who were helping you out” 
(Pink). But in addition to a genuinely friendly attitude, there was a rather 
ominous undertone of feeling stuck with those people and worry of offending 
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them. The printer “will always be there printing, and if they don’t like you it will be 
printing all the time that you suck” (Violet).  
As part of the participant’s desire to form a community, they were open to 
learn about each other’s views and beliefs: “we didn’t go in fighting we went in 
thinking ‘oh this is really nice to get to know these people’” (Pink). One of the first things 
the participants explored were the boundaries of the group, for example, 
“trying to work out if it was possible to offend anybody” (Pink), or “to feel out what jokes 
you can make” (Violet). Throughout both studies humour played an important 
role in establishing relationships within the group.  
Violet: “It was a little tricky at the start. You don't know sense 
of humours. Can you make a joke? If there had been a leave person, 
I didn't want to insult them. So it took a while. But once you sort 
of have figured out, that OK most people on it are either Remain 
or quiet, and with sort of similar sense of humour, so you could 
sort of make jokes about it, and ‘as a mother drinking game’, 
which is lethal don't do that.” 
In both studies the participants were all fairly liberal, which meant that 
although they usually voted for a variety of different parties, they agreed on 
general issues. Within the first few programs they watched together they knew 
that the group was fairly homogenous and realized they “are in a bubble”, which 
may have contributed to a level of “conformation bias” (Red). Although they were 
similar, “it was quite nice to have people agreeing for different reasons” (Violet).  
Mint: “We both voted to Remain. I think it just backed up and 
it made me feel better about my choice in it, knowing the other 
people who have watched as much as I have, and maybe researched 
as much as I had, came to the same conclusion as me. It just kind 
of reaffirmed my ... because it’s one of the ones that you worry, 
like is your choice going to be good either way, just because it is so 
unknown. It was good, it reaffirmed my choice.” 
Within the interviews every participant was asked to talk about what they 
learned about the other participants. Some like Green managed to “build a 
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profile of their agendas”, while others like Yellow got “a sense of their personality, even 
more so than the views”. This difference in what they learned about each other 
may have stemmed from the range of ways they used the Social Printers. As 
Mint observed, some used it to share their political opinion, while others used 
it as a conversational tool:  
Mint: “Some people used it as a conversational tool, and some 
people used it for kind of like political, just writing points.”  
In the first study, where there was significantly less conversation, Blue and 
White did not feel that a community developed, and Blue in particular didn’t 
feel that he engaged with people, despite contributing the highest number of 
messages himself: “it was like a reticence for people to engage I think”. The rest of the 
households felt a sense of community flourish throughout. This was 
accompanied by the feeling of shared space:  
Pink: “You kind of felt that they were coming into your living 
room. You are sharing this kind of experience of sitting around the 
telly, probably cups of tea, commenting.”  
The Social Printers fostered a personal experience. A sense of teamwork and 
trust emerged as the study progressed. Some like Pink, Violet and Mint even 
described the others as friends. For example, Mint said that “you felt like they 
were your friends, like you got to know them, but you didn’t know anything about them” and 
Pink expressed missing their new friends after the study had concluded.  
Yellow: “It had a very community feel rather than something that 
would happen on the Internet [...] it felt a lot more personal a lot 
more like a conversation.”  
5.4.4. Self-Expression  
Levels of participation with the printers varied a lot between households, 
ranging from just 17 messages (Lime) to 337 (Red). The participants reported 
a part of the reason why they sent a lot of messages was to not lose the 
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connection with the others: “Because it is a team effort [...] you are kind of still wanting 
to keep the chat going” (Mint). When asked whether their comments were truthful 
and honest, participants responded positively, but they also outlined instances 
where they moderated themselves in order to not offend and be polite. For 
example, Yellow felt she was “truthful in what I said but I did not necessarily reveal 
my intentions”; Blue was cautious with “the types of humour that I may have used or I 
didn’t use, because you don’t know whether people are going to take offence”; and Violet 
was especially aware of avoiding the use of profanity because they knew other 
participants had children. It was a natural moderation that would occur when 
speaking to new people in any situation.  
Yellow: “I was moderating myself but not as a result of the 
platform, because if I was with somebody in the same room I 
would still moderate what I said.”  
Red at times used self-moderation to actively avoid conflict. She described a 
particularly troubling moment for her in the discussion when the topic of 
spoiled ballots arose. She had been working as a counting agent and had a fair 
amount of insider information about the issue, but instead of arguing her point 
by sharing her knowledge, she remained silent in order to not be antagonistic.  
Red: “I remember thinking that what I actually wanted to say 
here is that there is never a high number of spoiled ballot papers, 
there just isn’t. I didn’t want to look like I was showing off [...] 
I really really disagreed with that statement and then I remember 
kind of going quiet about it here [...] Grr I will just be polite”  
There were a variety of issues when it came to self- expression in the context 
of the Social Printers. Most importantly the participants had to be quick and 
focused, otherwise their comments could fall behind the frame of speech. Slow 
typing speeds meant that Pink wrote short messages, whereas Mint sometimes 
didn’t send a comment because he felt it was too late. As described previously, 
their household members sometimes helped in the process of writing their 
commentary. Yellow on the other hand found it difficult to research the points 
given by the other participants and keep up with the flow of conversation. 
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Although message immediacy could be an issue it was also “exciting to have that 
quick conversation” (Yellow).  
Yellow: “Blue said that [the EU] makes trade easier because it 
removes paperwork. So I decided to go and look that up [...] But 
by the time I had looked it up [...] it had gone into a discussion 
about imported granite.”  
A lack of confidence could also be detrimental to the discourse. Mint felt that 
points he wanted to send were at times obvious, whereas Violet didn’t want to 
be the first to send a print. Green’s experience of sharing his thoughts was “a 
case of shouting at the telly [...] and then trying to articulate that into the printer”. He was 
not as worried about speed and would happily spend longer periods of time 
articulating his point.  
Another factor that affected self-expression was the familiar feel of the social 
network. Red noted that she usually has more in-depth conversations on 
Facebook, but there is no second screen culture around it, whereas Twitter is 
used for such a purpose, but is not as good for immediate responses and 
conversations. She concluded that “it was somewhere in between Facebook and 
Twitter”.  
Yellow, who was the only one undecided about their vote in the EU 
Referendum, adopted a strategy about the way she expressed herself: “I would 
probably find out what the other person’s views are first and see how widely they differ from 
me, that may influence how I phrase my views”. Until the end of the study she did not 
disclose that she had not made up her mind. When Mint asked if anyone was 
still undecided in the sixth program of the schedule, Yellow waited to see what 
everyone said, but took too long and the conversation moved on. “I was going 
to say ‘Well I am undecided I am undecided for those reasons’. I got kind of half way but I 
just didn’t send”. The other participants saw this as reluctance to offend and 
provoke, since Yellow had the most different political views from the group. 
Violet thought that “they weren’t looking to provoke people, they were not looking to change 
people’s opinion”.  
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Mint: “I was surprised that even if Yellow had opposing views 
or was even undecided, I was surprised they felt shy to speak about 
them, but I did have some points where I could have been more 
extreme in my viewpoint but didn't because you are still in a 
community of people that have to read it.” 
5.4.5. Discourse  
Overall issues around self-expression, such as typing speed, research, and 
distributed attention across multiple devices resulted in a chaotic and 
disjointed discussion.  
Violet: “It was quite tricky sometimes to keep up with the 
conversations, because it took slightly longer to type it all out, for 
it to send for it to print, so you end up reading one, then you start 
replying to it, because it was being printed you tended to type more 
than I think if it was just instant message style. So, it ended up 
being that you are replying to one that is actually three messages 
behind, and it was a bit difficult to sometimes keep track.” 
Although the experience was often overwhelming, the object encouraged 
discourse. Mint reported that, although he sometimes watched TV 
accompanied by his phone, he did not usually post content on social media. 
He observed that the Social Printers made the experience of watching the 
programs more interactive and involved. At the start of the study it was 
sometimes difficult to begin conversations and participants described feeling 
nervous to do so. But the dialog tended to increase in quality by the final 
debates, when the majority of participants were present and a community had 
been established.  
Mint: “I think we had better quality conversation on [the sixth 
program] even though we had more conversation on [the fourth].”  
Pink: “The last debate was good because I think everyone was 
involved in it.”  
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The conversations they had were often serious, about big political issues, but 
the participants were also easily distracted by topics unrelated to either the 
debates or current affairs in general. Violet recounted: “we would go down a rabbit 
hole [...] but then something big would happen and we would come back”. The 
commentary helped Pink “feel more informed about what other people are saying and 
doing”, and Yellow to “experience this range of views”. For Yellow, who had not 
made up her mind on the EU Referendum, the Social Printer was an 
opportunity to see how others felt about their future vote. It was beneficial in 
showing her “that there were so many unknowns for both sides”. This led to extensive 
research on her part, which ultimately helped her decide on the night before 
the vote.  
Yellow: “Once I was using my laptop I did look up a lot of 
information that was being discussed more on the printer, than 
whatever the original point was on TV […] they gave an answer 
about trade and the reduction of paperwork and the ease of travel 
between different countries in the EU and that made me think 
‘Maybe, does the EU make trade easier’, it revealed ignorance on 
my part so I decided to go and find out for myself.”  
As previously mentioned the group in both studies had uniformly liberal 
attitudes. This homogeneity stimulated a supportive discussion, where no 
heated emotional arguments occurred. “Everyone was really supportive and obviously 
paying attention to what you had said” (Pink). But a supportive discussion also meant 
that they often reinforced their beliefs, which could be both negative because 
“it is like giving people encouragement rather than actually giving a reason why they agree” 
(Yellow) and positive because “it made me feel better about my choice” (Mint). The 
participants did disagree with each other but tended to stay quiet until the 
conversation had moved on, rather than be provocative.  
The first study had a lot less conversation and activity on the part of the 
participants with 315 prints, 96 of which were prompts in the form of Twitter 
messages. Tweets forwarded to the printers, were collected from the top of the 
“top tweets” page of the relevant hashtag. They included opinions and 
statements, such as: “Seriously stop focussing on the referendum! Too much time taken up 
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discussing it! Move onto current issues!!” and “Remember that time @theSNP ignored calls 
from @ScotTories to inspect school building standards?”. There was overall agreement 
that the tweets forwarded to the printers did not work in terms of stimulating 
conversation. Some of the households, such as Yellow, Pink, and Blue found 
the tweets distracting. Yellow found that “the tweets that were coming in were in some 
respects like background noise”. While the White household felt that they were “the 
most interesting parts of it”, “They were good just to read just to sample what people thought 
in the wider social media environment, but they weren't necessarily a good thing to start a 
conversation”. The topics that the participants spoke about were mainly 
connected to morality and fairness, such as the Panama papers scandal, which 
was “going to stir people up more [...] these things of social injustice and the human 
condition” (Pink). When discussing the discourse that took place, the households 
focused on humorous commentary and the points of agreement and 
disagreement. A topic that all of the participants agreed upon was the 
importance of sustainability and positive environmental impact depicted in the 
following conversation the participants had in the study: 
“Green: Even being anti-trident, that is a very good point. However, 
progression and expansion in other industries should create more 
than enough jobs to counterbalance the loss of jobs 
Pink: Go Patrick, sustainable energy is the only way forward 
Blue: We can't rely on North Sea oil any more, lets make high 
skilled jobs in wind, solar and tidal 
Pink: Absolutely!” 
What ultimately defined the discourse in the first study was its lack of 
conversation. The commentary was “like a series of statements” (Pink) with very 
short insubstantial discussions.  
White: “There were a few occasions where you would start a 
conversation, as such that lasted maybe two or three messages, I 
think it’s the same as Twitter and anything, I think trying to have 
a serious conversation in 140 characters or on the little till receipts 
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it difficult. So, it is difficult to have a substantial conversation, it is 
more sort of small observations.” 
The seriousness of the EU Referendum and the exciting debates led to a 
difference in the amount of activity I observed in the second study. Although 
there were only 17 prompts in the form of general questions, the participants 
sent a total of 888 messages. Pink reported that the second study “allowed for 
more free-flowing conversation” but that it also allowed for participants to become 
easily distracted. Examples of the questions sent to the households include: 
“We are pretty close to the end of the referendum campaign, so do you still have a question 
you would like to be clarified tonight?” and “How does everyone feel about the amount of 
money sent from the UK to the EU and the way it is spent?”. Households Pink and 
Yellow agreed that they preferred the second iteration of the study because it 
had more humour, excitement, and it was focused. “Having it around an issue like 
this was a more effective purpose for it” (Yellow). The use of questions after a five-
minute lull helped stimulate conversation. Pink reflected that it gave them an 
opportunity for “everybody to give their opinion [...] this was a chance for all of [them] 
to confess”.  
Yellow: “I think it was better to have those prompts. Especially 
when there was very little happening on TV and to then have 
something to have a conversation around, particularly early on and 
when it was kind of only me and Red and on one of the discussions, 
it was just helpful to have another person prompting the discussion.” 
Violet: “And there were a couple where you asked "Do you think 
this is a problem?" and most assumed "Well no because we are 
Remain voters" nothing is a problem for us we are awesome, but it 
just made us think a little bit more and say well why isn't it a 
problem.” 
Some of the themes that emerged within the printed discourse were the lack 
of solid political arguments, making the discussion relevant to Scotland, issues 
with the Remain campaign, and predicted turnouts. An example of these 
themes, was the inability of the group to align with the Remain campaign. The 
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pro-European views of the group meant that taking the side of Remain would 
also align them with David Cameron who initiated the referendum. Pink felt 
that it was especially problematic in Scotland because “we didn't want to be 
Conservative”. The Remain campaign was strongly criticized by everyone 
throughout the second study due to its weak arguments and the politicians that 
were a part of it: 
“Violet: It’s going to be a nightmare. Remain need to pull their 
finger out and make solid arguments in terms people can understand 
Lime: From an objective perspective, so do Leave… 
Lime: So far, all I've heard from leave is "omg we can't fish wtf" 
and "plz stop immigrants taking your jobs and benefits” 
Red: Remain up here have a very hard job. Put forward positive 
case, on the same side as Cameron, but don't align themselves with 
Project Fear and/or Cameron.” 
Although the topics that arose were very serious in nature, the discourse 
overall was much more playful and humorous. Violet initiated a drinking 
game, in which every time a politician said “as a mother” they had to take a 
drink, and Red and Yellow incorporated 37 smiley and sad faces into their 
commentary. Red recalled that she used them out of habit and to make the 
discourse “a bit more personal [and] a bit friendlier”.  
5.5. Discussion 
The Social Printers were successful in encouraging the households to take part 
in a political discourse about the programs they watched together. In 
households with multiple participants, one took on a primary role whereby 
they took ownership of the printer and interacting with others. These primary 
participants often involved other household members in the writing and 
reading of prints, or in the process of putting them away in the scrapbook. 
Although the participants used the printers, they highlighted how the objects 
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were at times awkward due to their situated nature and long thin physical 
scroll of paper, which contained the conversation. Despite this, the paper 
could also be seen as a physical artefact and a record of history. Other aspects 
of the physicality of the printers also made the participants reflect on the 
experience of using the Social Printers, such as the form, aesthetic and even 
sounds of the object, which created a novel and engaging experience. The 
object and paper became talking points within the households.  
Although the physicality of the printers influenced how they were used and 
perceived, the communication between the households was central to the 
experience of the study.   One of the biggest challenges for the participants 
was the establishment of a community between the households. For some, the 
pseudonymous nature of the physical social network could at times hinder the 
establishment of a community due to pre-conceived associations between 
colours and gender or political affiliations. Pseudonimity also enabled other 
participants to keep an open mind and not have pre-conceived judgements 
about the other households. With the help of continued conversation and 
humour, many felt a sense of community, which was characterised by polite 
messages and the experience of a shared space. The need for immediacy, 
typing speed, confidence, and articulation could all hinder discourse and self-
expression. The participants dealt well with these limitations of the Social 
Printers and adopted an array of strategies to aid the experience.  
The majority of the participants felt that communicating with the other 
households was beneficial and engaging, because they were exposed to 
different viewpoints. The Social Printers created more conversation around 
the EU referendum, which indicates that more divisive and exciting elections 
or referendums may produce more engagement within political debate second 
screen applications. Below, I discuss the implications of my findings in two 
main areas: first, in embracing the situated nature of television; and second, in 
exploring the benefits of physical technologies in the context of second screens. 
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5.5.1. Engaging the Living Room 
When we think about second screens, we typically think about people using 
personal devices alone, possibly to interact with people who are far away. 
However, this is not how television is consumed: it is a communal object, very 
much situated within the home and capable of engaging the entire household. 
The Social Printers captured more of this spirit than traditional second screen 
applications, encouraging the participants to make time and focus on the 
televised political activity, share their thoughts, gain new perspectives, be more 
informed and encouraged conversation without judgement. A big factor, 
which contributed to these emerging assets of the research products, was that 
the printers fostered a more personal experience from conventional social 
media. As Yellow recounted: “it felt a lot more personal a lot more like a conversation”. 
Participants like Mint and Pink, who have limited use of social media while 
watching TV, were able to effectively join into the discourse. Many of the 
participants reported that they felt they benefited from the experience because 
they watched and contemplated the election campaign material and televised 
debates, which helped them feel more informed. As reflected in the Home 
Observation study, the participants valued knowing how others feel about the 
main political issues. Gauging the views of others can in tern reinforce your 
views or enable you to question them. 
Yellow: “I think that the positives are that you can experience this 
range of views coming into your house […] I think it would 
certainly lead me to question more issues if I was having regular 
discussion with people about them. Obviously I would be exposed 
to a lot more, wider range of views and stances on things. I think 
I would be spending a lot more time on Google, and I think over 
time it would, not necessarily change what my views are, but give 
me a better understanding of what all the party's views are.” 
By displacing the social experience from the personal device, the Social 
Printers encouraged an intimate experience with high levels of direct 
engagement. There are grounds to suggest that situating the object within the 
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living environment of the participants may have aided the perception of a 
personal experience to occur. For example, Baillie and Benyon (2008) showed 
that the location and control of an object in the home plays a vital role in the 
way it is perceived by the inhabitants. The perception of intimacy is especially 
highlighted by the experience of a shared space. As Green recalled: “it felt like 
you were in a room having a debate”. The small group size may have further 
contributed to an overly polite atmosphere, which although deterring from a 
heated debate, contributed to fostering a sense of community. Over time, the 
printers became more effective as tools for good quality discourse, as the 
community strengthened and the debates became more heated. By the end, 
some of the participants even referred to each other as friends. Violet, who 
easily conversed with Red, told us that she missed her and their conversations. 
This suggest that this research naturally builds upon similar research into the 
use of research products. Whereas Lindley et al.’s messaging system was able 
to maintain a relationship between family members (2010) and Gaver et al.’s 
Energy Babble was able to create a public around a topic (Gaver et al., 2015), 
the Social Printers created a community between strangers that went beyond 
the topic of the debates. 
5.5.2. Challenging the Dominance of the Screen 
Despite the main interaction between participants taking place on paper 
rather than a screen, behaviour across the Social Printers mirrored 
conventional second screen usage during debates. There was an overlap in the 
motivations and behaviours that stimulated the use of the printers with the 
research I presented in Chapter 4. In a similar fashion the participants used 
the printers to scope out each other’s views, share their thoughts and make the 
debates more entertaining. This suggests that physical devices are quite 
capable of mimicking the existing uses of second screens, but this research also 
suggests they may have other advantages. 
In the same way that physical devices have been used to engage people in 
political issues in public spaces (Taylor et al., 2012), we saw how the object 
was able to engage the entire household rather than just a single viewer using 
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a personal device. Although one participant in each household took ownership 
of the device, the other household members were often involved in discussions 
around the printer and debate. In part this was enabled by the tactile nature 
of the paper, which became an artefact that could be shared and revisited after 
the broadcast. But it was also enabled by the physicality of the Social Printers 
themselves, which stimulated the imagination and creativity of the 
participants. They personified the object, seeing it come “to life”. Red called it 
WALL-E’s “little buddy” and her children were enchanted by the object and 
inspected it whenever they thought they were not being observed. The 
participants also adapted it to their home by finding the most suitable position 
for it in the living room. Such rich interaction may not be as prominent if the 
network was solely screen based. 
The Social Printers fostered discussions, speculation, reflection, and social 
interaction, which overlap with previous research into the deployment of an 
interactive artefact in the home (Gaver et al., 2006). Having this dedicated 
physical stream of chat during the debates was beneficial to the emergence of 
these behaviours. Although the participants still used their personal devices to 
write and send the messages, the paper was the only data output and hosted 
all of the discourse. The physicality of the paper and the printer stimulated a 
novel and engaging experience. This research indicates that physical devices, 
such as Internet of Things products, have the potential to engage citizens 
further with the discourse around political debates. This indicates there is 
potential that future political discourse may benefit from further exploring new 
interaction modalities.  
5.5.3. Limitations 
Although, the participants in both studies varied in their party allegiance, 
including SNP, Labour, Green, and Lib Dems, they were primarily liberal and 
the majority of them had similar views on the EU Referendum. Although these 
views largely coincide with opinion and voting trends from the public in 
Scotland across Dundee, Glasgow and Fife (BBC News, 2016b), where the 
households were located, the prominence of liberal views on the discussion 
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may have contributed to the emergence of polite commentary and the 
willingness of some participants to not voice their opinions when they 
disagreed with others.  
5.6. Summary 
Throughout this study, we have seen how nine households adopted the Social 
Printers into the way they watched political television programmes. They 
shared their views, personal space and time with the other households and 
scoped each other’s characters and political ideologies. What emerged was a 
primarily civilised and supportive discussion in a network of people who 
wanted to like each other. The qualities of the physicality of the object were 
often intertwined with their perception of the experience, creating an 
experience that captured many of the behaviours of second screen use but also 
exceeded it. The ability of the Social Printers to stimulate a personal 
experience and discourse highlights the potential that future IoT solutions may 
have for television viewing and political engagement. By challenging the 
dominance of the screen, we may be able to find new forms that future social 
media platforms can take. The Social Printers study also illustrated that by 
changing the functions and constraints of a network we can also influence what 
issues affect the discourse. For example, they demonstrated that anonymity 
online may not necessarily encourage trolling and abusive behaviour within a 
small social network.  
The Social Printers exemplified recurring issues such as conformation bias and 
filter bubbles, which have been observed within political discourse at large. 
However, they did illustrate that anonymity does not always correlate to 
abusive behaviour. While this research project enabled the exploration of the 
ways in which IoT can challenge current notions around “second screens”, 
they also highlighted the need for an in-depth exploration of how particular 
online political discourse issues, such as filter bubbles may be more suitably 
addressed through design.  
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6. Exploring Future Directions with 
Stakeholders 
6.1. Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the constraints and functions of digital social tools 
affect the second screen experiences of viewers. The limited group size, 
situated experiences, and the pseudonymous nature of the communication 
helped foster a friendly interaction. While, some issues with political discourse, 
like trolling did not occur, others such as the echo chamber effect may have 
been amplified due to the way the Social Printers facilitated discussion. 
Furthermore, Chapter 4 revealed some of the perceived issues that viewers 
experience using their second screens, such as worries around posting opinions 
online due to fear of provoking others and reaching an unwanted audience. 
The participants that took part in the observations study often reported 
experiencing conformation bias. This effect may have been further amplified 
by the Social Printers, which created an echo chamber where the households 
either agreed with each other or remained silent. The households reported 
that the conversations they had with each other rarely led them to question 
their own opinions. These results indicate that the prominent issues with 
broader online political engagement, such as filter bubbles, echo chambers, 
abusive behaviour, and conformation bias, are also applicable to the second 
screen use of social tools around political debates. 
Political engagement online is subject to an array of deep-rooted problems, 
including fake news, filter bubbles and personal abuse. These issues can 
undermine the value of online tools for the public and may also affect second 
screen use around televised debates, where viewers utilise their second screens 
to gauge the opinions of the public, share their own views, or as a form of 
entertainment. Previous research into political second screen use has been able 
to explore the way Twitter is being used (Anstead and O'Loughlin, 2014, 
Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011, Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Brooker et 
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al., 2015), and the effect of social media on opinion formation during debates 
(Maruyama et al., 2017, Maruyama et al., 2014) but it has not yet identified 
the issues with political discourse that affect the practice.  
What remains is to identify directions for the development of appropriate 
second screen tools that cater to viewer’s needs and address the current issues 
with political discourse online more broadly. However, I argue that in order 
to do this we need to account for the numerous stakeholders who shape this 
online activity. Politicians, broadcasters, journalists and social media platforms 
all take part in the second screen activity surrounding debates. They all aim to 
either foster further political engagement, inform the public, or persuade them 
of certain views. Due to their strong interest and deep understanding of 
political engagement these stakeholders would likely play a key role in the 
development of second screen tools in the future. By involving them in a design 
research process I can identify the implications of proposed design directions. 
The aim of this research is to identify the opportunities and challenges for 
second screens alongside political debates from multiple perspectives, which 
could then be used to develop ways to improve the experience of interacting 
with others. I achieve this by involving both viewers and experts, such as 
politicians, academics, debate producers, and social media representatives. 
The research question addressed is:  
What opportunities for second screens to address issues with political 
discourse can be identified through design-led research combining 
viewer and expert perspectives?  
This study makes three contributions to the study of second screens alongside 
political debates. Through a series of workshops with political debate viewers, 
I contribute an audience perspective on the issues with political discourse 
online and opportunities for second screens alongside debates to address them. 
Based on these, I contribute four design concepts for second screen tools, used 
to capture possible solutions and prompt discussion. Finally, I contribute an 
expert opinion on the implications of addressing the issues through the 
identified opportunities encapsulated within the designs presented to them. 
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The feedback generated by the experts points to a disparity between viewer’s 
expectations and complexities of addressing them. These findings can inform 
the way future tools are developed for a more engaging and informative viewer 
experience.  
6.2. Context  
This research took place in 2016 and 2017, which were filled with political 
activity. In Europe the rise of right populist views, which leverage anti-
immigration policies was felt across all major elections. France elected 
Emmanuel Macron who won against his opponent Marine Le Pen, the leader 
of the Nationalist Front Party, in the second round of the election. Germany 
elected Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), 
led by Chancellor Angela Merkel but also voted the AfD, a populist radical 
right party, into the Bundestag (Mudde, 2017). In the United States, Donald 
Trump, a businessman and television personality, won the presidential 
election using an anti-immigration platform campaign. Trump is a prolific 
Twitter user and the messages he writes are often reported on the news.  
Although other political figures in the US including Obama, have personally 
used Twitter, Trump uses the platform in a new, more prolific way. He 
popularised the phrase fake news by tweeting about news stories published by 
CNN, ABC, CBS, NBCNews and the New York Times. He also often 
comments personal opinions on matters such as international affairs, such as 
Germany’s contributions to NATO, or calling the leader of North Korea Kim 
Jong-un ‘rocket man’ (Sampathkumar, 2018).  
The United Kingdom voted to leave the EU, which resulted in a snap General 
Election the following year. In the aftermath of the vote, David Cameron 
resigned as Prime Minister succeeded by Theresa May who won the 
Conservative Party leadership election of 2016 despite her initial support for 
the Remain campaign. In March of 2017 May triggered Article 50, a section 
of the Lisbon Treaty outlining a two-year negotiation period for the voluntary 
withdrawal of a country from the European Union. A month later she 
announced a snap General Election in order to strengthen her position within 
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the House of Commons when negotiating the Brexit deal with the EU. The 
snap election featured 14 different debates, the majority of which were 
regional and did not feature neither Labour nor the Conservative Party. The 
highlight of the election was an hour and a half long debate, which took place 
on the 31st of May aired on the BBC and featured all major parties including 
the Conservatives, Labour, Lib Dems, Greens, UKIP, SNP, and Plaid Cymru 
(BBC News, 2017a). Theresa May was widely criticised for not taking part in 
any televised events with a conventional debate format. The election resulted 
in a hung parliament where a Conservatives minority government needed the 
support of the DUP. 
As in previous campaigns, this one was accompanied by a lot of online activity. 
The hashtag #GE2017 was constantly in Twitter’s top hashtags throughout 
the last month of the campaign (Figure 19) (Cram et al., 2017). The Twitter 
activity closely followed and increased alongside events like the release of party 
manifestoes and televised debates (Cram et al., 2017). Labour and in particular 
the presence of Jeremy Corbyn dominated Twitter during the snap election 
(Cram et al., 2017). The election used Facebook as a platform for targeted 
advertising, whereby political parties attempted to reach a specific audience 
with a messaged designed especially for them (Dommett and Temple, 2018). 
The use of digital technology enabled the emergence of satellite campaigns, 
whereby non-party organisations raised funds and campaigned in favour of 
their preferred political parties (Dommett and Temple, 2018).  
 
Figure 19 Hashtags that peaked on a given day on Twitter during the 2017 Snap election 
(Cram et al., 2017). 
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6.3. Study Design 
To understand the opportunities for second screens alongside political debates 
I adopted a design led approach that investigated the views of multiple 
stakeholders. The research was composed of three distinct parts including 
workshops with debate viewers, speculative designs, and interviews with 
experts. This approach allowed me to juxtapose the opportunities for second 
screens identified by politically active members of the public, with those of 
experts involved in politics, social media, and broadcasting. I conducted four 
design workshops around recent political events with politically engaged 
participants. The workshop results were then used to identify six key issues 
with political discourse online and their complementary opportunities to be 
addressed through second screen tools. The second screen opportunities were 
then encapsulated in four speculative design concepts, which were used to 
mediate the ideas of the viewers and prompt discussion with political and 
media experts. The experts took part in one-on-one interviews where they 
were able to highlight the wider context around political engagement online, 
and the implications and difficulties of addressing them. 
I adopted this design led approach in order to facilitate creativity, insight, and 
focus the discussion with a variety of stakeholders. Previous research into 
online political discourse has largely focused on collecting and analysing 
openly available Twitter data (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Bruns and 
Burgess, 2011, Shephard, 2014), this trend is also visible within the research 
into political second screen use (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011, Brooker et 
al., 2015). Although analysing visible behaviour online provides a good 
understanding of the practice, it is not sensitive to the different perspectives of 
the stakeholders involved in televised debates. By comparison, design research 
is well-equipped to explore this type of complex, multifaceted problem that 
cannot be captured or understood using traditional approaches (Zimmerman 
et al., 2007). Design interventions are a good example of how this approach 
can tackle complicated problems, but the few projects within second screens 
for political discourse do not account for the stakeholders that exist in this 
space (Pluss and Liddo, 2015). 
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In particular, speculative design approaches can create space for discussion 
around different possibilities (Dunne and Raby, 2013), aiming not to solve the 
problem, but to produce a range of possible solutions that can be used to 
explore the problem space and identify potential benefits and challenges. In 
the context of politics, speculative approaches have been used to enable the 
formation and analysis of unrealised design and civic ideas, these include 
speculative civics (DiSalvo et al., 2016) and design fiction (Bleecker, 2009). DiSalvo 
(2016) coined the term speculative civic to refer to the use of speculative 
technology as part of public life (DiSalvo et al., 2016), whereas design fiction 
can adopt a broader speculative goal (Bleecker, 2009). Within design fiction 
imagined design concepts are used to explore alternative futures (Bleecker, 
2009). A design fiction research project, which adopted design concepts from 
science fiction novel The Circle, found that the concepts were successful in 
highlighting their implications for privacy and surveillance. They further 
speculated that design fictions could be used as interview probes to enable 
greater reflectivity (Wong et al., 2017). In order to develop speculative second 
screen tools that explore the future possibilities for second screens and enable 
discussions with media and politics experts I conducted a series of workshops 
with debate viewers. 
6.4. Workshops with Debate Viewers 
To begin the study I conducted a series of four, two-hour workshops with 18 
participants in total, where they discussed the issues with political discourse at 
large and the opportunities they see for second screens to address them.  
6.4.1. Method 
In an attempt to ground the conversation within the context of watching a 
political debate at home, I tried to create a comfortable homely environment. 
Although the workshops were hosted within the university, which uses 
relatively uncomfortable seating and harsh lighting, I chose the smallest 
available room fitted with a large TV that only seats 10 people (Figure 20). I 
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also brought along tea, coffee, muffins, water, and juice in an effort to create 
a comfortable informal atmosphere. Creating this atmosphere also helped the 
participants to get to know each other and facilitated a productive and 
constructive debate.  
 
Figure 20 An Image from the first debate viewer workshop. 
I began each workshop by explaining the purpose of the event, gaining 
informed consent to take part in the study, and asking participants to fill out a 
questionnaire (see Appendix D.5) containing questions about their age, 
education level, occupation, nationality, self-assigned political interest level, 
and optional questions relating to their recent UK political voting history.  
In order to facilitate social interaction between the workshop participants who 
primarily did not know each other, I began each workshop with a game of 
political Taboo, a guessing game where the player explains a phrase or name 
without using a list of relevant words. I had created cards with a political word, 
phrase, or name, such as Article 50, Brexit, and Nicola Sturgeon. Underneath 
the phrase there was a list of words that the participants could not use. For 
example, one taboo card contained the name of the current prime minister 
Theresa May and the words and phrases the participant could not use while 
describing her were: leader, conservative party, Prime Minister, Brexit, article 
50, politician, and government. The goal of the game was to make the other 
participants guess the phrase at the top of the card as quickly as possible. 
Overall the game was successful at relieving tension and initiating 
conversation. 
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After the game of political Taboo I started the political program using iPlayer. 
To prompt a focused discussion, the workshops were conducted alongside the 
most recent televised debate from national broadcasters: the first two 
workshops watched a Question Time debate focused on the UK’s EU 
referendum, while the second two watched a Scottish party leaders’ debate 
from the UK 2017 General Election. We watched the first 10 minutes of the 
program in silence and then began a series of discussions. The discussions 
were structured around four topics inspired by Kietzmann et al.’s (2011) parts 
of a social network: 
1. Content, where the participants discussed the value of the content 
they were given, what made content appropriate, and how can a tool 
encourage the sharing of trustworthy information.  
2. Identity, where the participants were asked what information they 
would like to share and see about others, how an online profile can 
enable trust and respect, and how anonymity affects the discourse.  
3. Communication, including how a tool could support meaningful 
political discussion during debates, what would its purpose be, and 
what form would it take.  
4. Relationships, which asked what the relationships between users 
should be, how we could increase empathy, and whether a debate tool 
should force diversity into the communication. 
During the discussion around online political content, the participants were 
given printed tweets and Reddit threads generated by the public throughout 
the debate they were viewing. I selected the top 30 most popular tweets visible 
within the ‘top’ tweets page of the relevant hashtag, and three most highly 
voted comment threads from discussion topics about the debates on the 
“ukpolitics” subreddit (Figure 21). For example, some of the tweets and one of 
the reddit threads presented around the first and second workshop were 
generated live during the Question Time Special and included: 
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#bbcqt Nick Clegg alongside Alex Salmond tower above the 
others in their grasp of this pressing issue. Davis is a shambolic 
figure. 
 
Why the hell is another UKIP person on #bbcqt? They don’t 
have any MPs. Why not put the Green Party on instead? 
 
I know UKIP have no MPs, but they do have 10-15% of the 
vote, and nobody complains about Lib Dems (8%) or SNP 
(5%) being on #bbcqt 
 
“No deal is about the worst possible deal you can imagine” 
warns @nick_clegg #bbcqt 
 
44% of UK exports go to the EU 8% of EU exports go to UK 
That’s the killer equation Reality is gonna hit the Brexit 
dreamers very hard #bbcqt 
 
It’s handy that the #bbcqt panel has no-one from Northern 
Ireland. I mean nothing is happening there today & Brexit 
won’t really affect it. 
 
The only good thing about #bbcqt tonight was Dimbleby’s 
confession that he thought the red button was literally on the TV. 
 
 
 
Figure 21 A Reddit thread that was shown to participants during the Content discussion at 
the start of the workshop, which was generated during the Scottish Party Leaders Debate. 
The topics and questions that accompanied them were laser-cut into four 
acrylic boards as well as large printed boards containing the topics and 
questions, which were mounted on the wall for clarity and reference (see 
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Appendix D.6). The participants were prompted to first discuss each question 
and then write an answer on a sticky note and place it in the board under the 
relevant question (Figure 22). The discussion on each board always started 
with a look at the current issues with political discourse online that the 
participants had personal experience with, and then I focused the 
conversation on potential solutions and opportunities for second screens to 
address them.  
 
Figure 22 The Communication Board containing participant responses from the first 
workshop. 
Participants were recruited through university mailing lists, posters, flyers, 
Facebook groups, Twitter, and snowball sampling at the end of each 
workshop. The participants that took part in the workshops were 
demographically diverse. They ranged in age from 21 to 56 (M=30; SD=9), 
nine were female and nine male. There were nine different nationalities 
(Brazil, Bulgaria, Ghana, Ireland, Kenyan, Mozambique, Peru, USA), with 
the majority being British (N=9). The British segment of the participants 
reported voting for a variety of different parties. They self-reported their 
political engagement as low (N=2), medium (N=4) and high (N=12). However, 
as participants were all regular debate viewers or otherwise interested in 
politics, they were therefore more engaged than the general public. Within this 
chapter the participants are referred to as V1 through to V18. Participation 
was voluntary and without a reward. 
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Table 5 Data for participants from the Exploring Future Directions with Stakeholders study - 
gender, age, number of prints and political engagement level. 
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V1 
International 
Management 
Masters 
Male Mozambique 30s N/A 
V2 International Law Masters Male Brazil 
30s 
 N/A 
V3 Oil and Gas Law -Student Female Kenya 20s N/A 
V4 Student Male UK 20s N/A 
V5 Art Masters Female USA 50s N/A 
V6 Energy Law Student Male Ghana 20s N/A 
V7 Unemployed Male Ireland 40s N/A 
2 
V8 
Neuro-science 
and Psychology 
PhD  
Male UK 20s Green party 
V9 Politics and Literature Student Female UK 20s SNP 
V10 Politics Student Male UK 20s Labour 
V11 Politics Student Male UK 20s Green  
3 
V12 Support Worker Female UK 20s Green 
V13 Product Design Student Female UK 30s Lib Dem 
V14 Retail Male UK 20s SNP 
V15 Law and Policy Masters Female Peru 20s N/A 
4 
V16 Politics Student Female UK 20s Labour 
V17 
Politics and 
International 
Relations Masters 
Female Bulgaria 30s N/A 
V18 Educational Research Female USA 30s N/A 
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6.4.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
The workshops were audio recorded then transcribed. An anonymised version 
of the transcripts is available on an open data repository (Gorkovenko and 
Taylor, 2019). The transcripts and sticky notes generated throughout the 
workshops by the participants were then thematically analysed (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006) in relation to the workshop topics and synthesised into six 
emerging issues and six corresponding opportunities for second screens. These 
issues were used to develop a number of design concepts, which were iterated 
until the research team was satisfied that they encapsulated the issues raised 
without offering solutions that were too concrete.  
6.4.3. Results 
Below I describe the findings from the workshops. For each theme, I derive 
the relevant issues with political discourse and the opportunities to address 
them through second screens.  
6.4.3.1. Content 
Issue 1. Lack of fact-based, informed content. The participants 
acknowledged that social media, televised debates and the news have a lasting 
effect on people’s understanding of key issues. As a result, participants showed 
a strong desire for extremely factual information, which they felt was not 
present on social media. Fake news—which participants used to describe both 
intentionally misleading and satirical content—was used as an example of this 
lack of factual content online. In addition to fake news, the participants felt 
that social media is dominated by opinions rather than reputable sources. 
Furthermore, political discourse online was also seen as “propagating untruths”. 
V3, who is from Kenya, spoke about a group of influential Kenyans with 
thousands of followers, who at times spread information without verifying it, 
which is then accepted by the public as fact. 
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Televised debates were perceived to lack a fact-based discussion and instead 
repeat the party rhetoric without delving deeper into its justifications. This 
confused viewers who can feel that they are being exposed to conflicting views. 
For example, V12 recalled how one candidate said “that pensioners are actually 
£1000 better off because of their policies. But everything else I have read says the total 
opposite”. Thus, social media became a useful information source alongside 
debates (V3: “I feel like if mainstream media was doing its job properly people wouldn't 
need Twitter”). The participants felt that despite social media’s potential to be 
used as a collective fact-checker or a way to find more resources, the content 
they had observed on Facebook and Twitter alongside debates was like “noise”, 
lacked “substance” and “political education”.  
V18: “I don't think that enough productive discussion is 
happening on social media. I think that it is just propagating 
untruths.” 
Opportunity 1. Increase informational value through supporting 
material. The participants felt that a second screen tool should be there to 
enlighten the public. They saw three opportunities to increase the 
informational value of online content. Firstly, by providing factual 
complementary material provided by the political parties through a second 
screen tool. Secondly, that second screen tools should also encourage users to 
share the history and context of their opinions, which may help frame personal 
opinions in a way that makes them useful to the general public (V8: “Everyone 
must try and explain why they feel a certain way”). Finally, through a viewer 
generated fact-base consisting of government documents and news sources. 
V9 said it should be open source, publicly accessible, reliable and 
independently regulated, much like Wikipedia. A tool that enables users to 
quickly and easily find facts could help the public identify misinformation from 
the live debate. 
Issue 2. It is difficult to understand and write content. The tweets 
and Reddit posts at the workshop were seen to lack insightfulness and political 
focus. The participants felt that Twitter’s short comment length meant that 
content could easily be “misinterpreted” due to the way it is worded. The vast 
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amounts of tweets generated live along the debate also meant that any “useful 
comments get just lost” in the crowd. Reddit was seen as “useful” but “too long”, 
while Facebook’s recent live streaming and commentating tools were seen as 
chaotic. V14 thought that the low quality of online content is in part due to 
how difficult it is to write commentary and watch the debate at the same time. 
All of these issues around how difficult it is to understand and write second 
screen content were tied to the limited tools we use. 
Opportunity 2. Create alternative participation methods. The 
social media platforms we use alongside debates enable us to view opinions 
and share our own, in a way that does not complement the fast-paced debate. 
To enable political focus, V8 had the idea of compartmentalising the 
discussion by prompting viewers to share their thoughts on the debate 
questions, which could help increase content quality by giving posts more 
context, while lowering visible quantity. To find an alternative to the 
traditional written post platforms, V14 felt that viewers should be able to 
provide live-feedback in a simple form: “you get agree or disagree on an app and you 
just tick […] like a snapshot as it goes. It stops you having to type”. V10 envisioned an 
online network like Twitch, which lets people live-stream themselves while 
others send them messages. V13 imagined a speculative tool that is centred 
around a game “where you can put in how you think the country should be governed and 
actually model that and show other people”. 
6.4.3.2. Identity 
Issue 3. Anonymity can empower abusive behaviour but revealing 
your identity could negatively impact your credibility and 
personal life. From personal accounts and observations, the participants 
often attributed abusive and derogatory language online to the veil of 
anonymity. V5 felt that anonymity online is “dangerous”, while V16 recalled 
how her 17-year-old friend was bullied by an anonymous Twitter account due 
to her political views. Conversely, anonymity could help people express 
themselves more freely. Our profiles on Facebook and Twitter leave a 
permanent record that can be seen by our friends, family and employers. V12 
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felt that political discourse “shouldn't have to factor in your family and friendships and 
getting jobs”. Furthermore, your location and job may be used as a tool to 
undermine the value of your opinions. V3 explained how in Kenya, a person’s 
name is indicative of the region they come from, so their opinions may be 
dismissed based on their name. Overall the participants agreed that for some 
revealing their full identity creates a threshold for participation, where their 
identity may prevent them from sharing their thoughts or being taken 
seriously.  
V18: “if you make it so that there is a certain threshold for 
knowledge in order to use it, then it cuts out a population of people 
who have always been voiceless” 
Opportunity 3. Give users control over their public profile 
information but restrict interactions between anonymous and 
full-identity profiles to promote equality. Some participants felt that 
full transparency is required online. Sharing their name, age, education level, 
ideology and even salary would aid a self-regulated respectful discussion, 
because people’s experience could validate their opinions. V17 felt that despite 
fears people may have, it is vital that there is an open discussion with full 
transparency because it is “the most effective way of defending our freedom of speech”. 
Other participants felt that pseudonimity, where individual contributors use 
consistent pseudonyms, would still enable respect and civil discussion. Within 
more pseudonymous solutions, relationships and a sense of community would 
have to be built over time. Some playful ideas emerged, such as the 
development of a dating style app with the use of a political allegiance cross to 
connect people, matching people based on similar interests, not party 
allegiances.  
As a result of this division between participants on the topic of identity, the 
discussion leaned towards promoting equality and choice. Participants felt 
future second screen tools should restrict interactions between profiles with 
unequally visible personal information. They felt debate viewers should also 
have a choice in their online presence and be able to take part in both 
pseudonymous and full identity networks.  
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Issue 4. Filter bubbles and echo chambers can limit viewers’ 
exposure to diverse political opinions. In the context of online political 
discourse, it was seen as beneficial to be exposed to a broad range of opinions 
that challenge your own views. The participants were aware of effects 
commonly referred to as filter bubbles or echo chambers: V14: “A lot of the time 
you can be fed stuff that kind of backs your opinion, which is I feel social media's extreme 
weakness at this point”. They identified that the structure of social media 
platforms can limit exposure to diverse opinion through the way they bring 
people together. The pages users follow and the friends they have influence 
what content the network makes visible to them.  
Opportunity 4. Control the political diversity of the group by 
grouping users. In line with the ethos of political debates, participants felt 
a second screen tool should connect people with different views. V8 imagined 
a tool with different topic-related chat rooms, where a user would volunteer 
information such as voting history, location and interest, “debating in assigned 
rooms, based on a diverse population of people”. By compartmentalising the discussion 
and grouping viewers, a second screen tool would both limit the vast amounts 
of content and allow users to talk about issues they are interested in. V13 
imagined a forum style tool, where under each discussion topic the screen splits 
in two and users see, and can contribute to, the different sides of an argument. 
6.4.3.3. Communication 
Issue 5. Communication with others alongside the debate can be 
uncivil. Uncivil communication was seen as a major issue in political 
discourse due to its ability to deteriorate the discussion (V8: “If someone says 
something offensive that dominates the political debate”). The participants made a 
distinction between free speech and hate speech: although free speech is vital 
for political discourse, abuse and trolling border on anti-social and criminal 
behaviour and have the potential to make a lasting negative impression on 
people’s lives.   
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V18: “An online forum encourages people to react emotionally, 
because it gives them a forum that is real time and when it is real 
time they don't have to really filter their thoughts.” 
The format of the debates themselves aided personal attacks. Both the media 
and the public pay attention to the way the politicians dress, talk and behave. 
It was observed that one UK politician is constantly criticized by news outlets 
who, as V9 observed, point out “how he eats hummus, he sits on the floor, he rides a 
bike, he wears a shabby hat. They made this little pathetic persona”. Although, the 
participants were aware that the politician’s self-presentation was often used 
to attack and undermine them on a personal level, they often did the same 
when focusing on the debate within the workshop. One was seen as “hyper”, 
while another was described as an “asshole”. V18 identified that political 
debates stimulate an emotional reaction, where it is difficult for viewers to 
“filter their thoughts”. 
Opportunity 5. Create a code of conduct or a requirement to 
provide sources for statements. It was agreed that online content needs 
to use “non-derogatory language, productive discussion, backed by evidence, not 
assumptions”. The participants felt that a fact-base, such as the one from the 
Content theme, could enable civil behaviour because it would empower 
viewers to fact-check both the debate and each other. When viewers are 
posting personal opinions they should be prompted to share the reasons for 
their opinions, which would enable understanding. Moderation was seen as a 
viable way to establish a self-regulated and productive political discussion. V18 
felt that a “flame war” on social media is mostly conducted for the benefit of the 
audience, which could be tackled by allowing people to have a personal 
conversation with fewer people.  
Issue 6. Users lack the power to regulate and moderate. The online 
discourse could enable the public to identify misinformation and repetitive 
rhetoric in the debate. V7 felt the internet provides a platform for the 
crowdsourced fact-checking of the debates. Furthermore, there are many 
benefits to using social media alongside debates, such as to improve your 
personal debate skills, gain in-depth understanding of the issues, and establish 
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meaningful connections. In this way, online discourse can create “value for the 
community” and help “build civil society”. However, these benefits of social media 
use are undermined by the unequal distribution of power between the 
networks and their users. In its current form, social media platforms have 
control over mediating and moderating the discourse. This was seen as 
problematic, particularly in light of recent allegations that fake “troll” or “bot” 
accounts are being used to influence election and referendum results 
internationally (BBC News, 2017b).  
Opportunity 6. Moderation powers given to users. The participants 
envisioned that future second screen tools could shift the power to the users. 
Network moderators from within the community and a code of conduct could 
help enable communication that is “always respectful and following pre-determined 
rules”. The moderators could be determined through “a system allowing a 
reputation score”, while respect between users could be encouraged through a 
sense of community that spans beyond political allegiance. This could be done 
by amplifying other commonalities between people, such as their interests and 
location. A mix between a forum and chat room was widely favoured. Forums 
benefit from having a compartmentalised discussion with some level of 
moderation, while chat rooms can foster a personal conversation with a 
limited number of people.  
6.5. Design Concepts 
Based on these issues and opportunities generated by the participants I 
developed four speculative design concepts. They attempt to make visible 
some of the implications of exploring the opportunities for second screens to 
address current issues with political discourse. They all have social elements 
because they tend to seek a way to help debate viewers voice their opinions, 
find facts, or interact with others, which were seen as beneficial in the 
workshops. 
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6.5.1. Approach 
I adopted a speculative design approach to convey the workshop findings to 
experts in a way that would enable reflection. I created a series of four design 
concepts that served as mediators between the audience and expert 
perspectives. They were not intended to act as solutions, but rather to 
encapsulate the key issues and some of the prominent opportunities identified 
by the participants. By offering possible futures, none of which were intended 
to be without faults of their own, the designs were acted as provocations to 
prompt discussion and highlight some of the implications of addressing the 
workshop results. I presented simple mock-ups to the experts alongside a small 
paragraph describing their function. 
6.5.2. Viewers’ Debate 
 
Figure 23 The Viewer's Debate speculative design concept. 
This tool would allow debate viewers to find, submit and summarise links to 
external sources for and against policies being discussed during the debate 
(Figure 23). It would also enable the users to moderate the content by giving 
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them the power to add new points of view and to vote content up or down on 
all sides of the argument. 
Rationale: This tool was inspired by the strong desire for fact-based 
deliberation captured within opportunity 1, which aims to increase the 
informational value of the debate by providing supporting material on a 
second screen. It also addresses opportunities 4, 5, and 6, which identify a need 
for control of the ideological diversity of users online, to require users to 
provide sources, and give them moderation powers. 
The tool aims to expose viewers to good quality information rather than tackle 
fake news or enable fact-checking. It aims to give viewers the power to curate 
content by upvoting and downvoting links to articles with short summaries of 
their contents. By exposing viewers to the different political opinions around 
a question posed within the televised debate the tool would break users away 
from their pre-existing filter bubbles. It also aims to tackle issues around 
anonymity and identity by eliminating user profiles altogether. The 
application was partly inspired by ConsiderIt, a pro/con political deliberation 
tool (Kriplean et al., 2012a). The main difference is that Viewers’ Debate only 
allows users to share links to external sources rather than personal opinions. 
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6.5.3. Political Date App 
 
Figure 24 The Political Date App speculative design concept. 
Rather than start romantic relationships, this Political Date App (Figure 24) 
would enable personal communication between people with different political 
ideologies. This design concept aims to encourage civil interaction between 
users by fostering personal one-on-one conversation. Profiles on the app would 
summarise the users’ stance on different issues (e.g. healthcare and 
immigration), allowing comparison with other users on both points of 
similarity and difference between them. It was designed to reduce the 
temptation to see the other person solely in terms of a single issue, considering 
things you share as well as things you do not. Reminiscent of apps like Tinder 
or Chat Roulette, in which users are potentially exposed to a wide variety of 
other users, the Political Date App would let people choose a selection of 
potential talking partners by either swiping left or right. Only if the other 
person has swiped right for them would they be able to have a conversation 
alongside the debate.  
Rationale: This design concept aims to encourage civil interaction between 
users by fostering personal conversation. The Political Date App addresses 
opportunity 3 and 4 identified within the Identity theme, which aim to 
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promote equality between users through their profiles and controlling the 
political diversity of online discussions by grouping users. It also aims to 
address issue 5, which identifies that political communication can be uncivil, 
but rather than creating a code of conduct for the users to abide by, it gives 
users control over who they are interacting with, letting them change the 
person they are communicating easily. 
6.5.4. Identity Equality 
 
Figure 25 Identity Equality speculative design concept. 
Anonymity can give people power to abuse others online. This tool would 
promote equality between users. It would give users full control and choice in 
their self-representation online, allowing them to reveal as much or as little 
about themselves as they wish, but would only allow them to see and interact 
with Twitter content from accounts that have made the same level of public 
personal information available (Figure 25). This enables them to interact with 
others on an equal basis within discussion spaces that suit their preferred 
interaction experience.  
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Rationale: By restricting interactions between users to a network of people 
with the same level of public information available, the tool aims to encourage 
respectful and equal communication. I expect to see a positive influence on 
comfort levels within users and the emergence of civil discourse within the 
more developed identity discussions. Within the more anonymous discussion 
spaces within the tool, I expect to observe both more heated, aggressive 
commentary, as well as more humorous content, including memes.  
This tool mainly addresses opportunities within the theme of identity (3) and 
communication (5). As outlined by the opportunity 3 identified by the 
participants the tool gives users control over their public profile information 
but restrict interactions between anonymous and full-identity profiles to 
promote equality. By interlinking identity and anonymity with the group of 
people that the user has the ability to communicate with, the tool aims to 
create an unwritten code of conduct like the one identified within opportunity 
5, where negatively perceived behaviours, such as abusive language might be 
observed only within the more anonymous discussion spaces.  
6.5.5. Live Feedback Tool 
 
Figure 26 Live Feedback speculative design concept 
Viewers often find paying attention to the debate while interacting with others 
through written messages online challenging. The Live Feedback tool will 
utilise voice assistant technology as a hands-free interface, removing the need 
for the ‘second screen’ and allowing the viewers to focus on the broadcast. The 
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tool would listen to the viewer in order to detect key words, phrases and verbal 
reactions indicating either agreement and disagreement to the arguments 
brought forward by the politicians. The device would collect representative 
opinions from across the country in real time. The feedback would then be 
visually overlaid onto the debate through a wave-like visualisation reflecting 
the quantity and attitude of viewer opinion. 
Rationale: The design explores ways to address opportunity 2, which 
identifies a need for alternative participation methods. The participants felt 
the debate is at time too fast paced for the writing of informed commentary. 
Instead this tool would automate feedback collection. It will remove personal 
communication, which will eliminate abuse between users. It would be more 
inclusive to the segment of the audience that avoids confrontations or does not 
actively utilise social tools during political debates. 
6.6. Interviews with Experts 
The four speculative designs were used to mediate some of the salient 
opportunities identified by the workshop participants to politics and media 
experts. They were used in a series of one-on-one interviews where we 
discussed the issues with political discourse that were identified within the 
workshops, the speculative designs, and what the implications of developing 
second screen tools would be on viewers and politics. 
6.6.1. Method 
Seven political and media professionals were interviewed to give their 
feedback on the issues and design concepts. They were recruited through 
direct emails, based on my knowledge of their work, or suggestions by fellow 
academics. Due to their limited availability, the expert’s insights were gathered 
through one-on-one semi-structured interviews that lasted between 38 and 56 
minutes rather than a workshop. They were interviewed either in person 
(N=4), through Skype (N=2), or through Facebook Messenger (N=1) at a 
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location and time that suited their schedule. They were given the speculative 
designs and issues derived by the workshop participants ahead of the interview 
in order to give them the opportunity to consider their feedback over a longer 
period of time. Each feedback session started with an overview of issues 
identified by the participants where the experts spoke about how relevant they 
felt the issues were. Then we discussed each speculative design concept, if it 
addressed the issues identified, and what the implications of giving a viewer 
that tool might be. The experts, referred to as E1 through to E7, held a range 
of professional roles (Table 6). 
Table 6 The professional roles of politics and media experts that took part in the Exploring 
Future Directions with Stakeholders study. 
Expert Occupation 
E1 A researcher for a major social media network who focuses on social psychology. 
E2 An elected city councillor who had worked as a political advisor for 15 years. 
E3 Former newspaper journalist, now a politics textbook author and journalism lecturer. 
E4 
A policy researcher who used to be a local political party vice-chair, 
and has been involved in the running of elections and referendums 
locally since 2013. 
E5 A politics lecturer who researches public opinions around political debates. 
E6 The interactive producer for a major political debate program in the UK since 1999. 
E7 A professor of politics who was part of a parliamentary commission on digital democracy. 
6.6.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
The expert interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and thematically 
analysed in relation to the issues derived from the workshops (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). An anonymised version of the transcripts from each interviews 
are available on an open data repository (Gorkovenko and Taylor, 2019). The 
codes and themes were verified by a second researcher until reaching overall 
agreement. 
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6.6.3. Results 
The speculative design concepts were presented to a series of experts for 
feedback. I verbally explained the issues and opportunities identified by the 
workshop participants and showed them the four designs with an 
accompanying short description of their function (see Appendix D.7). Overall, 
the experts felt that the workshop results accurately reflected the issues with 
political discourse on social media. Uncivil behaviour and anonymity were 
generally seen as the most prominent of the six issues. Considering recent 
claims of foreign intervention through social media, which dominated the 
media at the time, E2, who is an elected city councillor, felt that the biggest 
issue with social media is its openness to abuse by external influences. There 
was no one specific design concept that was favoured by the majority of 
experts. Instead, they predicted an ever-changing and diverse design space 
that adapts to issues and caters to a variety of viewers (E7: “Different tools for 
different people, different types of conversations. I think it would be changing all the time”). 
6.6.3.1. Fact-Based, Informed Content 
The lack of fact-based and informed content online was by far the most 
controversial issue for the experts. Most experts felt that this claim was 
problematic. E5 referred to Shephard (2014), which contradicts the notion 
that content on Twitter is uninformed. Furthermore, a lot of political discourse 
is speculative and opinion based, which makes determining the validity of facts 
extremely challenging. Within a debate, every “fact” can represent a certain 
position, which can seem biased to viewers. E4 felt that rather than creating a 
new second screen tool, broadcasters could promote the perception of a more-
fact based debate by allowing additional information to be displayed on 
screen.  
E2: “I think that the kind of response to fakeness or lies, that 
there is an objective truth on the other side, in many circumstances 
it doesn’t apply [...] it is that culture of dismissing expertise that 
is the issue, it is not the information that is available.” 
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Despite their issues with the underlying beliefs, the Viewers’ Debate concept 
received positive attention. E5 felt that such a tool would be extremely 
beneficial for researchers who study deliberation. The experts felt the up and 
down voting of content should be excluded because viewers would not be able 
to appropriately access the credibility of sources, instead the tool should focus 
on exposing viewers to a wide range of content. 
E3: “Take the focus away from let’s vote on what is the most 
reliable or the least reliable kind of thing and instead put the focus 
on people using this tool as an avenue to actually pro-actively 
explore more widely.” 
Conversely, E1 felt that in order for the Viewers’ Debate to promote people’s 
understanding of key issues, sources would need to be verified. She felt that 
vetted individuals such as journalists or an independent body of professionals, 
rather than viewers, should fact-check sources.  
E6, who works as an interactive debate producer, felt that a complex tool like 
Viewers’ Debate may be difficult to use alongside a debate due to time 
pressures, but may bring about great benefits for extending the conversation 
throughout the week after the debate (“You could […] go beyond a mere one-hour 
shouting match and actually take it onto a much more serious and informed debate on a more 
prolonged scale”). It could promote greater reflection amongst viewers in the days 
following the debate and be used as an information bank. 
6.6.3.2. Ease of Content Production and Understanding 
In the context of political debates, current second screen tools can feel 
inaccessible and elitist as an engagement tool for the general public. The 
Viewers’ Debate tool was seen as the most inaccessible tool for the public, 
while the Live Feedback tool was seen as the only design concept that allowed 
for the collection of opinions from the less politically engaged segment of the 
audience. 
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The Live Feedback Tool was the most disliked concept, with concern being 
raised around the ethics of collecting and owning the data, its reliability and 
its effect on the debate. However, it was also seen as the most likely to actually 
come into existence in the near future, since it has the most potential to excite 
TV producers, politicians and pollsters. E2 felt that with the prevalence of 
smart TVs and voice assistants in the near future, it would be an opt-out rather 
than an opt-in aspect of watching televised debates. E1 felt the Live Feedback 
tool could also encourage the public to be abusive towards the politicians, 
while, E2, E3 and E5 identified that a big issue with the idea is that it would 
encourage politicians to appeal to the masses by expressing opinions they see 
get a positive feedback. Instead of agree and disagree options, they felt the tool 
could measure party allegiance of the viewers throughout the debate. 
E4: “A live feedback tool [...] could tell us what we are getting 
right and what we are getting wrong.” 
6.6.3.3. Uncivil Communication 
There was an overall agreement that discourse online can be uncivil: “It is a 
very hostile environment and people are often right to step away from it” (E4). E1 felt that 
eliminating anonymity, as in the case of the Political Date App and parts of 
the Identity Equality tool, would decrease trolling. She referred to YouTube 
as an example: “the abuse got so bad that they had to enforce a comment-only-if-you’re-
logged-in policy, which drove down engagement but also decreased harassment”. 
There was no agreement on which of the design concepts would encourage 
respectful conversation the most. E5 and E7 felt that the Identity Equality tool 
would encourage civility, while the politicians and debate program producer 
seemed to favour the Political Date App. E2 felt that no digital tools encourage 
the collective view of the world and find common ground with each other. 
Instead, he felt that face-to-face communication is better for political 
discourse, so favoured that way that the Political Date App was “effectively 
digitising face to face conversation”. E6, who works as a producer on a debate 
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program, compared the interaction that the Political Date app may create to 
what he observes in the program between audience members: 
E6: “You often end up with a very intriguing discussion between 
two people sitting next to each other [...] what could almost be 
seen by viewers as hostile, but it is actually quite friendly robust 
discussion by people who don't have clearly the same political 
views.” 
On the other hand, the politics professors felt that the Political Date App 
would not encourage political deliberation because it would break the debate 
viewer’s filter bubble, thus hindering a relaxed conversation.  
6.6.3.4. Filter Bubbles and Echo Chambers 
Filter bubbles were seen as contributing to people’s perceptions of a lack of 
informed content. E7 felt that they are at times responsible for the public’s 
inability to spot fake news, because they see a very limited scope of bias and 
opinions. At the same time E6 and E7 doubted the public’s desire to actually 
escape those bubbles, especially during political debates. E7 states that “people 
are only willing to deliberate and discuss [...] when they agree with each other”, citing 
Mutz (2013), who identifies a common misconception that the public want to 
discuss and deliberate, whereas in reality it is just a small group of informed 
individuals. 
The rest of the experts felt that breaking the existing filter bubbles on social 
media during political debates is vital to help inform people’s voting choices. 
The two design concepts that are meant to address this issue are the Viewers’ 
Debate and the Political Date App, which were both found to be at risk of 
creating filter bubbles of their own. The Political Date App could be appealing 
to a small demographic subsection of viewers, whereas the Viewers’ Debate 
tool could have limited market appeal and would likely be dominated by 
engaged individuals: 
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E4: “You would end up with people like me using it and 
dominating the political conversation and on the other end of the 
scale you would end up with some of the more wild elements of 
the online community. The people who we should be targeting are 
somewhere in the middle.” 
The Viewers’ Debate tool was favoured by E1, E3 and E5, who felt that it has 
significant potential to expose viewers to a wide range of opinions. Even if the 
content is generated by experts or trolls, E3 felt it may still be beneficial to 
viewers who observe the range of information. 
E3: “Whether you have gravitated to your natural source because 
you like the politics or you have just decided for once to look at the 
other side and what they are saying, it can only be better to consult 
a variety of different sources.” 
E2 and E4 preferred the Political Date App. They identified that one-on–one 
conversation in the context of a political debate would be less intimidating, less 
time demanding, and more entertaining. Contrary to E7’s citation of Mutz 
(2013), the way the interaction is structured may even feel supportive due to 
the highlighting of similarities between users. E4 felt that instead of matching 
people if they favour different parties that the tool would be more engaging if 
it matches people based on opposing views on key issues such as immigration. 
6.6.3.5. Identity and Anonymity 
The experts also felt strongly that anonymity is linked to abusive behaviour. 
E4 pointed out that in addition to not developing an online profile, people can 
also feel anonymous by hiding in plain sight: “in the sense that it gets lost in the 
crowd”. The Political Date app combats that: “When you have got a smaller 
sample of people, people will automatically behave themselves a bit more”. 
Although that may positively affect behaviour, the Date App would not aid 
the formation of a community, which E7 felt was vital for engagement. 
Instead, the Identity Equality tool may help people build up their confidence 
and relationships with others over time. Despite this E2 felt that it may “become 
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too dry too quickly”, because at the full- identity side of the tool the discourse may 
encourage participation by a small group of very engaged individuals. 
E2: “It would probably just create a second kind of gated 
community, where you have people who are prepared to tell you 
who they are and they would have reasonably moderate opinions.” 
E4 and E5 noted that the design concepts highlighted some vital questions 
about the meaning of labelling one-self as for a certain party, or as interested 
in a certain topic. Rather than forming an identity, these labels could be 
misrepresentative. Instead users should be allowed to provide a more nuanced 
biography.  
E5: “So if someone says the Green Party. What does that say? 
Are they a member of the Green Party, did they vote Green last 
time, are they going to vote Green next time, or is it just how they 
happened to feel aligned to that particular topic on that day?” 
The experts felt that there is room to combine the Identity Equality tool with 
the Political Date App and the Viewers’ Debate. By elevating the importance 
of equality between users, promoting intimate conversations, and the 
development of a community, a tool could have a positive effect on both 
behaviour and ability to deliberate. E2 felt that introducing identity can 
“validate” the content. 
6.6.3.6. Power to Regulate and Moderate 
All of the above issues are enabled by the current social media platforms 
utilised by the public. E1, who works for a major social network, felt that it is 
possible to enable more civil and productive discussion by empowering the 
public to moderate together like in the Viewers’ Debate concept. E7 felt that 
the different laws on freedom of expression online differ across the globe, 
which makes it difficult for networks to accommodate for everyone. When E1 
was asked if in the future social media platforms would be able to account for 
the differences in law for political contexts she said: “Trying to meet everyone in the 
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middle is the best compromise I can see in the future”. Contrary to the view that social 
media platforms can find a compromising solution to discourse regulation and 
moderation E2 felt that “we will come to the point reasonably soon where people think, 
why on earth did we allow these companies to have a global monopoly on how we interact as 
human beings”. 
Instead, E7 predicted that the future of social media second screen tools for 
political debates would be very volatile and dynamic, with many tools for 
different types of people. She felt that these tools would be owned by the big 
international social media platforms that exist today because of their capital 
and influence, instead she felt governments could “promote regulations and laws 
that shape and frame the space”. On the other hand, E5 felt that broadcasters could 
potentially benefit from adding second screen tools to their pre-existing debate 
pages. This way local broadcasters could moderate and facilitate the discourse. 
6.7. Discussion 
Designing appropriate second screen tools inevitably involves addressing the 
larger issues with online political discourse. The experts felt that the range of 
issues viewers are currently experiencing are all interconnected: anonymity 
empowers abusive behaviour; filter bubbles limit our ability to spot factual and 
false content, and social media platforms’ prevalence in the second screen use 
enables all of the above. However, there are opportunities for the development 
of a healthy internet practice around second screens and debates. Below, I 
discuss some of the key themes emerging from the research that suggest 
possible ways forward, drawing on both viewer and expert insights. These 
findings point to three considerations for future tools.  
6.7.1. Diversity versus Homogeneity  
Both the experts and viewers felt debate audiences should not communicate 
in echo chambers around debates. Understanding opposing opinions could 
help people make informed voting choices. However, while diversity in 
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political discourse was desired by everyone, the experts identified that extreme 
political opinions could alienate the general public. Literature on the topic also 
gives us conflicting perspectives: Semaan et al. (2015a) shows that people 
actively seek out an audience that is diverse in political opinion, while Mutz 
(2013), who was cited by E7, shows that people seek out supportive and 
homogenous political deliberation environments. Although the participants 
reported wanting diverse opinions, the experts were critical of the effects on 
deliberation and participation that could result from breaking existing filter 
bubbles.   
Future second screen tools will need to explore how to balance creating a 
supportive online environment and fostering diverse political views. Both the 
experts and debate viewers agreed that networks containing politically 
polarising views can encourage abusive and derogatory language, which can 
in turn limit deliberation and engagement. The participants and experts felt 
that these unwanted effects can be addressed in a variety of ways, such as 
fostering more personal one-on-one communication by limiting the group size 
of discussion spaces. Another solution may be encouraging pseudonymity 
because full identity second screen tools may feel inaccessible for the general 
public due to fear of engaging with controversial topics (Taber and Whittaker, 
2018). I propose that future second screen tools should encourage the sharing 
of partial personal information, as explored through the Identity Equality design, 
but that special care is taken for users to feel equal. As identified by 
Opportunity 4, promoting dialogue within groups would help the 
development of a community, which may raise engagement. 
6.7.2. Facts and Validity of Content 
The currently unfolding narrative around the impact of data mining, bots and 
fake news on elections and referendums emphasises the importance of 
leveraging factually accurate content online. For example, a recent study 
showed that fact checks rarely reach those who read fake news articles (Guess 
et al., 2018). Social media gives a platform for “troll” or “bot” accounts to 
attempt to influence elections internationally by posting divisive political 
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opinions (BBC News, 2017b). Furthermore, the use of data gathered about 
individual’s opinions and identity, like in the case of Cambridge Analytica, 
may be used by campaigners to influence voting choices through targeted 
advertisements (Halpern, 2018). These problems with social media use raise 
serious concerns about the effects of encouraging more political engagement 
through second screen tools, where a variety of stakeholders attempt to gather 
data and influence the public’s opinions.  
This study indicates that when addressing issues around increasing the 
prominence of factual content online around debates, special care needs to be 
taken not to give moderating powers to groups who may find it hard to rate 
the validity of information, such as viewers and social media platforms. The 
viewers felt the power to moderate and fact-check should be given to the 
audience, but the experts found this problematic. They were particularly 
sceptical of up-and down voting of content used by Viewers’ Debate, which they 
felt would not lead to a well curated fact-based stream of information. The 
experts felt that instead of looking for an elusive objective truth, debate viewers 
should be exposed to a wide range of diverse information. Despite these 
suggestions of how to create a more truthful information stream for viewers, 
E7 identified that the future directions for second screen tools would likely be 
influenced by new government legislations on social media networks. Future 
legislation may seek ways to limit the impact and exposure of debate viewers 
to targeted adverts, fake news, and troll and bot accounts. 
Alternatively, we may increase the perceived validity of online content by 
promoting more in-depth, respectful discourse. By enabling the public to 
discuss rather than just comment alongside the debate, the content which is 
generated may not be perceived as noise. A way to improve the way debate 
viewers communicate with each other online may be to encourage more one-
on-one communication and active listening between users, as was done in the 
work of Kriplean et al. (2012b). Active listening is facilitated by prompting 
responses, which summarise the previous point of the other user. One way that 
active listening could be implemented within the speculative designs may be 
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within the Viewer’s Debate tool where users can be requested to create their 
own summaries of the sources added to the platform by other users.  
6.7.3. Alternatives to Fast-Paced Second Screen Experiences 
The participants reflected that the real-time format of the debates meant that 
viewers experience a time pressure to write and interact with others online. 
This contributes to the kind of commentary that participants felt lacked 
“substance” and described as “noise”. Second screen tools can help viewers to 
either share their opinions more easily by enabling instant feedback or prolong 
the conversation beyond the broadcast.  
The workshop participants imagined a simple agree/disagree feedback tool 
that would simplify the interaction. Work in this area includes the research of 
De Liddo et al. (2017), in which a variety of responses in the form of feedback 
cards allowed viewers to give nuanced feedback, or Feltwell et al. (2017b) who 
explored social tagging as a way to enable critical viewing. New technological 
developments in the home, such as IoT, could help further facilitate instant 
interactions with the debate content and provide an alternative to 
conventional screen-based applications. As I explored in the previous chapter, 
IoT products can successfully be utilised as second screen political discourse 
tools. While the Live Feedback tool attempted to illustrate the potential of IoT 
within this context, the experts felt that such a tool may have negative effects 
on the debate quality. Instead they proposed the tool may become more useful 
by measuring party allegiance throughout a debate rather than agreement 
with the speaker.  
These real time interactions may be facilitating a reactionary and shallow 
response. Instead second screen tools could gather insights and opinions 
throughout the debate but encourage users to continue using the tool after it 
is finished. This idea is supported by a study around the politically charged 
reality program Benefits Street, in which it was observed that the content on 
Twitter in the hours after the program became less judgemental and 
empathetic (Brooker et al., 2015). While extending the use of a second screen 
165 
 
 
tool beyond the duration of a broadcast is unsuitable for most TV contexts, I 
feel that it may be beneficial for political debate discussions. A tool that gathers 
links, and opinions like the Viewer’s Debate tool could help create a 
knowledge bank. E6, the interactive debate producer, especially favoured the 
Viewers’ Debate concept because he felt that extending the discussion 
throughout the week may increase the public’s ability to find information, 
deliberate, and may help form an online community. 
6.7.4. Combining Stakeholder Perspectives 
This research approach gathered multiple perspectives from both debate 
viewers and experts. Through the process of gaining the expert’s feedback I 
was able to identify some of the limitations of collecting data from “the 
viewers”. Although the experts agreed with the majority of the viewer’s issues 
with political discourse, they also identified some of the negatives of the 
opportunities for second screen that the participants identified. Where the 
viewers wanted more fact-based discussion, the experts felt that “facts” were 
subjective; where the viewers wanted to full identity discussion spaces and to 
break away from their filter bubbles, the experts felt this may exclude the wider 
public. At the same time experts and the audience agreed on many of the issues 
and potential solutions for second screen debate tools, such as the problem of 
uncivil online behaviour, issues with anonymity and the limitations of 
conventional social media platforms for second screen purposes.  
Reconciling those perspectives was made possible with the help of the 
speculative designs. They were able to highlight how the functional 
implementation of new second screen tools may impact the way the audience 
interacts with the debate and deliberate. The feedback I gained from the 
experts validated the majority of the opinions given to us by the workshop 
participants. Critically, the experts were able to pre-emptively identify weak 
or inconsistent points within the reasoning of participants, such as their search 
for an elusive political truth.  
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6.7.5. Limitations 
No strong feedback on the topic of Relationships emerged, in part because the 
relationships between the network users was strongly dependant on the types 
of communication that would be fostered, and also in part due to the 
discussion of the topic at the end of the workshop by when participants had 
already discussed aspects of online relationships under all of the other 
discussion topics.  
6.8. Summary 
Second screen activity around political debates is vulnerable to an array of 
issues that undermine the audience’s ability to deliberate and discuss. I have 
taken a bottom-up approach to research by involving both the debate 
audience and political and media experts. The 18 participants who watch 
debates identified seven key issues: lack of fact-based content, uncivil 
communication, filter bubbles, tensions between anonymity and identity, lack 
of diversity of medium and content, and social media platforms’ monopoly 
over political discourse. These findings were communicated to experts 
through four speculative design concepts. The experts identified the most 
legitimate audience concerns and the most problematic ones. They were able 
to envision strategies that can improve future second screen tools, such as 
constructing safe and diverse networks, regulate online services, and finding 
alternatives to the current fast-paced online experiences. These findings 
critically explore the opportunities for second screens to support debate 
viewers. They benefit from a juxtaposition of multiple stakeholder 
perspectives, which highlight areas of similarities and differences between the 
perspectives of media and politics experts and those of debate viewers. 
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7. Discussion 
Technology is shifting the political landscape in ways that are both 
empowering and unpredictable. Online platforms, such as Facebook and 
Twitter, are now a vital part of the campaign toolkit. They are used by 
politicians to raise funds, advertise, organise events, and engage with the 
public during key moments, such as during political debates. Although 
technology has helped make political campaigns more accessible to the 
electorate, it has also created uncertainty about the way it influences and even 
manipulates public opinion. Thus, it is vital to explore the opportunities for 
digital tools to appropriately enable discourse and deliberation.  
This thesis focused on the way the public uses second screens during televised 
debates. It was motivated by the belief that debates provide an invaluable 
opportunity for the public to engage in political discourse. The aim of this 
research was to understand how and why personal devices are currently used, 
and how emerging technologies could shape the future of second screens 
during televised political debates. The research adopted a design-led approach 
and used a triangulation of methods in order to explore this complex issue in 
depth. Speculative designs, research products, workshops, interviews, and at-
home observations were used to gain insight into the debate viewing context 
and perspectives of viewers and experts.  
Through the four studies presented in this thesis, the research makes two 
major contributions to the study of second screen use during televised debates. 
The first is an understanding of the range of second screen activity that takes 
place during a debate and the motivations that frame it. The second is an 
exploration of the design opportunities for second screen tools to engage 
debate viewers and address some of the issues with political discourse. 
Below I discuss the research findings and their implications. I begin with how 
second screens are used currently, the ways in which they support debate 
viewers and the ways that they do not. I then recount how this research 
challenged their secondary screen-based nature. I further discuss in greater 
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detail what design directions for second screens were identified within this 
research and how they might affect the political discourse. I end by discussing 
the implications of this research in terms of social media platforms, 
broadcasters and politics.  
7.1. Current Second Screen Practices  
Chapter 4 examined the current second screen practices of viewers through 
two studies. The first thematically analysed tweets generated during the 
General Election Leaders’ Debate in order to investigate the visible behaviours 
exhibited within. This work identified a small gap in the relevant research into 
the use of Twitter, which has looked at the sentiment of the posts (Wang et al., 
2012, Wang et al., 2011), or has organised the content in pre-determined 
themes (Wohn and Na, 2011), but has not thematically analysed what 
behaviours are present. Results demonstrated that debate viewers use Twitter 
in order to interact with others, post relevant factual information, and for four 
different types of commentating: sharing experiences, evaluations, humour, 
and provocations. While the analysis of Twitter may illustrate the behaviours 
that the social network currently supports, it does not account for less visible 
activity, such as searching for information.  
The second study examined the ways in which current tools support debate 
viewers and how they do not. Where past research into second screen use 
around televised debates have been limited to the analysis of Twitter (Anstead 
and O'Loughlin, 2014, Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011, Trilling, 2014, Wohn 
and Na, 2011), I aimed to investigate what motivates viewers to use their 
devices, what social media platforms and digital tools they choose, and in what 
ways do they use them. I used home observations where I could capture both 
behaviours that resulted in visible online activity, such as posting a comment 
on Facebook, and those that did not, such as searching for information. This 
allowed me to investigate the real-life context of debate viewing. The study 
revealed that posting opinions and content is a small fraction of the activity 
that takes place in the home.  
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The research revealed that debate viewers are motivated to use second screens 
for a variety of different reasons, including to gauge the opinions of others, 
enrich the experience of watching a debate and to share their own opinions. 
The current use of second screens in a debate context can also be a challenging 
experience. The participants discussed how they had to split their attention 
between the information intensive debate and the even more abundant online 
content. Within section 4.4.3.3. the participants discussed some of the barriers 
to participation they experienced. Their Facebook accounts were connected 
with their friends and family, which had the effect of discouraging some of 
them from posting their opinions knowing that they may be perceived 
negatively. Furthermore, they did not want to flood others’ timeline. Twitter 
posed a different set of challenges, such as the perception that “it can go badly” 
(P1) if you post controversial views or get into an argument with strangers. 
Regardless of the social platform they did not wish to engage in discussions 
with negative and aggressive language. The participants in the observation 
study reported that the perceived online audience, effort to write, and the 
possible repercussions of posting, all led to their disengagement and 
unwillingness to share their thoughts with others online. These barriers stifled 
their participation. Instead many of the participants, especially those who did 
not see themselves as very politically engaged, expressed a preference for 
passively observing the online activity surrounding the debates and engaging 
in conversation with others in the living room rather than online. 
Being exposed to both the debate and viewer generated opinions gave viewers 
an opportunity to learn, reflect and reaffirm their opinions. The participants 
reported that the content they found as being most valuable online usually had 
to be humorous, have integrity and be relevant to the discussion topics 
discussed within the debate. Online content could create discussions within 
the living room and stimulated a more engaging debate experience. Having 
access to online platforms was also empowering for those who chose to voice 
their opinions. As reported by the participants in section 4.4, utilising social 
media around debates can empower political activism, inform them about 
aspects of the election they are interested in, entertain them, help them reflect, 
reaffirm their opinions, and give them a platform to share their own views.  
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The analysis of Twitter revealed a wide range of contextually and 
informationally rich content, which was useful to the participants within the 
observation study as a means to gauge the reaction of others to the debate. 
The range of behaviours visible within the tweets reveal that debate viewers 
who use Twitter can be exposed to a wide range of political opinions that may 
be absent from their social circles. Furthermore, the behaviours exhibited 
within the Twitter posts, such as sharing evaluations and experiences (section 
4.3.3.1.), reveal that Twitter could help viewers feel part of a community and 
give them a platform for self-expression.  
These two studies illustrate the ways that current tools both support and 
hinder engagement around political debates. Twitter had a strong role within 
the home observations, in part due to its live event appeal. Although Twitter 
is just one social media platform among many, its content is open to the public 
and broadcasters commonly encourage viewers to join in on the online 
discussion through the use of a debate specific hashtag. The analysis of Twitter 
content generated alongside a UK General election debate revealed a variety 
of behaviours. Although, some of them like the evaluations, and humour may 
be boosting viewer engagement, others like provoking may be deterring users. 
Here the utopian vision of technology as a tool for political engagement and 
empowerment clashes with its use as a means for provoking and mocking. 
Social media platforms for political engagement would benefit from exploring 
the relationship between observed behaviour and user engagement in order to 
understand how to increase engagement.  
7.2. Challenging the Notion of the Second Screen  
Within the observation study the second screen was at times central to the 
debate experience. The discussions that happened on screen guided the 
participants through a range of online activities, from seeing what the public 
thinks about a key election issue, to posting a jokey comment about the 
behaviour of one of the politicians, to discussing a tweet made by a celebrity. 
The second screen activities that emerged during the broadcast were framed 
by the debate but were at times primary. 
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One of the things that became evident throughout the exploration of current 
second screen practices was that viewers have a variety of different reasons to 
pick up their personal devices. The highly attention demanding activity was 
motivated by the wish to verify information, gauge the opinions of others, to 
commentate along or even engage in an online conversation. The research 
projects within this thesis illustrated that the ‘second screen’ often took on a 
more primary role than the debate itself. Political debates can be seen as 
boring and repeating the party rhetoric, but the second screen bridged the 
viewers to each other, allowing them to engage in an array of activities, which 
they found empowering. 
Although I have embraced the phrase ‘second screens’ within this thesis, I 
challenge the inherent assumption about the type of devices we should use 
alongside television and which content is at the forefront of the attention of 
the viewer. This prominence of the value of the secondary device was also 
observed in the work of Kusumoto et al. (2014) and Holz et al. (2015) where 
they discovered that the second screen may become primary “when the TV 
program is not appealing”. With the aid of their personal devices the participants 
in section 4.4 took on a variety of roles including fact-checkers, content 
contributors, activists and spectators. These activities sparked discussion 
within the living room.  
These findings echo the work of Geerts et al. (2014) who discovered that 
viewers value social interaction while watching TV and often talk with those 
in the living room. This research reveals that we need to find ways to 
distinguish between foreground and background content rather than assuming 
the dominance of any one device. By challenging these preconceived notions, 
we can further explore new ways to create complementary content or social 
interactions around televised debates. These may have significant benefits for 
debate viewers who choose to use their personal devices, such as fostering 
positive engagement, learning, understanding opposing views, and giving 
viewers a platform for self-expression. Furthermore, as technology develops 
and we adopt new specialised internet connected devices, other modes of 
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interaction, such as voice commands, may facilitate faster and less taxing 
engagement around the debates.  
7.3. Design Directions for Future Political Second 
Screens 
My work investigated how the development of new tools can help make second 
screens more engaging, useful, and safe. As explored in section 4.4, second 
screens can engage viewers further with the broadcast by giving them a 
platform for self-expression and empowerment. The Social Printers presented 
in section 5 illustrated how in small social groups with the aid of pseudonymity, 
IoT products provide alternative, novel, and intimate ways for viewers to share 
their experiences with each other and form social bonds. My work with debate 
viewers and experts in section 6 revealed many opportunities for new tools 
that tackle some of the greater issues with online political discourse, such as 
abusive behaviour, the formation of echo-chambers, and tensions between 
anonymity and identity online.  
Looking towards the future there are multiple design directions and 
considerations, which may influence the development of new tools. I have 
developed the design directions discussed below by considering the 
opportunities identified by debate viewers and experts in section 6, the lessons 
I learned by exploring the potential of IoT technology in section 5, and the 
needs that were not currently being met by existing digital tools as reported by 
the participants in section 4.4. 
Although I see several directions for the future development of tools, which 
have the potential to alleviate some of the prominent current issues and 
support deliberation and discourse, there are wide-ranging implications of 
developing online political discourse tools, which are difficult to foresee and 
understand. Political discourse tools are subject to several ethical 
considerations. Do political online spaces make people susceptible to 
manipulation? Is changing the voting choices of people a sign of enabling more 
informed formation of opinions or a form of manipulation, as has been implied 
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within the Cambridge Analytica scandal? Do political discussions spaces 
ultimately lead to enabling the formation of populist views? These 
considerations are vital to establishing healthy political discourse practices. 
The below presented design directions illustrate some of the ways that second 
screen tools can be more engaging, empowering, and safe.  
7.3.1. Validating Content 
The debate viewers, from the study presented in Chapter 6, expressed 
concerns around the quality of information distributed in debates and through 
the digital tools around them. The opinions expressed by others online were 
described as “noise” and to lack political focus. Furthermore, concerns around 
the emergence of fake news within online discussion spaces revealed that even 
very politically engaged members of the public do not differentiate between 
news stories that are factually incorrect and satirical news sources like The 
Onion. These findings are further confirmed by research into fake news, 
where people were asked to identify fake news articles from a Facebook feed 
(Flintham et al., 2018). The findings indicate that social media users rely on 
personal judgement, such as perceptions about the trustworthiness of the news 
source, to decide if articles they are seeing are true or not (Flintham et al., 
2018). Furthermore, search engines provide biased search results, which may 
also affect the user’s perception of the trustworthiness of the sources they find 
(Kulshrestha et al., 2017). As the experts within the final study identified, these 
reported concerns around facts and fake news raise questions about the extent 
to which fake news is a problem, and if the public differentiates between biased 
and false information.  
Claiming that politicians do not present factually accurate information when 
given a media platform is problematic. Political debates often expose the 
public to speculations about the future impact of their proposed political 
agenda. As E2, who is a politician, identified that politicians often propose 
their hypothesis about the future during elections and referendums. He felt 
that although politicians can draw allusions to other places, it is ultimately an 
educated speculation. Instead of searching for an elusive truth, debate viewers 
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need to be presented with a wide range of information that would help them 
make an informed decision about their vote.    
As it was seen in the final study, section 6.4.3.1, the way politicians present 
information within televised political debates can be confusing for viewers 
who may feel that they are getting conflicting information. This perception is 
supported by existing research into the way politicians use misleading rhetoric 
when speaking (Jackson and Jamieson, 2004). Jackson and Jamieson (2004) 
discovered that although politicians say information that is literally truthful, 
they do not adopt coherent definitions of terms, do not clarify underlying 
assumptions, equate average with typical, and omit key details that frame and 
give context to the information. In light of these strategies when framing 
information, it is not surprising that debate viewers felt that debates need to 
present more factually accurate information. This may mean that rather than 
needing more facts viewers need greater detail about the context and meaning 
of the rhetoric used by politicians on screen. A key opportunity identified 
within this work would be to give politicians a platform to give evidence to 
support their claims. The time-constrained debate requires clear and concise 
reasoning, which can lack the information depth that can be provided through 
links to documents, manifestos, and news articles. Giving viewers such 
supporting material through a companion application can aid their 
deliberation and understanding of the key issues discussed on screen.  
In addition to improving the value of the debate discussion, online content can 
also be validated. There are several opportunities to frame content in way 
which would help viewers make informed conclusions about its truthfulness. 
These include providing fact-checks alongside the content and providing 
information about the bias of the publisher. Fact-checking content is already 
being pursued by social media: in order to facilitate the better spread of 
factchecks, Facebook has an initiative to automatically add fact-checks to 
sources (Vargo et al., 2018). While this may seem like a straightforward 
solution, convincing the public of the validity of the fact-checks may be 
difficult. Past research indicates that in order to increase the trustworthiness of 
a fact-checking tool, there needs to be full transparency about the process, 
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funding and function of the tool (Brandtzaeg and Folstad, 2017). Another way 
to help the public assess the validity of information is to identify the biases of 
the news provider. As outlined in the work of Kulshrestha et al. (2017), which 
looks into the bias of search results, there is an opportunity to inform users of 
the bias contained within the sources that they see. This may help the public 
make a more informed judgement of the value and diversity of information 
they are exposed to.  
7.3.2. Break the Formation of Echo Chambers 
There is an intricate moral dilemma lurking beneath the premise and 
assumptions of this thesis. Based on the overall agreement within this research 
field I have worked on the basis that echo chambers and filter bubbles have a 
primarily negative effect on democracy and political discourse. They limit our 
exposure to diverse information and bias and leave us uninformed about the 
politics of others. But is it right to purposefully deter people from supportive 
and friendly deliberation environments? E7 highlighted the work of Mutz 
(2013) who points out that having extremely diverse deliberation 
environments decrease both participation and our ability to deliberate. This 
may lead to networks and platforms to be dominated by political elites and to 
feel inaccessible to the general public. Furthermore, research suggests that due 
to normative conformation effects people can be swayed into agreeing and 
going along with the opinions of the majority. Although it may seem beneficial 
in certain cases, as when a single individual’s views are extremely politically 
radical, it may also have significant negative repercussions if the opinions of 
the masses are extreme in themselves. With thousands of troll and bot accounts 
attempting to sway elections internationally, it is worth considering how 
exactly we make social media platforms diverse, how we encourage social 
interaction and who are those taking part. How do we make sure that we are 
not making tools that would inadvertently manipulate, mislead and misinform 
the public? 
Echo chambers form within both Twitter and Facebook because these 
networks encourage their users to follow or befriend people they already know 
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or like. These tools are not designed for political discourse and the formation 
of likeminded discussion groups is not an issue in most other circumstances. 
Furthermore, as identified by E7 in the last study, people naturally seek 
supportive environments, which in turn foster deliberation (Mutz, 2013, 
Wojcieszak and Mutz, 2009). Although there is evidence to suggest that debate 
viewers may feel uncomfortable in very politically diverse environments, 
within the context of elections and referendums understanding the different 
political ideologies and different sides of political arguments is crucial. Debates 
aim to inform the public of this diversity in opinions. Furthermore, as 
indicated by Kelly (2009), people may be slightly less likely to open articles 
that oppose their views but when they do they spend more time reading them 
and being critical.  
Future second screen interfaces for political debates will need to strike a 
balance between diversity and conformity of opinion. Viewers may benefit 
from a more scaffolded experience, designed to guide participation in ways 
that are simple and effective, building confidence and reducing barriers. One 
way to achieve this might be to offer more structured avenues for contributing 
content, as having complete freedom can often cause anxiety. Structuring the 
format of posts may have additional benefits that ease producing content, such 
as shortening content generation time and supporting the process of reflection.  
Another design opportunity for breaking the formation of filter bubbles may 
be to limit discussions to very small groups. As we saw in the last study (sections 
6.5.3 and 6.6.4) there is an opportunity to help debate viewers talk to people 
with different political ideology from themselves by helping them engage in 
one on one conversation. The Political Date App concept also encouraged the 
highlighting of commonalities as well as differences. Helping debate viewers 
establish a common ground with each other despite differences in political 
ideology has also been suggested as a potential way to bridge uses on 
traditional social media platforms when discussing politics (Grevet et al., 
2014).  
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7.3.3. Connecting the Audience with the Debate 
Currently there is a limited scope for the audience to engage with televised 
debates directly. Programs like BBC’s Question Time encourage viewers to 
commentate along using a dedicated hashtag, but this discussion does not feed 
into the program itself. Many of the participants that took part in the studies 
did not wish to post their opinions online (section 4.4.3.3). Posting opinions 
could be intimidating, reach an unwanted audience, provoke others, and take 
a lot of effort. Instead, as discussed in section 6.4.1, there may be other ways 
to engage the public that make it easier to share opinions.  
Connecting the audience with the debate in a meaningful way can benefit the 
viewers, broadcasters and politicians. One way to draw this connection may 
be to allow politicians to gather supporting information, which could be used 
to complement the broadcast at key times of the debate. Although this 
opportunity was not explored within the speculative designs, it was identified 
by the debate viewers is section 6.4.1. Supportive material can be delivered to 
viewers through a dedicated second screen application, the broadcaster’s 
website, or even interactive services (such as the BBC’s Red Button). Giving 
politicians an opportunity to gather and distribute such supportive material 
would reinforce their points within the time-constraint debate.  
Another opportunity to connect the debate with the viewers may be to enable 
the collection of live feedback. One of the speculative designs is section 6.5.4 
illustrated what this may look like. The Live Feedback Tool used a voice 
assistant to detect approval or disproval in the viewer’s vocal reactions to the 
debate and visualised the collective reaction of the audience by overlaying it 
on the screen. A benefit of utilising voice would be that it does not require 
visual attention. Although the design was not liked by the experts, they felt that 
some iteration of this idea would soon come into existence. Issues that they 
saw included that it may influence the politicians, who may feel they need to 
say content that the audience like, and that it could influence other viewers.  
Finally, although currently televised debates like Question Time allow audience 
members to participate by asking questions, the online audience could also be 
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involved within this process. Currently audience questions are pre-selected. 
They are then given the opportunity to ask them on air, and potentially ask 
follow up questions. Viewers at home may take part in this process in a very 
structured manner, for example by allowing viewers to vote on which 
questions they would like to be asked. In contrast to the Live Feedback Tool 
this opportunity for direct feedback may be less detrimental for the 
deliberation of other viewers.  
7.3.4. Fostering Civil Interactions 
Finding ways to combat trolling and derogatory language will be a crucial 
challenge for future tools. As reported by participants throughout all of my 
studies, viewers do not want to interact with others who use provocative 
language. This was especially salient within the home observations, where 
some of the participants felt that sharing their opinions on social media could 
mean they get a negative reaction. Within the study fears of an unwanted 
reaction were not limited to strangers but also included friends and family, 
who may not have the same political opinions as the participant. When 
designing for such an emotionally charged context, where people are exposed 
to opinions and information that may be in conflict with their beliefs, creating 
safe and civil discussion spaces may be achieved in several ways, including by 
establishing a code of conduct and fostering more personal communication.   
Within the Social Printer’s study, which facilitated social interactions around 
televised debates between participants, no uncivil behaviour was observed. 
Contrary to expectation, pseudonimity did not help participants feel a lack of 
repercussions when interacting with others. Several reasons contributed to the 
sense of accountability that they experienced. The situated nature of the device 
made them feel as if they shared a space, they felt “stuck” with the other 
participants, some of them experienced a sense of community with each other, 
and the group size was small. Although there are many factors that influenced 
the overly civil interactions that were observed within the Social Printers study, 
all these factors may positively facilitate civil interactions in other contexts as 
well.  
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Another opportunity would be to create a tool that uses a code of conduct as 
described in section 6.4.3. The debate viewers felt that abusive and derogatory 
language has no place within online political discourse and that online 
platforms should actively moderate the conversation in order to limit hate-
speech. Another opportunity they identified was that users should be 
encouraged to explain what they believe and why in order to help others 
understand their point of view.  
7.3.5. Enabling Self-Expression 
Through a large scale survey, which looked at secondary content practices of 
viewers, Bentley (2017) discovered that people are reluctant to post online even 
when it is about their favourite shows, instead he proposed that one-on-one 
communication may help them overcome their reluctance. Although the study 
looked at second screens use in the context of TV series, in section 4.4 I also 
observed a reluctance to contribute online. Political debates are divisive and 
contentious, which can make communicating with others seem intimidating. 
Furthermore, even within when people post of Twitter alongside debates the 
presence of an @ sign does not indicate discussion and conversation (Mascaro 
and Goggins, 2015). Discourse around political debates is difficult for several 
reasons. The first is that the second screen experiences are very fast paced. As 
we saw in Chapter 5, even when people talk within very small networks they 
can struggle to keep up with the pace. Another reason is that the debate 
content can be very controversial and as discussed in 4.4.4.1, participants did 
not want to receive a negative reaction online or say something that may have 
negative repercussions for them.  
During the Social Printers study at least one person in each household took 
ownership of both the object and interacting with others. Although some of 
the participants may have felt compelled to interact with the others because 
they were taking part in a study, none of them reported feeling intimidated or 
that they observed provocative language within the prints. Instead they were 
able to commentate and chat alongside the debate and as the study progressed 
formed relationships with each other. This indicates that social media 
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platforms can be formed in ways that encourage debate viewers to engage in 
conversation. As discussed in Chapter 6, the small group size, the situated 
nature of the object and the veil of pseudonimity aided the use of the printers 
as platforms for discussion. 
I suggest several opportunities for encouraging debate viewers to engage with 
others, these include facilitating personal communication, making the 
communication feel more ephemeral, fostering digital storytelling, or by 
separating viewers from their pre-existing online social group. While social 
media users are reluctant to post controversial opinions on Facebook because 
they view their audience as judgemental, other more ephemeral forms of 
creating content, like Snapchat, where the content disappears after it is seen, 
can help users feel more extroverted and stimulate content creation (Taber 
and Whittaker, 2018). A way to help debate viewers feel that they would not 
be judged, or that they will not experience repercussions for posting 
controversial opinions may be to adopt an approach to treating content similar 
to Snapchat, where content and conversations are deleted in the hours after 
the broadcast. Another way to limit perceptions around negative repercussions 
may be to separate the network of users the participant interacts with day to 
day from those they interact with during a debate. Finally, Michie et al. (2018) 
discovered that digital storytelling can be used to engage the public with very 
politically polarising issues, such as abortion rights in Ireland, both expanding 
the pro-choice community and stimulating engagement. By encouraging 
viewers to share stories, they may feel the interactions they have with others 
are more personal and approachable. A point of concern within this drive to 
encourage more active participation would be that by encouraging this type 
of engagement viewers may become more susceptible to changing their 
opinions because the act of posting and reading content online can change the 
opinions of the writer and well at the reader of that content (Pingree, 2007).  
7.3.6. Designing for a Time Constrained Context 
The participants throughout my home observation and Social Printers studies 
expressed how difficult it is to divide their attention between the debate and 
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the second screen or printer. Not only are the debates rich in information, but 
the accompanying social media feed or print roll may also be seen as 
interesting and engaging. This meant that the participants using the Social 
Printers had to be very focused throughout the debate. Within the observation 
study in Chapter 4, the participants reported that they struggled to write 
commentary alongside the debate. In part, this happened because they felt 
that the content they post had to be relevant to the topics of the debate as they 
were being discussed, and have integrity which often meant that their opinions 
had to be researched.  Writing content that was both timely and had integrity 
was difficult to achieve in the time constrained context of the broadcast.  
Although the character limitations of Twitter made reading content generated 
by others quicker, this is easily offset by the sheer volume of Tweets generated 
throughout the duration of the program. Furthermore, writing tweets within 
the character limit imposed by the platform made participants agonise over 
draft tweets, which were at times illegible. Overall neither the tools the 
participants used in the home observations, nor the Social Printers were seen 
as easy to use in the fast-paced debate. This was addressed within the 
workshops with debate viewers, who felt there should be alternatives to the 
current second screen interactions utilised by the public. One way to enable 
social interaction with others may be by allowing viewers to give quick 
feedback about their opinions and feeling throughout the debate, much like 
the Live Feedback Tool. This could be done through a simple screen-based 
app or with the help of IoT and voice commands. While the simplicity of the 
feedback means that the interactions can be creative and diverse, giving 
viewers the ability to provide just negative or positive responses may be an 
oversimplification of their experience. 
Another way to design content for viewers in a way that would require less 
visual attention than reading through a long list of opinions and comments 
may be to aggregate this information in a visual way. This might be achieved 
using the contextual data gathered by networks about their users, such as 
location and age. This data could be used to help users gauge the opinion of 
the public in a more realistic manner, for example by allowing them to see 
how opinion varies around the country. As a participant mentioned (Chapter 
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4), it was very valuable to see the approval from people from other parts of the 
country for a particular candidate, which verified his belief that the candidate 
had performed well. Further research is needed to examine the most 
appropriate ways to gather and visualise data generated by debate viewers. 
Finally, Bentley (2017) discovered that TV viewers often engage with 
secondary content before the start and after the end of a program. One way 
to help viewers engage with each other around political debates without 
creating a very intensive, stressful experience may be to encourage 
engagement in the hours before and after the event.  
7.3.7. Enabling Equality 
Throughout this research the inequality between the value of content created 
by different viewers was repeatedly highlighted. In The Myth of the Digital 
Democracy, Hindman (2009) discusses how technology provides a platform for 
everyone to express their opinions, but it is difficult for those opinions to reach 
a wide audience. Instead, political discourse online is dominated by a series of 
political experts and journalists (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Hindman, 
2009, Kreiss, 2014). The content generated by these small groups of 
individuals is seen and discussed by more people due to their pre-existing 
network and status (Ausserhofer and Maireder, 2012, Kreiss, 2014). It is 
interesting to note that the participants throughout all of the studies did not 
flag that as a concern that they account for in their personal online 
participation activity. Some participants, such as E4 in section 6.6.3, identified 
that on Twitter content can get lost in the crowd. Instead of finding this 
problematic, a participant reflected in section 4.4.3.3 that different patterns of 
use emerged around the different social media platforms. That participant 
used Facebook to reach and interact with their friends, whereas he used 
Twitter to gauge the opinions of the public. In addition to this difference is 
online influence, inequality is also created by the use of anonymity. As 
discussed by a participants in section 6.4.2, Issue 3, anonymity can empower 
individuals on the internet to harass others.  
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Future second screen tools should explore strategies that enable the perception 
of equality between accounts. As discussed in section 6.5.4, one potential 
solution may be to only allow interactions between accounts who are prepared 
to reveal the same amount of information about themselves. A design that 
leverages equality may help viewers express themselves without fearing trolling 
and may increase the credibility of views expressed by ordinary citizens. As E2 
discussed, this may also create communities of very moderate and politically 
engaged individuals where discussions become dry.  
Another possible solution to leveraging equality may be to encourage one-on-
one communication, as presented in the Political Date App design concept. 
This design direction would limit the range of views that the public interact 
with but may help people communicate on a personal and equal level, which 
could increase user’s ability to empathise with each other’s views. 
Furthermore, discussing the debate with one person at a time, would be less 
time-demanding and complement the fast-paced nature of the debate. 
7.3.8. Utilising Emerging Technologies 
As IoT technology becomes prevalent, it would likely be utilised for second 
screen type engagement around broadcasts. The current dominance of screen-
based social media interactions around debates, may create a barrier to online 
participation for many viewers, who experience concerns posting online. 
Furthermore, posting opinions is time-consuming and difficult. The future of 
second screen interactions might not involve screens at all, but rather collect 
opinions and data through IoT sensors. Reducing the visual attention of the 
debate viewer would be a vital component of bettering such tools for 
communication.  
Although I see many benefits to the development of physical engagement tools 
like the Social Printers, this work has also highlighted considerations for future 
designs solutions. The most important of which is to keep the activity at 
manageable levels within the dynamic and fast-paced nature of a political 
debate. Although it seems beneficial to have a large social network, in practice 
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I observed that even with only five households the amount of activity taking 
place on the printers was overwhelming for some of the participants. 
Alternatively, future designs may find more appropriate data outputs than the 
thin paper rolls that I used. Finally, it is vital to consider to what extent will a 
physical solution be intrusive in the home environment, as the noise disrupted 
the Red household. Despite the shortcomings of the Social Printers I argue 
that they were intrinsically more interesting to interact with than a 
conventional social network. 
7.3.9. Designing for Less Politically Engaged Viewers 
It is evident throughout the home observation study that the more politically 
engaged a participant self-reported to be the more likely they were to actively 
engage in social media use around the debates. The politically active 
participants reported that posting content gave them the opportunity to 
commentate along, gave them an ego-boost, and could benefit their career. 
Their pro-active forms of engagement contrasted those of the participants who 
self-reported to have low of average political engagement level. They were 
more likely to just use their personal devices to seek information and gauge the 
public’s opinions. They also found second screens helped to lighten up the 
emotionally charged debate through humour-often seeking out memes and 
jokes that complemented the debate. Humour was also seen as a beneficial 
tool for expressing political ideas in a way that would make them less 
antagonistic for others. Humour also had a prominent role within the Tweets 
that were thematically analysed in section 4.3. Previous research has also 
identified that sarcasm, satire and irony are used in political debate 
commentary (Trilling, 2014). Debate viewers use humour for meaningful 
political engagement (Davis et al., 2018). It can “express opposition, establish 
political subjectivity, and engage in direct and symbolic civic support” (Davis 
et al., 2018). This may indicate that humour can be used as a tool to involve 
less politically engaged viewers in political discourse.  
In addition to fostering humour as part of political engagement, the study in 
Chapter 6, outlined that scaffolding interactions, and creating supportive 
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deliberation environments may also help engage a wider segment of viewers. 
The politics and media experts identified that some speculative designs, such 
as the Viewers’ Debate tool and the Identity Equality tool, presented in 
sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.4, may create a sort of gated community that feels 
inaccessible to the general public. Instead as a participant within the 
workshops reflected, an online political engagement tool should not require a 
certain threshold of knowledge in order to participate, because that may cut 
out a segment of the population that has traditionally been voiceless within 
politics. The expert feedback suggested that creating very supportive 
deliberation environments, and scaffolding the way viewers contribute to 
online discourse tools, may help make digital tools feel more accessible. The 
Live Feedback Tool, which scaffolds participation through simple verbal 
feedback may be seen as inclusive by the wider public. Despite this, the experts 
felt that the tool may have adverse effects on the politicians that take part in 
the debate. Meanwhile, creating supportive deliberation environments may be 
difficult due to the possibility of creating very homogenous echo-chambers. A 
challenge remains to identify the most appropriate ways to do this, but it may 
be beneficial to explore how the diversity of views within a group and its size 
affect the comfort levels of viewers who do not see themselves as politically 
engaged.   
7.4. Implications of Research Findings 
Designers, developers, governments, and broadcasters will all play a role in 
the shaping of future second screen tools. Below I discuss several wide-
reaching implications of the research in relation to these stakeholders.  
7.4.1. Implications for Online Platforms 
If online platforms were to explore the development of second screen tools for 
political debates, they would need to be acutely aware of the way they affect 
their users. Balancing anonymity and identity, homogeneity and diversity, and 
small and large group size could all have a significant impact on the quality of 
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discourse. Within my Social Printers study, I found similarities between the 
physical social network created by the Social Printers and conventional 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter. The printers were able to create a 
community, the feeling of a shared experience, and helped reaffirm the views 
of some of the participants in a similar way users adopt Twitter during TV 
dramas (Schirra et al., 2014). A dedicated outlet for political discourse around 
election periods may have numerous benefits, such as the establishment of a 
strong community, in-depth discussions and a more informed electorate. For 
example one participant reflected that Facebook users do not typically post 
while watching TV, whereas Twitter does not allow for in-depth discourse. 
The printer was able to fill in a potential gap in the digital platforms available 
to her. These insights into how anonymity and playful behaviour in the 
establishment of a community would affect engagement could be used in the 
design of political discourse tools. 
While the studies presented in this thesis highlight many opportunities for 
online platforms to develop engaging debate tools, there are also concerns that 
they need to address. As seen by the study I present in Chapter 6, viewers may 
not have a well-developed understanding of what constitutes factual content. 
The audience has not adopted a journalistic definition of what fake news 
means and instead tends to believe that news is fake when it does not align 
with their beliefs (Nielsen and Graves, 2017). This lack of agreement about 
notions of truth was clearly seen within this research. The participants also 
expressed a desire for more facts, which would accompany the debates, but 
the experts expressed concerns about what it means to decide what content is 
reliable and what is not. Pre-existing social media platforms and tools that 
cater to debate viewers are responsible for the way they present information 
to their users.  
The future of political engagement online more broadly would depend on the 
continuous self-monitoring of tech companies and their transparency on the 
ways their tools are being used. Previous research has already established the 
strong need for technology firms like Facebook, Google and Twitter to tackle 
issues like echo-chambers, filter bubbles, and fake news (Spohr, 2017). New 
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worrying trends like bot/troll accounts, data mining, and targeted 
advertisements are yet to be fully researched, but tech giants like Facebook 
and Google have disclosed data, which reveals that political advertisements 
are targeting specific groups of people with tailored political messages in order 
to influence their voting decisions (Wong, 2018). These technology firms have 
expressed their willingness to collaborate with governments and to help 
alleviate the growing influence of malicious actors within democratic 
processes. An example is Google’s decision to stop any targeted advertisements 
during the Irish Abortion Referendum campaign, which ran during May of 
2018 (Waterson, 2018). This is important, since social media platforms and 
search engines would likely continue to be used by the public around elections 
and televised debate to search for information and socialise. As David 
Runciman (2014) argues, although governments may feel an incentive to 
champion technology, they cannot gather enough resources to develop digital 
tools on their own. Governments need large social media platforms to 
research, develop and host tools that would enable political discourse. In 
return the social media platforms need governments to provide the necessary 
infrastructure needed for the adoption of this technology, for example they 
need favourable social climate where people can afford their tools (Runciman, 
2014). This may result in the necessity for a strong future partnership between 
tech companies and governments. 
7.4.2. Implications for Broadcasters 
Broadcasters can also help their viewers connect to the debate and each other. 
In the final study, which examined viewer and expert perspectives on the 
potential directions for second screen tools, both the experts and viewers felt 
that broadcasters should explore opportunities within second screens. Viewers 
currently utilise pre-existing digital tools, which are not designed specifically 
for this context and which exhibit a worrying susceptibility to data mining and 
external influence (BBC News, 2017b, Halpern, 2018). One of the greatest 
worries around encouraging broadcasters to explore ways to facilitate political 
interaction around debates is their potential bias and the effect it may have on 
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the viewers. If broadcasters create second screen tools for their debate viewers 
it would be their responsibility to remain neutral.  
Despite concerns, broadcasters have an advantage when it comes to creating 
tools for viewers because they can tailor the viewer’s experience specifically to 
their debate programs. Broadcasters have already ventured into the second 
screen market with an array of event specific and series specific applications 
(Ansaldo, 2016, Ansaldo, 2017), which has not been reflected within real-time 
debates. Within the final study the British debate program’s interactive 
producer felt that there is room to incorporate a tool for the viewers into their 
website. The debate show has already utilised an array of interactive tools, 
including the Red Button, where if viewers press the red button on their 
remote control they can see a selection of incoming texts. Although, this 
service is moderated by the broadcaster it does not provide the same 
interactivity as online tools and attracts viewers over the age of 50 (E6). As the 
debate producer reflected, political debates thrive on human interaction, and 
while broadcasters currently encourage viewers to join in on Twitter, they lose 
an opportunity to create a safe discussion space on their own websites. 
Creating second screen tools for debate viewers would be a difficult task for 
broadcasters, but it could receive backing and support from government who 
may seek to regulate online political discussion spaces.  
7.4.3. Implications for Politics  
The research I present within this thesis has several implications for politicians, 
these include that they should embrace political debates and the social activity 
surrounding them because it helps them seem transparent and approachable, 
they should aim to give viewers supplementary material to back up their points 
from the debate, and that they should seek to regulate how social tools enable 
communication and distribute information around debates. 
Despite worries that political debates overemphasise the role of party leaders 
and the importance of smaller parties, they would continue to be used in the 
United Kingdom (Gardam et al., 2011, Walker, 2015). Debates are an 
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accessible way to inform and engage citizens. They play a vital role in the 
public’s understanding of key issues and the formation of their political 
opinions (McKinney and Warner, 2013). While the information delivered by 
politicians during debates can be thoroughly researched, practiced, and 
framed in a favourable way, the online discourse surrounding them can be 
unstructured, provocative, and contradict the discussion on screen. This 
highlights the importance of recognising the issues with second screen use 
during political debates. Understanding how technology affects viewers can 
empower politicians to make educated decisions about appropriate ways to 
engage with them. 
This can in turn have several positive effects for politicians. The public views 
politicians who use social media to express personal opinions as more 
authentic, and this perception of authenticity can in turn foster more trust and 
be a decisive factor in voting preference (Enli and Rosenberg, 2018). As 
discussed by participants in section 4.4.3.2, politicians can foster these positive 
perceptions if they engage with the public through social media. Furthermore, 
the participants in section 6.4.1 identified, that there is an opportunity to 
provide viewers with complementary information that would support the 
debate. This was seen as necessary because televised debates were seen to 
repeat the party rhetoric without informing the public of its justifications and 
meaning. Politicians may want to provide supporting material to their claims 
and speculations about the impact of their future policies. This can in turn 
help them appear more transparent and approachable to the public. 
While embracing social tools could have a positive effect on the way politicians 
are perceived they may also have negative effects on democracy. Second 
screens affect viewer’s ability to form opinions. The majority of the 
participants who took part in the home-observation study, section 4.4.3.1, 
reported that they used social media to gauge the opinions of others, which 
largely affirmed their pre-existing beliefs. Nonetheless, some of the 
participants, such as P7, identified that social media posts affected the way 
they perceived the performances of the party leaders. These effects have also 
been observed by Maruyama et al. (2014, 2017), who discovered that viewers 
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conform to the opinions of others when they actively post online. In line with 
this work, the politics and media experts in section 6.6.3 felt that the Live 
Feedback Tool concept could have a detrimental effect on viewer’s ability to 
deliberate. The on-screen visualisation is similar to that of the Worm, which, 
as Davis et al. (2011) discovered, impacts viewer’s perceptions of the 
performance of politicians and impedes them from developing opinions of 
their own. These conformational trends make it difficult to assess the value of 
encouraging viewers to actively engage online during debates. 
Although we have observed the predominant issues with political discourse 
online, this activity has emerged in an extremely unregulated social space. 
Recent events, such as Cambridge Analytica, have demonstrated the 
increasing importance technology plays throughout elections and the ways it 
can negatively influence democratic processes. This is especially concerning in 
light of research that demonstrates that propaganda and media control can 
effectively steer populations into embracing radical ideologies (Palonen, 2009). 
Governments across the globe should seek out ways to regulate technology 
companies in order to preserve the integrity of campaigns. The past three 
years have brought to light the power of social media to collect data and 
influence voters. Although, governments find it difficult to keep up with the 
fast development of technology (Wadhwa, 2014), they should aim to 
continuously evolve their data protection policies, such as the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union (Tankard, 2016), in 
order to protect their citizens. Although governments can aim to regulate 
online discussion spaces, they would likely continue to rely on pre-existing 
social media platforms and broadcasters to host and facilitate online 
engagement. 
7.4.4. Implications for Citizens 
The studies presented in this thesis have been conducted using design research 
methods in order to explore current effects of technology and new directions 
for the development of engagement tools alongside televised debates. Past 
research views online political engagement as a sign of everyday socio-political talk 
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and a talking electorate (Brooker et al., 2015, Halpern and Gibbs, 2013). This 
engagement has been seen to influence the emergence of activist movements 
and grassroots campaigning (Dommett and Temple, 2018, Gibson, 2013, 
Lotan et al., 2011, Parker, 2014). The research presented within this thesis has 
also had a primarily positive view of online engagement around debates and 
has been motivated by the belief that it contributes to society. Meanwhile there 
is still room to generate critical implications for debate viewers. These 
implications refer to the choice of tools they use and the way that they use 
them. Below I outline some of the considerations that viewers may have when 
picking up their second screen, but it is important to highlight that there are 
no definitive best practices that have been generated throughout this research, 
instead I present the range of factors that have influenced the thinking and 
experiences of debate viewers and experts from across the studies.  
As discussed within chapter four debate viewers use online tools in order to 
gauge the views of others, enrich the debate, or share their own opinion. These 
varying intents should impact the choice of pre-existing tools that viewers use 
in order to foster experiences that suit their needs. The participants in the 
home observation study indicate that a key reason to use second screens is to 
gauge the opinions of others. Viewers should consider if they are interested in 
select individuals, relatives, or the public as a whole. Participants felt that 
Facebook is suitable to access the views of friends, while Twitter could be used 
to see the views of politicians, journalists, celebrities, and strangers.  
When using second screens to enrich the experience of watching the debate, 
viewers reported utilising a much more varied set of tools. Whether using 
Wikipedia to find a specific answer, or scrolling through a satirical Twitter 
account, all activities surrounding political debates are valuable. Meanwhile 
discussions generated around the study presented in chapter six indicate that 
the quality and truthfulness of content online are key considerations. 
Suggestions generated by the experts indicate that viewers would benefit from 
seeking out a variety of content within news with a variety of bias, rather than 
searching for purely factual content.   
192 
 
 
Finally, when posting opinions online viewers would benefit from considering 
the audience they would like to reach, what they would risk by posting an 
opinion, how difficult or easy it would be to post and engage in discussion on 
a particular platform, and the normative rules that they perceive as being 
commonly adopted on a platform. Issues around uncivil communication are 
more difficult to address, both the debates and the conversations around them 
can be extremely emotionally charged, this means that the language used by 
viewers can be at times harsh and disrespectful. The issue of negative and 
derogatory language and trolling has no straightforward solution.  While social 
networking platforms are working hard on enforcing fact-checkers and 
moderation practices, on an individual level political discourse with strangers 
can have serious negative consequences. In response to that the participants 
who took part in the studies had adopted a range of practices, from using 
humour when expressing themselves, to withdrawing from online discussions 
altogether.  
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis has explored how second screens allow debate viewers to gauge the 
opinions of the public, share their own opinions, and enrich the experience of 
watching the broadcast. Rather than taking on a strictly secondary role, they 
were at times central to the experience. The debate acted as a metronome for 
the activity, guiding viewers through discussion topics and prompting 
interactions with their digital devices and each other. These findings 
challenged the underlying assumptions within the phrase second screens, 
where the primary screen is the TV and visual content is delivered to viewers 
through the secondary device. Through the deployment of an IoT research 
product, I questioned the dominance of screen-based interactions and allowed 
viewers to have a new type of social experience around debates. The Social 
Printers study illustrated how in small pseudonymous groups relationships 
begin to flourish and people can engage in supportive political conversations. 
The success of the physical research products in enabling conversation around 
debates revealed that “second screens” have the potential to take on a 
multitude of forms and create social media platforms that enable different 
behaviours than the commonly used Facebook and Twitter. In order to 
investigate new design directions, I conducted the final study, which explored 
viewer and expert perspectives on the future of engagement around televised 
debates. It unravelled what viewers feel are the predominant issues with 
political discourse online and how they can be addressed through second 
screens. Using speculative designs their ideas were mediated to politics and 
media experts who were able to identify how these design opportunities may 
affect the discourse. 
This varied methodological approach allowed me to explore the real-life 
context of debate viewing, explore unrealised possibilities for the development 
of new tools, and gather insights from a variety of stakeholders. It revealed 
insights into both active behaviours, such as posting on social media, and more 
passive behaviours, such as reading the posts of others. These findings make 
two major contributions to the study of second screens. The first is an 
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understanding of the behaviours and motivations of debate viewers, and the 
second is an exploration of design directions for future second screen tools.  
Meanwhile, developments in the political landscape over the past four years 
have revealed how online tools are used in malicious ways for political 
purposes, which further highlighted the importance of understanding debate 
viewer’s use of technology. Numerous stakeholders attempt to influence public 
opinion either through advertisements or through their online presence. 
Trolls, bots, data leaks, and data mining practices highlight how vulnerable 
we are to being unknowingly exploited. In 2016 bot and troll accounts were 
said to spread divisive messages through Twitter and to have purchased 
political advertisements aimed at the US electorate (Savage and Rosenberg, 
2018). This activity led to multiple House intelligence investigations, which 
aimed to reveal how this troll and bot activity affected the election. Since then, 
a Republican House investigation into accusations against Russia found that 
there was interference involved, but their report raised doubts about whom 
this activity benefited (Savage and Rosenberg, 2018).  
In addition to bot and troll activity, since the completion of the final study 
presented in this thesis the Cambridge Analytica scandal revealed that data 
for around 87 million Facebook users was gathered through the use of a 
personality quiz (Halpern, 2018). This data mining tactic was developed with 
the intention of gathering data not just from the users that consented to it but 
also the public profiles of all of their friends who had not (Halpern, 2018). This 
data was then used by Cambridge Analytica as a campaign information tool, 
data from which influenced campaign tactics in both the US Presidential 
Election and in the UK’s EU Referendum (Halpern, 2018). The story brought 
to light how little users understand the terms and conditions they sign up for 
when using social media platforms, and how easy it is to exploit the data that 
they provide online. The scandal led to the Congress hearing of Mark 
Zuckerberg, the creator and CEO of Facebook, where he gave testimony 
about the company’s involvement and role within the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal. The hearing led to the consideration of government regulation on 
technology and social media platforms (Sorkin, 2018). We are yet to 
195 
 
 
understand how targeted advertisements and provocations by troll and bot 
accounts affected the voting decisions in the recent elections and referendums. 
These events have raised serious concerns about how digital tools are used to 
influence the opinions of the electorate. Furthermore, they highlight the 
importance of investigating how and why debate viewers use digital tools 
during the broadcast.  
While these events will impact the future of online political discourse it is vital 
to highlight that technology has wide-reaching benefits for the electorate, such 
as enabling the development of grassroots political activism (Dommett and 
Temple, 2018, Gibson, 2013, Lotan et al., 2011). Televised political debates 
provide an invaluable opportunity to both inform and engage the public. 
Millions of viewers watch the debates every election and referendum in the 
United Kingdom (BBC News, 2015b, Shepherd, 2017). As a large portion of 
the country takes the opportunity to become more informed about the current 
political campaign, they can also engage with each other, deliberate, and be 
heard. For those that choose to use their personal devices during political 
debates, digital tools can help them share their opinions (Anstead and 
O’Loughlin, 2011, Trilling, 2014), aid their learning (Jennings et al., 2017, 
Nee and Dozier, 2017), and increase engagement by making the debates more 
enjoyable (Thorson et al., 2015). This research was based in the belief that 
second screen tools can further empower citizens while they watch political 
debates.  
In this section, I return to my research questions and recount the studies I 
conducted in order to address them. I further identify some of the key 
challenges and opportunities for future work within second screens for political 
discourse. Finally, I finish this conclusion with closing remarks. 
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8.1. Research Questions 
How and why are second screens used currently by the public 
during political debates? 
In order to investigate how and why second screens are currently used by the 
public, I conducted two studies around the UK General Election of 2015. The 
election held four separate televised debates. Thematic analysis of tweets 
during one of these debates revealed that the public uses Twitter in order to 
commentate along by sharing evaluations, experiences, post humorous and 
provocative tweets and interact with and inform others. The study makes a 
minor contribution to our understanding of Twitter activity surrounding 
political debates. It provides a look into the visible online content posted by a 
fraction of debate viewers.  
In order to gain a more nuanced and in-depth view of how second screens are 
used during political debates I conducted at-home observations of 18 
participants, who recorded themselves watching a debate of their choosing 
with a small wearable camera. This study makes a significant contribution to 
our understanding of the motivations and behaviours that frame political 
second screen use. The study gathers insights into the range of second screen 
activity beyond the use of Twitter and captures both the fulfilled and 
unfulfilled needs of the viewers. We see that second screens were used by 
viewers in order to gauge the opinions of others, enrich the experience of 
watching the debate and share their own opinions. The participants describe 
barriers to online participation, such as fear of engaging with provocative 
topics and reaching an unwanted audience, such as family members with 
different political views. The study also revealed how second screens can be 
used as a focus point for conversations within the living-room. An unexpected 
finding of the study was that the debate took on a secondary role when the 
personal device presented the participants with more engaging content.  
The studies into current second screen practices led me to challenge the pre-
determined notions of the phrase second screens and explore if connected 
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devices can offer an alternative to screen based interactions. It also allowed me 
to look for design opportunities that place greater importance and value on 
the social interactions around debates, leveraging the communication over the 
passive consumption of debates.  
Can emerging technologies offer new opportunities for 
engagement in political discourse around televised debates? 
In order to investigate how emerging technologies can be used to engage the 
public in political discourse I conducted the Social Printers study. I deployed 
a series of internet-connected printers into five Scottish homes for two separate 
month-long studies during the Scottish Election and the EU Referendum. The 
printers were used by the participants during televised political debates in 
order to pseudonymously talk with each other. The study revealed how a social 
object in the home is used by the house-members, what relationships emerge 
between households, and how it is used for debate related conversations. The 
printers were successful in allowing the households to communicate with each 
other and the study indicates that in small groups self-moderation may 
contribute to polite conversation despite the veil of pseudonymity. The 
situated nature of the object, the way it enabled discourse, and the long 
duration of the study contributed to the emergence of a sense of community 
between the households. The study explored an alternative to traditional 
screen-based interactions and revealed how the constraints of a social network 
impact what benefits and issues occur. 
The Social Printers study revealed the potential of new technology to be used 
within a second screen context. It also revealed that certain issues can be 
diminished by altering the functions and constraints of the social network, such 
as limiting abusive behaviour by limiting the communication group size. This 
led me to question how second screen tools can be designed in order to address 
the greater challenges with political discourse online.  
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What opportunities for second screens to address issues with 
political discourse can be identified through design-led research 
combining viewer and expert perspectives?  
In order to investigate new design opportunities for second screens I designed 
a study, which gathered insights from both debate viewers and political and 
media experts. Debate viewers were recruited in four two-hour long 
workshops alongside a televised debate, in which we discussed issues with 
political discourse and how second screens can address them. The participants 
were able to identify six issues, including the need for more fact-based content, 
easier tools for content production, uncivil interactions, filter bubbles, issues 
around identity and anonymity and the lack of regulation and moderation 
power for the users. They were then able to identify potential opportunities 
for design to address them, such as controlling the political ideology diversity 
of online discussion spaces, asking users to provide links to sources, creating 
tools for live feedback, and giving content moderation powers to the end user. 
These issues and opportunities make a minor contribution to our 
understanding of the public’s perspective on online political discourse and 
largely overlap with existing research.  
These findings were then encapsulated in a series of four speculative designs, 
which were used in interviews with political and media experts. Until this point 
I relied on the experiences of debate viewers in order to understand second 
screen activity, but investigating possible future solutions required the 
involvement of individuals with political and media experience who could use 
their professional experiences to speculate on the implications of identified 
design opportunities. The experts were able to identify issues with the 
opportunities presented in the four designs, such as tensions around breaking 
people from their existing filter bubbles and the problematic nature of 
assessing the credibility of sources. The final study presented in this thesis 
identified both design opportunities for second screen tools and provided 
predictions about their impact on the debate viewer.  
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8.2. Future Work  
Looking forward, the speculative designs can be altered in order to address the 
feedback provided by the experts. The Viewer’s Debate can eliminate up and 
down voting of content. The Political Date App can be more specific about 
the user’s interests and sensitive to the way it displays similarities and 
differences between people. The Live Feedback tool can express party 
preference rather than sentiment and agreement. Finally, the Identity Equality 
Tool can be made to encourage more politically diverse discussion groups. 
These tools should be prototyped and tested in order to assess their impact on 
debate viewers and examine whether they do have potential to mitigate the 
negative issues identified with political discourse, such as the lack of perceived 
factual information, the formation of filter bubbles, and uncivil interactions. 
In the same way that I was able to observe how the use of playful language 
and limited group size fostered a sense of community between the Social 
Printer’s households, by deploying prototypes in the wild, we would be able to 
identify if they engage the viewers in a meaningful, productive and enjoyable 
way. These studies would be required to evaluate to what extent the design 
directions that have been identified within this thesis manage to enhance the 
experience of using second screens alongside debates.  
Although HCI research can further explore how to facilitate political discourse 
using social digital tools, a major challenge looking forward would be to 
involve the politicians, broadcasters and social media platforms in this 
research process. Televised debates can inform the public of manifestoes, 
prominent issues and political arguments, meanwhile giving them the 
opportunity to discuss and deliberate. Much of the visible public engagement 
is facilitated through the use of second screens. Currently broadcasters 
promote the use of a dedicated hashtag, which is used by viewers on Twitter, 
but there are issues and barriers to participation around the currently utilised 
second screen tools. While exploring the benefits of technology, we have to be 
mindful of the ways it can influence and manipulate the public. 
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The events that occurred during this PhD have also highlighted the 
importance of security. While the aim remained to explore how second screen 
tools can support debate viewers to engage with politics, the importance of 
data security has significantly increased. At the start of this research in 2014 
the main issues around second screen use during political debates involved 
breaking people away from their pre-existing echo chambers and protecting 
them from abusive behaviour. Today we have to consider an even more 
worrying possibility, that by encouraging debate viewers to share their political 
ideology and opinions online we may be making them vulnerable to being 
manipulated by private companies and international political actors. In order 
to address this we need to explore how to support debate viewers in learning 
and engaging around debates. This could be achieved by finding ways to 
validate content and expose viewers to a wide range of information.  
Looking forward governments should aim to regulate search tools and social 
media platforms in order to protect their citizens. This can be done by 
continuously updating and protecting people’s rights to digital privacy, 
security, and limiting the reach of political advertisements. Technology 
companies like Facebook, Google, and Twitter can also explore ways to help 
their users discuss and deliberate in safe and supportive environments. Finally, 
broadcasters can also create second screen tools for their debate viewers. They 
have the advantage of being able to communicate with the politicians ahead 
of the debates, in order to collaborate on the content and information they 
provide. Furthermore, they can create complementary experiences for their 
viewers that are tailored to the format, topics, and events of the debate. All of 
these stakeholders are part of the discussions that arise around televised 
debates. They can take on a more pro-active role by designing discussion and 
deliberation tools or implementing legislation to protect citizens when they 
share their views online. 
8.3. Closing Remarks 
Multiple elections and referendums framed this research. The aftermath of 
each political campaign revealed the importance of technology for the public 
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as a means to learn, reflect, share their opinions, and deliberate. However 
technology has also been seen to negatively influence the electorate by 
exposing them to fake news, trolling, and abusive behaviour, mining their data 
for political purposes, and limiting the scope of opinions they are exposed to.  
Campaigns are accompanied by televised political debates, where the public 
could join in on the debate discussions through an array of online tools. They 
provide a key opportunity to engage viewers from across a multitude of 
political ideologies in a dialogue with each other. Viewers currently utilise pre-
existing tools in order to find information and communicate with each other, 
and while these tools support a lot of the needs of debate viewers, they are 
subject to issues that can hinder-self-expression and engagement. 
This research was motivated by the belief that second screens can present an 
opportunity for the public to feel more politically engaged and informed. 
Throughout the four studies I presented within this thesis, I explored both 
current behaviours and opportunities for the development of new second 
screen tools. My work revealed that the public used their personal devices to 
gauge the opinions of others, share their own, and to enrich the viewing of the 
broadcast. The second screens were at times central to the experience of 
watching the debates. The way they were used illustrated how the debate 
could act as a metronome for online activity, guiding the participants through 
different topics and activities on their personal devices. These findings allowed 
me to challenge the underlying assumptions embodied within the phrase 
second screens and explore the possibilities for connected devices within this 
context.  
The Social Printers successfully enabled political talk and the establishment of 
relationships between households. A sense of community and friendly political 
talk emerged in a small pseudonymous network of participants. The qualities 
of the printers, their physicality, interactions and situational purpose framed 
the experiences of the participants. Some behaviours were similar to those of 
conventional second screen use, while others were surprising and novel. 
Primarily the study revealed how by changing the communication constraints 
and functions of digital tools we can affect the experiences of viewers.  
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The Social Printers study led me to investigate new design directions for 
second screen tools through workshops and interviews with both debate 
viewers and media and politics experts. By combining research with a variety 
of stakeholders I was able to identify six key issues with online political 
discourse. The experts and debate viewers identified that these issues can be 
mitigated within second screen tools through a series of strategies, including 
constructing safe and diverse social media platforms, regulating online 
services, and finding alternatives to the current fast-paced online experiences. 
An opportunity remains to explore these design directions and evaluate their 
impact on debate viewers. As a result of these four studies this thesis 
contributes an understanding of current second screen behaviours and 
explores future design directions for second screen tools that support debate 
viewers in their political engagement.  
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10. Appendix 
 
 
 
A. Databases 
 
A.1  Tweets used in the thematic analysis presented in section 4.3 
Taylor, N. and Gorkovenko, K. (2015). Tweets from #leadersdebate (2015 UK General 
Election TV Debates). https://doi.org/10.15132/e0f2d122- f40f-449d-93b1-e58300ab1f3f 
 
A.2  Data used in the thematic analysis presented in Chapter 5 
Katerina Gorkovenko and Nick Taylor. 2016. Social Printers study data (2016 Scottish 
Election and EU Referendum debates). http://doi.org/10.15132/10000122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Study Materials for Current Second Screen Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. 1 Information Sheet 
 
B. 2 Consent Form 
 
Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art & Design, University of Dundee
Participant Informed Consent Form
Full title of experimental programme/ project: 
Second screens for engagement with political discourse
 I have read the information relating to the above project/ programme of research in 
which I have been asked to participate and have been given a copy to keep.  The 
nature and purposes of the research have been explained to me, and I have had the 
opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions about this information.  I under-
stand what is being proposed and the procedures in which I will be involved have 
been explained to me.
 I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular information/data from 
this research, will remain strictly confidential.  All the information that I provide for 
your study will be stored safely and kept separate from information about my identity. 
Only the student and supervisor involved in the study will have access to the informa-
tion/ data.  If information about me is used for publications or presentation, you will 
ensure that there is no reference to my identity. Alternatively, you will seek my permis-
sion for my name to be included and I will be able to approve this information prior to 
publishing. If a photograph or video clip is used for presentation, my name will be 
changed. 
 With
reference
to
the
use
of
photographic
or
video
data
for
presentations,
please

tick
one
of
the
following
boxes:
 
  I agree to the audio recording of the interview I partake in which would be used  
  anonymously.  
  YES    NO
  I agree to the video recordings of the UK General Election Debates observations  
  which will be seen only by the research team. 
  YES    NO  
  I agree to have photos taken of me which feature my face which would be used  
  anonymously for the purpose of documentation and which will not be published  
  publicly.  
  YES    NO
 It has been explained to me what will happen to the data once the project has been 
completed.
I hereby consent to participation in the study which has been fully explained to me.
Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the pro-
gramme at any time without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give 
any reason.
By signing below I am agreeing that I have read and understood the Participant Infor-
mation Sheet and that I agree to take part in this research study. 

A
copy
of
this
signed
form
must
be
submitted
to
the
DJCAD
Postgraduate
Office.
Gogglebox
for research
UK General
Election Debate
B. 3 Questionnaire 
 
 
B. 4 Instructions Booklet 
 
 
 
 
B.5 Post-interview questions 
1. What did you use your personal device for during the debate. Ask about social media, information retrieval, 
unrelatedusage, messaging? 
2. If they used it for information:  
2.1. What information did you look up? 
2.2. Which sources did you trust and which did you overlook? 
3. If they used their device for unrelated usage:  
3.1. What did you use your device for? Why? 
4. If they used their device for social media- 
4.1. Which social media platform did you use?  
4.2. How did you use it?  
4.3. Why did you use it?  
4.4. What do you like about it?  
4.5. Did the use of social media distract you from the debate? 
5. If they used Twitter during the debate- 
5.1. What value do you see in the tweets under the debate hashtag? 
5.2. What value does the ability to address politicians and journalists using an @ sign have for you? 
6. Do you prefer actively participating on social media by contributing or reading the stream of information?  
6.1 If they like reading the information. 
6.1.1. What were you most interested in reading and by whom?  
6.1.2. Do you value famous or influential people’s opinions more than that of random users?  
6.1.3. What hashtags do you follow during a debate? 
6.1.4. What content attracted your attention most?  
6.1.5. Was it funny, informative, provocative, conversational, or content that gave an opinion about how the politicians 
were performing?  
6.1.6. Does the typical tweet/comment you like contain an image or a link? 
6.1.7. Did you contribute any content and if not why?  
6.2. If they like taking part by posting content or commenting/chatting. 
6.2.1. What triggered you to contribute? 
6.2.2. Is there any value to talking with others about politics online?  
6.2.3. What is the value for you?  
6.2.4. What do you think others gain from it?  
6.2.5.  Did it influence your opinion on the leaders, or the policies?  
6.2.6. Can you give an example? 
6.2.7. How do the limitation of your preferred social media platform affect the way you express yourself, for example 
that Twitter lets you write only 140 characters? 
6.2.8. Did you encounter any problems when you used social media to talk about a debate? 
7.  What do you like about political discourse on social media?  
8.  What don’t you like about it? 
9.  Is there anything that bothers you about the way others use social media during political debates? 
10. What is the effect do radical and biased statements on social media have on you? 
11. Did social media have any influence on your political opinion? 
12. What do you think politicians gain from people discussing the debates online? 
13. What is your favourite part about watching the debate with a friend or family that would lack if you were alone? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Study Materials for Beyond the Second Screen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.1 Information Sheet 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHTEET 
 
Dear participant,  
 
You are asked to take part in a research project, as part of a PhD called 'Second 
Screens for Engagement with Political Discourse'. The aim of the research is to 
explore new ways of engaging the public with political broadcasts.  
 
The research will be conducted by Katerina Gorkovenko, a PhD student at the 
University of Dundee with Dr Nick Taylor as supervisor.  This study will require 
you to take on an object designed to accompany a political broadcast and use it 
in your home for the duration of a month, following you will be interviewed 
about the experience. Each week you will be asked to watch two political 
programmes chosen by you and me. You will be asked to read and reflect upon 
the content printed from the printer relating to the programme you are 
watching. The interviews that follow will be recorded using an audio recorder 
and will take place in a public location of your convenience and choosing. They 
will be semi-structured and last 30 minutes. Your participation in this study is 
voluntary. You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any 
time without explanation and without penalty.  There are no known risks for 
you in this study.  
 
For your participation you will receive a £10 Amazon voucher. 
 
The information you provide will not be linked to your name and will be used 
only for academic research purposes. The anonymous interview transcripts 
archived at the university's public repository in order to make them available to 
other researchers. The results will be published as part of academic papers, in 
addition to a PhD thesis.  Katerina Gorkovenko will be glad to answer your 
questions about this study at any time and would also be able to provide you 
with the final results from it. You may contact her at 
k.gorkovenko@dundee.ac.uk 
 
The University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Dundee has 
reviewed and approved this research study.   
 
Thank you, Katerina Gorkovenko 
 
                                                      
C.2 Consent Form 
 
 
 
!
!
CONSENT!FORM!
!
!
'Second! Screens! for! Engagement! with! Political! Discourse'! is! a! PhD! project,! which!
explores! how! social! media! is! used! for! political! discourse! during! political! broadcasts.!
This! study! is! designed! to! explore! existing! behaviours! during! political! programmes.! It!
will!investigate!how!people!are!utilising!personal!devices!and!social!media.!The!ultimate!
aim!of!the!research!is!to!explore!new!ways!of!engaging!the!wider!public!with!political!
debates.!
!
!
By!signing!below!you!are!indicating!that!you!have!read!and!understood!the!Participant!
Information!Sheet!and!that!you!agree!to!take!part!in!this!research!study!and!have!your!
voice!recorded!during!an!interview.!!
!
!
Researcher!Name:!Katerina!Gorkovenko!
!
!
Researcher!Signature:!!
!
!
Your!Name:!!
!
!
Your!Signature:!
!
!
I!agree!to!have!my!voice!recorded!during!the!interviews!at!the!end:!!
!
I!agree!to!have!the!anonymised!transcripts!stored!in!the!university!repository:!
!
!
Date:!
 
 
   
 
 
                                                            
       
 
C.3 Instructions Booklet 
 
 
C.4 Post-interview questions 
1. What was the experience like for you? 
2. What aspects did you find engaging? 
3. What aspects did you find lacking in engagement? 
4. What was it like to have the object in your home? 
5. In what ways did it affect the experience of watching the program?  
6. Were you able to concentrate on what the people on TV were saying? 
7. Did it make the experience of watching the program interesting or enjoyable? 
8. Would you have normally watched these programs and how? 
9. Were you able to pay attention to both the TV program and the printer? If not which one did you prioritise? 
10. Which programs did you feel the printer added most value to? How?  
11. In the aftermath of the debates did you discuss then or the prints with others (for example at work) and did others 
agree or disagree with the observations you had? 
12. Did you read material about the vent in the aftermath of the debates and did it confirm what was printed though 
out the event? 
13. Did it start conversations in the living room? 
14. What was the involvement of the other people in the house with the object though out the programs and outside of 
program times? 
15. What was it like speaking to others? 
16. How willing were you to share your thoughts with other using the printer? 
17. Were you open and truthful when you sent prints? 
18. Did you feel the need to moderate yourself? 
19. Has anything that has come out of the printer made you consider a point you have not before? 
20. What did you vote in the election and have the programmes you watched and the printer influenced you in any 
way? 
21. Have your political views changed? 
22. How did you find the logging process? 
23. How did you find the process of sending the messages? 
24. Did you feel connected to the others who had the printers? 
25. What do you think about the others in the network? What did you mange to learn about them? 
26. How do you feel about the role of anonymity in the study? 
27. Did you get into arguments with others in the network? 
28. If no why not? Do you think that if may have benefited your understanding of the other people’s points of view? 
29. Do you feel like you wanted to like the other participants? 
30. What do you feel about my involvement in it? 
31. What did you think about the prompts?  
32. Show me the prints that interested you most. 
33. Do you see any benefits for a system like this? What were its flaws? 
34. What did you do with the prints for the programmes you did not see live? Did you rematch any of the 
programmes? 
35. Why did you take part during certain programmes rather than others? 
36. For continuing participants? - What worked and didn’t work this time around?  
37. What do you think contributed to the amount of conversation taking place in the second study vs the first? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D. Study Materials for Perspectives on the future of Second Screens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.1 Information Sheet Workshop 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHTEET 
 
 
Dear participant,  
 
You are being asked to take part in a research project, which is part of a PhD 
called 'Second Screens for Engagement with Political Discourse'. The aim of the 
research is to explore new ways of engaging the public with political broadcasts.  
 
WHAT TO EXPECT 
The research will be conducted by Katerina Gorkovenko, a PhD student at the 
University of Dundee with Dr Nick Taylor as a supervisor. The research is 
funded by Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). This 
study will require you to take part in a co-design workshop, where you will 
share your experiences of how you use technology during political debates and 
brainstorm how technology could be used differently. Refreshments will be 
provided during the workshop.  
 
TIME COMMITMENT  
The workshop will be 2 hours long. 
 
COST, REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary and there is no reimbursement or 
compensation for taking part. 
 
RISKS 
There are no known risks for you in this study. 
 
TERMINATION OF PARTICIPATION 
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without 
explanation and without penalty. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
The information you provide will not be linked to your name and will be used 
only for academic research purposes. Data collected will include – voice 
recordings, video recordings, a questionnaire, and all written material you 
generate during the co-design workshop. This data will be stored in a secure 
location in the University of Dundee until it is transcribed and anonymised. The 
data will then be archived and made publically available at the university's public 
repository. The results will be published as part of academic papers, in addition 
to a PhD thesis.   
 
 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
Katerina Gorkovenko will be glad to answer your questions about this study at 
any time and would also be able to provide you with the final results from it. 
You may contact her at k.gorkovenko@dundee.ac.uk 
 
The University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Dundee has 
reviewed and approved this research study.  By taking part you are indicating 
that you have read and understood the Participant Information. 
 
Thank you.  
 
Yours, Katerina Gorkovenko 
University of Dundee 
k.gorkovenko@dundee.ac.uk 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
 
D.2 Information Sheet Feedback 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHTEET 
 
 
Dear participant,  
 
You are being asked to take part in a research project, which is part of a PhD 
called 'Second Screens for Engagement with Political Discourse'. The aim of the 
research is to explore new ways of engaging the public with political broadcasts.  
 
WHAT TO EXPECT 
The research will be conducted by Katerina Gorkovenko, a PhD student at the 
University of Dundee with Dr Nick Taylor as a supervisor. The research is 
funded by Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). This 
study will require you to take part in a feedback session, where you will share 
your opinions about a series of design probes, generated as a result of 
workshop, which explore the future of digital tools for live televised debates.   
 
TIME COMMITMENT  
The feedback will be up to an hour long. 
 
COST, REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary and there is no reimbursement or 
compensation for taking part. 
 
RISKS 
There are no known risks for you in this study. 
 
TERMINATION OF PARTICIPATION 
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without 
explanation and without penalty. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
The information you provide will not be linked to your name and will be used 
only for academic research purposes. Data collected will include a voice 
recording. This data will be stored in a secure location in the University of 
Dundee until it is transcribed and anonymised. The data will then be archived 
and made publically available at the university's public repository. The results 
will be published as part of academic papers, in addition to a PhD thesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
Katerina Gorkovenko will be glad to answer your questions about this study at 
any time and would also be able to provide you with the final results from it. 
You may contact her at k.gorkovenko@dundee.ac.uk 
 
The University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Dundee has 
reviewed and approved this research study.  By taking part you are indicating 
that you have read and understood the Participant Information. 
 
Thank you.  
 
Yours, Katerina Gorkovenko 
University of Dundee 
k.gorkovenko@dundee.ac.uk 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
 
D.3 Consent Form Workshop 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Please tick the appropriate boxes. 
 
 
I have read and understood the project information sheet provided.  
 
    
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.  
 
  
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at 
any time and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take 
part.  
 
  
I agree to audio recordings of me being recorded at the co-design workshop.  
 
  
I agree to photographs and video footage of me being recorded at the co-design 
workshop.  
  
I understand that an anonymised version of the audio transcripts and written 
material I generate will be made publically available on the university's public 
repository. 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________   _________________  ______________ 
Name of Participant    Signature   Date 
 
 
_____________________________   _________________  ______________ 
Name of Researcher    Signature   Date 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
D.4 Consent Form Feedback 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Please tick the appropriate boxes. 
 
 
I have read and understood the project information sheet provided.  
 
    
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.  
 
  
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at 
any time and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take 
part.  
 
  
I agree to audio recordings of me being recorded at the feedback session.  
 
  
I understand that an anonymised version of the audio transcripts and written 
material I generate will be made publically available on the university's public 
repository. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
_____________________________   _________________  ______________ 
Name of Participant    Signature   Date 
 
 
_____________________________   _________________  ______________ 
Name of Researcher    Signature   Date 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
D.5 Questionnaire Workshop 
 
University of Dundee 
Ques%onnaire 
Name 
Age 
Educa,on level 
Current occupa,on 
Na,onality 
City of residence 
Interest in poli,cs:  
a. Low 
b. Medium 
c. High 
Op%onal Ques%ons - What did you vote in these poli,cal events? 
General Elec,on 2015 
EU Referendum
                                                                                                                 
        
D.6 Panels 
 
 
 
 
 
D.7 Speculative Designs for Expert Feedback 
 
 
 
 
